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PREFACE
This is the 38th edition of How Ottawa Spends. We thank the School of Public 
Policy and Administration and our colleagues whose support has enabled an 
annual publication record that is unbroken since its first edition in 1980. This 
edition inaugurates a new format for How Ottawa Spends. To enhance its 
readability and appeal to a broad audience, most of the volume is composed of 
thought-provoking Policy Briefs designed to explore the options facing the 
federal government in a particular policy domain. We will continue to include 
longer Policy Research Papers similar in format and style to the chapters 
in previous editions. Two such studies are included in this edition.
We wish to thank Brittany Wiwat and Ashley McKee, who provided, excellent 
research, logistical, and editorial assistance for this volume and Mary Giles for 
her continuing expertise in managing the publication process. For final for-
matting and electronic publication services we wish to thank Creative Services 
in Carleton’s Department of Communications, and in particular acknowledge 
the work of Chris Strangemore.
Katherine A. H. Graham and Allan M. Maslove 
Ottawa 
September 2017
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Chapter 1 
CANADA AT 150: CONSISTENCY 
AND CHANGE
Katherine A. H. Graham and Allan M. Maslove
INTRODUCTION
This 38th edition of How Ottawa Spends coincides with the 150th anniversary of Confederation. It is particularly appropriate, then, to look back at Canada’s development and to look forward to the main 
issues that confront the country. As will be seen, the consistency of issues that 
have confronted the federal government over the years is quite remarkable. It 
is the specifics, in terms of items at the top of the policy agenda and the policy 
actors involved who may have changed over time. In this introductory chapter 
we combine that overview with an examination of the Trudeau government 
policies that relate to these issues, a brief assessment of the government’s 
2017 Budget (Budget 2017) and a summary of each of the contributions to this 
volume.
This edition incorporates a new format for How Ottawa Spends, also befitting 
this time of reflection on the themes of stability and change. The volume now 
has two types of contributions. Most of the chapters are in a new format that 
we are calling “policy briefs.” They are relatively short pieces designed to test 
ideas and be deliberately provocative. They often contain proposals for new 
policy directions. We continue, however, to value more fully formed “policy 
studies,” evidence-based contributions that readers of previous editions 
will be familiar with. As this year’s chapters on the state of federal policy on 
energy/environment and pharmacare suggest, policy studies will provide more 
in-depth analysis of some of the key contemporary issues on the federal policy 
agenda and on the public’s mind.
THE BIG PICTURE
The big picture economic and social challenges facing Canada@150 for the 
most part are not new. These same issues could have been identified in a 
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chapter about Canada@100 or Canada@50, albeit in somewhat different forms 
and emphases.
On the economic side, Canada has from its earliest days been dominated by 
three inter-related characteristics: a resource-based economy, regional dif-
ferentiation, and external trade dependence. The enduring political questions 
throughout our history have involved the role of government in economic 
development and growth, and how to align political responsibility to effectively 
address the economic policy questions.
Canada’s economic wellbeing has always been driven by resources, whether 
furs and forests or petroleum and natural gas. Notwithstanding the efforts of 
Canadian governments to foster non-resource dependent sectors, including 
the current government’s strategy to foster innovation and skills development 
(see below), the importance of natural resources to our economic prospects 
remains. What is different from our earlier history is the relative shift in 
reliance from renewable to non-renewable resources, and the need to balance 
resource exploitation with conservation and environmental concerns.
Because natural resources are not distributed uniformly in geographic terms, 
the various economic regions of Canada have often developed at different 
rates and in different ways so that policies beneficial to one region have often 
been harmful to another. As examples, we need only recall policy debates over 
the years about exchange rates, industrial policy, and the fiscal equalization 
program (see the Policy Briefs by Erich Hartmann and by Andrew Seto and 
Chris Stoney in this volume). Obviously numerous other debates could be cited 
as well.
Moving into the future, as we confront several of the major challenges before 
us, regional disparities and regionally diverse policy preferences are likely to 
be at the forefront. Perhaps the most obvious arena will be addressing climate 
change and the impacts on carbon-based energy exploitation, and the distri-
bution of adjustment costs (see the Policy Research Paper by Glen Toner, et. 
al. in this volume). Another set of potential challenges will revolve around the 
renewal of NAFTA (see Boliari).
The third related enduring question is about effectively aligning governance 
to address and manage these economic challenges. This has been another 
constant issue throughout the history of Canada that will continue into future 
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years. Among the domains where we are likely to see this theme play out are 
federal-provincial resource revenue sharing (a major issue in fiscal equaliza-
tion: see Hartmann), health care  (see Gagnon and McAllister), post-secondary 
education (Tupper/Harmsen), infrastructure investment, and interprovincial 
trade.
Social issues (broadly defined) have also been remarkably consistent over 
time. Once again, the specifics have changed but we are perennially concerned 
as a country with the role of the state in ensuring well-being in the broad fields 
of social welfare and health and with promoting respect and harmony among 
a diverse population. Regardless of the terms of confederation, the federal gov-
ernment is a major actor in these elements of Canadian life. In some periods, 
perhaps most notably during the Harper years, Ottawa’s influence was shaped 
by the federal government’s unwillingness to engage with provinces, territories 
and civil society organizations. The Trudeau government’s level of engagement 
has been in sharp contrast but in looking at how Ottawa spends (and decides) 
we must remember that engagement is distinct from policy action.
Perhaps the most interesting and important examples of the current govern-
ment’s approach to federal policy making come in the field of healthcare. The 
image that comes to mind in some important cases is of a federal government 
moving quickly down the playing field and forcing the provinces and territo-
ries to keep up, or at least follow behind. Two key examples over the past year 
that continue to evolve are the negotiation of health financing arrangements 
and the legalization of marijuana.
The negotiation of federal/provincial/territorial health financing arrangements 
began with all of the trappings of executive federalism that characterized the 
Canadian state from the time of Pearson to the Martin government – a classic 
meeting of ministers of health, ostensibly for the purpose of making a national 
deal. This came to nothing in the context of other provincial and territorial 
policy agendas and their expressed wish to have Premiers deal comprehen-
sively with the Prime Minister on a range of intergovernmental issues, includ-
ing health. The expressed desire of the federal government to place emphasis 
for health spending on mental health, long-term care and public health more 
broadly, rather than traditional treatment was also an issue for provinces and 
territories. The federal response was to pick the provinces and territories off, 
one by one. Every jurisdiction has signed on to a bi-lateral health deal.
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In the case of marijuana legalization, the Trudeau Government has moved 
determinedly forward on fulfilling its 2015 election promise. Here, Ministers 
of Health have shared policy space with Ministers responsible for public 
safety and law enforcement. But even with federal-provincial/territorial con-
sultations the federal government has moved decisively forward, setting the 
deadline for legalization in summer 2018 and leaving it up to the provinces 
and territories to follow behind, figuring out distribution and age restrictions 
on purchase.
One important area where the federal government (and provincial/territorial 
governments, as well) has been much more tentative is the issue of phar-
macare. Rising drug costs and issues of access to drugs have gained increas-
ing public attention in recent times. Marc-Andre Gagnon’s policy study on 
financing options for pharmacare demonstrates that the experience of other 
OECD countries that have national drug plans to compliment their national 
health systems shows no clear path forward for Canada. This is likely a major 
factor in the more muted intergovernmental discussions on the introduction of 
pharmacare.
Statistics Canada began to release increasingly fulsome data from the 2016 
Census over this past year. Interestingly, Canadians were very engaged par-
ticipants in this Census with the re-introduction of the long form survey, 
following the Harper government’s controversial termination of the long form 
Census on libertarian grounds. So far, the 2016 Census has indicated some 
important demographic trends that will both reveal and shape responses to 
public policy issues in the social and health domains. One of the most signifi-
cant is that the aging population is close to surpassing the population of young 
people (Ottawa Citizen, Feb 2, 2017).
This has implications for the health issues discussed above. The nation’s 
changing demographic profile also has significant implications for the social 
and economic relationship between the younger and older populations. Specif-
ically, Canada’s “dependency ratio,” the relationship of the working age popu-
lation available to support those who are not of working age, is changing. This 
reality may well be a factor in one of the government’s signature Budget 2017 
initiatives – that related to childcare.
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The meandering path of federal childcare policy has been well documented 
in How Ottawa Spends over the years. (See for example Phillips 1989, Collier 
and Mahon 2008) The Harper years were characterized by an approach to 
childcare that focused on direct parental support through various forms of tax 
credits and the potential for income splitting rather than supporting direct 
creation of childcare spaces.  Budget 2017 made a significant step in asserting 
a direct federal role in childcare with a $7 billion commitment to create child-
care spaces. The Budget aspires to create 40,000 subsidized childcare spaces 
over three years. In terms of retail politics, this resonates with the Budget’s 
theme “Building a Strong Middle Class.” The dose of reality involved is that 
barriers to labour force participation by young people need to be reduced to 
help sustain our public finance system.
Demographic realties and the labour market may well emerge even more 
prominently on the federal agenda. The policy brief by Moscovitch and 
Lochead argues that government thinking has to move beyond the current 
focus on updating the financing of different components of Canadian pension 
policy to make them financially sustainable. They advocate a wholesale rede-
sign of pension policy to take into account demographics, the rise in precarious 
work, the decline in workplace pensions, and the need for transparency in 
pension governance.
A consistent theme in the rhetoric of the current government is promoting 
respect and harmony among a diverse population. Indeed, this has taken on 
a mantra-like quality for the Prime Minister. In this context the government’s 
focus over the past year has seemingly been on immigration and refugee issues 
and on gender.
Interestingly, Budget 2017 has little, if any direct focus on immigration and 
refugee spending. Under the theme of “Infrastructure: Building Stronger, More 
Caring Communities,” it speaks vaguely of new investments in “cultural insti-
tutions and recreation facilities” but that is about the extent of it. According to 
Immigration and Citizenship Canada, 40, 081 Syrian refugees had arrived in 
Canada by January 29, 2017. (www.cic.gc.ca) Slightly over half of these were 
government-assisted (as compared to privately sponsored). The consequence is 
that federal funding to support these refugees in their first year is beginning to 
run out depending on individuals’ and families’ time of arrival.
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The Citizenship and Immigration Canada Departmental Plan for 2017-18 
indicates that the government allocated $959,908,977 to the Syrian refugee 
initiative from start (March 2015) to end (March 2019). At time of publication, 
the government had underspent its planned funding to date (Planned to date: 
$429,866,303; spent $384,729,619). (www.cic.gc.ca) This, plus the relatively 
weak attention to immigration/refugee issues in Budget 2017 suggests a taper-
ing of federal commitment.
The Trudeau government continues to focus on gender equity. Despite two 
Cabinet shuffles over the past year, gender parity in Cabinet remains. By its 
own assertion, the Government included significant initiatives related to 
gender equality in its first budget (2016), including introduction of the Child 
Tax Benefit and support for the Missing and Murdered indigenous Women’s 
Inquiry. Budget 2017 was trumpeted as the first federal budget developed 
using gender-based analysis, “More than 60 Budget 2017 measures were iden-
tified as having differential gender impacts…”.  It committed to a new National 
Strategy to Address Gender-based Violence, allocating $110 million over five 
years. (Budget.gc.ca) The government has also focused its gender lens on its 
international development agenda – at least in terms of its rhetoric. (Brown 
and Swiss)
It is impossible to review persistent federal policy issues, developments over 
the past year, and the future of this government without considering Indige-
nous issues. A new relationship between Canada and First Nations, Métis, and 
Inuit peoples has been a cornerstone of the Prime Minister’s agenda since he 
signed the mandate letters for members of his first Ministry. The 2015 election 
followed release of the galvanizing report of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission with its 94 Calls to Action for governments, all other sectors of 
society and individuals. Ironically, in 2016 the Report of the Royal Commis-
sion on Aboriginal Peoples became an increasing resource of interest on the 
twentieth anniversary of its release as we consider what a Nation-to-Nation or 
Inuit-to-Crown relationship might look like. (Hear Our Voice)
Possibly no file has been as difficult for the federal government as this one. 
As it struggles to begin defining a new relationship with First Nations, Métis, 
and Inuit – a difficult intellectual and political exercise - the government has 
to constantly deal with crises and persistent issues that literally affect the 
lives of Indigenous people and their communities. Crisis responses, be they 
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to youth suicide, weather events, or other emergencies can be galvanizing but 
rarely seem to lead to longer-term solutions. As part of its daily agenda, the 
federal government also has to deal with problematic issues related to funding 
for education, youth employment (Delic), poor community infrastructure, and 
high incarceration rates among the Indigenous population, among others. First 
Nations, Métis, and Inuit people, as well as the broader public rightly demand 
federal attention to these crises and persistent issues.
Budget 2017 is laced with references to “Creating More Opportunities for 
Indigenous Peoples, Charting a Better Future for Rural and Northern Com-
munities and Improving Indigenous Communities” that speak to program 
funding. Under the Budget’s third theme, “A Strong Canada at Home and in 
the World,” an entire section is devoted to “Furthering Partnerships With 
Indigenous Peoples.” In financial terms, the budget allocates $3.4 billion over 
five years to Indigenous initiatives, building on the $8.4 billion commitment 
made in the 2016 Budget. (www.aadnc-aandc.ca) The challenge for the 
government will be to incorporate less restrictive conditions on this funding 
than has traditionally existed for Indigenous programs. These restrictions 
have historically made it difficult for some Indigenous governments and orga-
nizations to access funds and spend them in ways that reflect real needs rather 
than the requirement to meet federal deadlines and reporting requirements.
To advance its broader agenda, the government will have to engage with 
First Nations, Métis, and Inuit to build new institutions, not new programs. 
Creation of the First Nations Health Authority in British Columbia and the 
recently announced Health Accord for Northwestern Ontario involving the 
federal government, Ontario, and the Nishnawabe Aski Nation may be pos-
itive signs. In July 2017, the Prime Minister released ten principles to guide 
“a renewed nation to nation, government to government, and Inuit-Crown 
relationship based on recognition of rights, respect, cooperation, and part-
nership as the foundation for transformative change. “ (www.justice.gc.ca) 
The Prime Minister has established a Working Group of federal ministers to 
review laws, policies, and operational practices to ensure that Canada is adher-
ing to its domestic legal obligations, is supporting the TRC Calls to Action 
and meeting its international obligations, including adherence to the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). This is 
also a potentially positive development. But the challenge of working on fun-
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damental issues of a new relationship while simultaneously dealing with crises 
and closing the gap in living conditions and opportunities for Indigenous 
peoples remains a profound one for the federal government.
A potential breakthrough on the government’s Indigenous agenda occurred on 
August 28, 2017 when the Prime Minister announced that ministerial respon-
sibility for Indigenous affairs would be split. A new Department of Crown- 
Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs will be responsible for stewarding a 
new fundamental relationship, while a Department of Indigenous Services will 
assume responsibility for the government’s responsibilities under the Indian 
Act. This goes a long way to implementing one of the key recommendations of 
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal peoples, some 20 years ago. One unan-
swered question, at least in the public domain, is how the budgetary arrange-
ments and fiscal policy requirements of building a new relationship and living 
up to service obligations will be dealt with. The Royal Commission had recom-
mended that the Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs 
should hold the reins of the fiscal relationship for all Indigenous Affairs. As 
things move ahead, Indigenous budgetary and fiscal policy issues may call 
for a very active role for the Prime Minister himself. Regardless, this move is 
significant and will be closely monitored by proponents and critics.
It is important to understand the backdrop of these major economic and social 
preoccupations (and, in some cases, funding commitments) when looking at 
any federal government’s current budget, as the budget is the best indicator of 
where the government of the day actually intends to go with its policy agenda.
BUDGET 2017
The Trudeau government budget of March 2017, like the government’s first 
budget in 2016, is a plan from a government with an ambitious agenda. Among 
the many areas in which the government intends to move forward are spurring 
innovation and productivity, education and skills upgrading of the workforce, 
infrastructure investment, supporting and strengthening the middle class, and 
inclusive sharing of the benefits of economic growth.
Before discussing each of these initiatives, it is useful to review the context 
in which the 2017 (and also the 2016) budget were written. In macro terms 
overall the Canadian economy is doing well. The unemployment rate has come 
down to its lowest levels since the sharp recession that hit in 2008, there 
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are no significant inflationary pressures (despite the low exchange rate), and 
personal incomes are growing on average (in the first quarter of 2017, house-
hold disposable income was 3.7% higher than a year earlier. Statistics Canada 
– CANSIM tables).
Figure 1
Fiscal Projections Comparison Table for Budget 2016, 2016 Fall Economic 
Statement, and Budget 2017
2016 Budget 
Projection
November 2016 
Projection
2017 Budget 
Projection
Real GDP Growth (%)
2017 2.2 2.0 1.9
2018 2.2 1.8 2.0
2019 2.0 1.8 1.7
Oil Price ($US per 
barrel)
2017 52.0 54.0 54.0
2018 59.0 57.0 59.0
2019 63.0 59.0 56.0
Budget Deficit $B
 2016/17 29.4 25.1 23.0
 2017/18 29.0 27.8 28.5
2018/19 22.8 25.9 27.4
Debt to GDP Ratio (%)
2016/17 32.5 31.8 31.5
2017/18 32.4 31.8 31.6
2018/19 32.1 31.9 31.6
Revenue $B
2016/17 287.7 291.1 292.1
2017/18 302.0 303.3 304.7
2018/19 315.3 313.2 315.6
Program Expenditures 
$B
2016/17 291.4 291.3 290.9
2017/18 304.6 306.5 305.4
2018/19 308.7 313.2 313.7
However, by historical standards real economic growth is very slow and is pro-
jected to remain anemic over the next several years. In earlier times achieving 
real growth rates of 3% and more was quite common; now we struggle to get 
up to 2%. That difference, which seems small, over time has enormous con-
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sequences for the growth of personal incomes and government revenues and 
budgets (governments at all levels).
Further, the economic outlook is clouded by several major uncertainties. Fore-
most among these is how U.S. President Donald Trump will seek to restructure 
U.S. trade relationships, and in particular what this will mean for NAFTA and 
Canada-U.S. trade. At the time of this writing, the US has identified several 
significant aspects of the NAFTA agreement that it wishes to renegotiate, but 
it is not yet clear how tough they are prepared to be in the negotiations. On the 
one hand Trump talks very tough about how America is treated unfairly by its 
trading partners, including Canada. He has created huge expectations among 
his more avid supporters that he will “fix” these trade agreements and that 
manufacturing jobs will come flooding back into the U.S. On the other hand, 
thus far in his presidency most of what he has been able to deliver bears little 
resemblance to his flamboyant election promises. The worst case scenario for 
the Canadian economy would be the termination of NAFTA; in that case a 
serious recession would seem to be inevitable. The best case scenario would be 
some minor tinkering that could even include adjustments to Canada’s benefit. 
The other concern on the trade front, but with much less impact on Canada is 
Brexit.
The last contextual factor that could have major implications for the Canadian 
economy and the government’s budget position is the price of petroleum. The 
government’s forecast is based on a stable or very slowly increasing prices, 
significant movement in either direction could significantly impact govern-
ment revenues, not only from the price change directly, but also because of the 
resulting change in economic activity especially in Alberta and Saskatchewan. 
At the time of writing the price of oil is well below the Budget’s projection for 
2017.
With that quick flagging of the main contextual factors, we can now look at 
the main elements of Ottawa’s budget plan. The focus on innovation has two 
aspects, education and skills upgrading, and identifying and supporting key 
sectors of the economy. The first element promises to invest in retraining 
members of the labour force displaced from old jobs to prepare them for new 
ones. The second element contains echoes of old-style industrial strategies of 
“picking winners”. But rather than identifying specific companies, the Liberals’ 
strategy is to support and foster what it regards as key sectors of an emerging 
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high-productivity economy, including clean technology, digital, and agri-food 
industries.
The infrastructure initiative focuses on expanding early child care capac-
ity, affordable housing, and green infrastructure, primarily transportation 
related. The novel aspect of this initiative is the proposal to create the Canada 
Infrastructure Bank with both federal government and private sector capital. 
A number of issues have quickly surfaced. The Bank has attracted interest 
from some of the country’s large pension funds, some of it at the government’s 
urging; that raises questions about consistency with he mandates of the 
funds and the relationships between the funds and government. Secondly, the 
involvement of private capital implies that the investments are intended to 
generate income flows to provide returns to the private sector investors. That, 
in turn, raises questions about moving in a major way towards user fees of 
various types, and the potential skewing of the types of infrastructure invest-
ments undertaken.
The ambitious Trudeau government agenda coupled with weak economic 
growth and thus slowly growing government revenues quickly forced the 
government to abandon its 2015 election promise of limiting the deficit to $10 
billion. The government first retreated to the position of achieving that level 
by the end of their electoral mandate. Now that is out of reach as well. To the 
extent that there is a deficit target guiding Ottawa’s decisions, it appears to 
be one of not increasing the debt/GDP ratio beyond its current level of about 
30%. While that is fully sustainable and would still keep Canada’s ratio well 
below most of the other G7 countries, it is notably different than the election 
promise.
Finally, we note the emphases in the budget of the themes of inclusive eco-
nomic growth, middle class fairness, and equal opportunity. The addition of 
a gender impact analysis of this budget is a marker of these themes. It will be 
interesting to monitor how the government will balance the potential internal 
inconsistencies between these – essentially equity based – objectives and its 
innovation agenda. While enhanced productivity can increase general living 
standards over the long term, in the short-run innovation inherently involves 
disruption and displacement (e.g., job losses). It is not a straightforward matter 
to ensure that the compensations and adjustments in place to address these 
negative aspects are effective.
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CANADA 150: COOL TO BE CANADIAN(?)
In addition to the broad economic and social themes that drive much of federal 
government policy, we see a consistent federal government preoccupation with 
fostering Canadian identity both at home and internationally.
Historically, this has taken different forms at different times but arguably 
began with Canada’s participation in the First World War and creation of key 
national institutions such as the CBC in the 1930s. It is interesting to reflect on 
how conscious and multi-faceted the federal government has been in pursuing 
this preoccupation over time. For example, the 1951 Royal Commission on 
Arts and Letters (Massey Commission) Report argued for federal funding for 
cultural activities to promote a sense of Canada. The 1957 Royal Commission 
on Canada’s Economic Prospects (Gordon Commission) argued against foreign 
ownership of Canadian resources and businesses. The Report of the Royal 
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Laurendeau and Dunton, 
1969) propelled us into official federal policies on bilingualism and multicul-
turalism. The Report of the Royal Commission on Economic Union and Devel-
opment Prospects for Canada (Macdonald Commission, 1985) recommended 
a free trade agreement with the United States, while retaining the broad 
architecture of the Canadian welfare state and retention of Parliamentary 
democracy (but with an elected Senate). The Reports of the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples (1996) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of Canada (2015) are equally significant as they argue that Canada cannot be 
truly realized without fundamentally rethinking the relationship with First 
Nations, Métis, and Inuit Peoples.
In short, these historic inquiries focused on some of the same themes and 
policy preoccupations we have as we reflect on Canada and on being Canadian 
today.
Currently, we receive signals that Canada is well regarded from away. It is 
reported that we are viewed as “the most reputable country.” (Huffington Post) 
Our Prime Minister makes the cover of Rolling Stone (“Why Can’t He Be Our 
President?”) and is the subject of a fawning article.
Domestically, we celebrate the country’s sesquicentennial –with lots of selfies 
all around. But we are appropriately given pause by relationships past and 
present with First Nations, Métis, and Inuit Peoples. We should want to do 
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better. In terms of economic and social policy our debates follow familiar 
themes but we view these debates through new lenses with new information 
and new options leading to the need for choices – choices that are no less chal-
lenging than those that have faced Canadians and their governments in the 
past. For the federal government, as it heads into the latter part of its mandate 
the priority will be actions that are recognized as being beyond imagery and as 
having tangible results.
THE CHAPTERS IN BRIEF
The policy briefs in this volume explore and provoke on a number of key issues 
that face Canada and the federal government.
Allan Tupper and Robert Harmsen explore the implications for contemporary 
Canada of having a system of postsecondary education under provincial/
territorial responsibility. They acknowledge the significant role of the federal 
government, particularly with regard to research but argue that Canada would 
be better served if governments loosened the strictures of historical federalism 
and developed new approaches to collaboration.
Natalia Boliari reflects on the context for the current re-negotiation of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Her observation that we do 
not have a real understanding of the impact so far of NAFTA on the economies 
of the three partner countries is significant and provocative. Her recommenda-
tions concerning the best course ahead for Canada in the current negotiations 
provide a point of departure for assessing events over the coming months.
Peter Phillips and colleagues look at the state of science and innovation policy 
under the Trudeau Liberals. Possibly their most startling observation is that 
the government has, at best, a muddied sense of what innovation is. They 
argue that the government has succumbed to the political pitfall of looking 
for quick and flashy “wins” in science and innovation spending, avoiding the 
foundational work that is required for a genuine contribution.
Two policy briefs discuss the state of fiscal federalism in Canada. Erich Hart-
mann argues that the federal equalization program no longer achieves its 
objectives very well because of a number of developments affecting it in recent 
years including federal budgetary restraint and volatile resource revenues. It 
has become a source of serious budgetary unpredictability for the receiving 
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provinces. A scheduled five-year renewal is coming up and Hartmann pro-
poses several changes to make the program payments more predictable.
Andrew Seto and Christopher Stoney examine the two largest federal transfers 
to the provinces – Equalization and the Canada Health Transfer – and argue 
that they are unduly manipulated to serve the political interests of the federal 
government of the day. This politicization of the programs hinders their effec-
tiveness, and generates obfuscation and cynicism. They propose that an inde-
pendent non-partisan commission be established to advise the government 
on changes to the programs, thereby reducing political gaming and increasing 
accountability.
This edition contains four policy briefs that consider social policy issues.
Senada Delic looks at the record of policies and programs related to Indige-
nous youth employment. She concludes that, generally, past initiatives have 
missed the mark, in terms of labour market participation by Indigenous youth 
and more general improvements in their life prospects. A major contributing 
factor is the absence of an holistic perspective on the situation of youth that 
results in an inability to link job-focused initiatives to more basic life circum-
stances and needs.
James McAllister argues in his Policy Brief, for an alternative to simply 
increasing the existing Canada Health Transfer. He points out that the rela-
tively large increases in the CHT over roughly the past decade have not bought 
the improvements that we might have expected. Rather, he argues the federal 
government should leave the CHT as it is and put new money into specific 
programs such as Indigenous health, pharmacare, and mental health.
Allan Moscovitch and Richard Lochead provide a thorough overview of the 
needs that demographic trends are creating in the field of old age security. 
They argue that the aging of the population, the rise in precarious employment 
and “the gig economy” for all age groups plus changes in our democratic sensi-
bilities should induce change in the terms and governance of pension policy.
Stephen Brown and Liam Swiss look at the government’s feminist agenda, 
specifically in international assistance. They argue that the rhetorical focus on 
gender is definitely present but that the real challenges for the government will 
come in implementation. These challenges go beyond following through with 
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appropriate investments and include confronting different conceptions of and 
attitudes to gender-based assistance.
Evert Lindquist examines an important, albeit somewhat obscured element 
of the government accountability regime – the Management Accountability 
Framework. He makes recommendations that could see it emerge as less of a 
burden and more of a tool for departments and agencies. He also sees it as an 
untapped resource for more public accountability.
The correspondence between government spending patterns and its priorities 
is addressed by Helaina Gaspard in her Policy Brief. Using federal spending on 
skills and innovation as an illustrative case, she argues that careful assessment 
of existing spending for operational efficiency and program impacts is required 
before forming judgments about incremental spending.
This volume contains two policy studies—more extended contributions on key 
topics.
Aman Chahal, Zak Jacques, Marc Quintaneiro, and Glen Toner examine 
the government’s energy and environment policies. They note the delicate 
balancing act between energy development and conservation, the further 
complications resulting from constitutional federalism that pre-dates preoc-
cupation with environmental issues and the retail political issues on this file 
at the national and provincial/territorial levels. To this point in the Liberals’ 
mandate, they see skillful negotiation of this complex and high profile field.
Marc-Andre Gagnon examines potential mechanisms that might be used to 
finance a public pharmacare scheme. He reviews the choice between general 
revenue and social insurance models in several other OECD countries, assess-
ing their efficiency and administrativey impacts. While the comparative anal-
ysis suggests there is no single path for Canada to follow, the model adopted 
should be compatible with the rest of health care service delivery and with the 
culture and institutions of public finance in general.
Policy Briefs
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Chapter 2 
A POST SECONDARY EDUCATION 
DIALOGUE FOR CANADA
By Robert Harmsen & Allan Tupper
INTRODUCTION
In 2017, post secondary education deeply engages governments and import-ant civil society forces. It is a complex policy sector that is a major area of public expenditure, a determinant of Canadian economic prosperity 
and increasingly, a policy sector with direct implications for many Canadians. 
University research receives considerable funding from the Government of 
Canada and is increasingly recognized as a contributor to Canadian economic 
competitiveness. Access to good higher education at reasonable cost is an 
ambition of many Canadian families and a subject tightly linked with the 
Trudeau’s government’s concern with “strengthening the middle class”.
Post secondary education also engages the Trudeau Liberals’ emphasis on 
“new federalism” which asserts the need for intergovernmental collaboration. 
The more co-operative Liberal rhetoric is a deliberate contrast to the Harper 
Conservatives’focus on a watertight federalism where governments were 
to proceed, wherever possible, each in its own sphere. Over the last decade 
higher education has also become more international in scope. In 2017, many 
undergraduate programs encourage students to take credit courses in other 
countries although as yet not many Canadian students have done so. Canadian 
universities often have joint degrees with universities abroad. International 
research partnerships demand careful policy co ordination with other coun-
tries. Canadian governments have generally allowed universities and colleges 
to charge international students much higher fees than domestic students. 
International students are now a major revenue source for universities - a 
commodity that they compete to attract.
Our policy brief begins with an overview of the Canadian post secondary 
education system. It notes the active role of the federal and provincial govern-
ments, while also highlighting the often-neglected role and potential of the 
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main non-governmental actors. Using the 2016 and 2017 federal budgets, we 
then look at the Trudeau Liberal government’s approach to post secondary 
education. In turn, three propositions are advanced. First, we reject reform 
proposals that urge a “federal dominant” system or a tightly co ordinated 
policy system through intergovernmental mechanisms as unlikely to succeed 
even assuming a strong will to change basic policy architecture. Second, we 
see a role for a structured national dialogue that reflects modified elements 
of current European practice. Finally, we argue that a stronger pan-Canadian 
forum should initially focus on international engagement.
THE PSE POLICY SYSTEM IN BRIEF
Canada’s PSE system took form in the 1960s when Alex Corry famously 
remarked that universities had become “public utilities”, that is objects of 
public policy that were important parts of the public sector (Corry 1970,x). In 
the 1960s, provincial governments built modern college and university systems 
as enrolment burgeoned. They controlled capital and operating funding, 
approved degrees and programs and established university governance 
processes. The provinces also developed policy and administrative capacity 
and established student loan systems. Provincial PSE systems did not follow 
a uniform blueprint. They varied in many ways including the relationships 
between colleges and universities, the generosity of loan and grant systems 
and tuition policies (cf. Harmsen and Tupper forthcoming).
In the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government also expanded its horizons and 
defined its PSE role more precisely. Ottawa established the Canada Student 
Loan Program in 1964. The funding of university research solidified as a 
focal point for Ottawa’s involvement. The current research granting councils 
took form and the National Research Council worked closely with university 
researchers.
The post secondary education sector has become much more complex since the 
1960s. More programs have been established, the research role of universities 
and colleges has expanded and costs have grown significantly. Questions about 
tuition policy, student debt and access for students from lower income families 
established a new agenda. Federal research funding grew more important 
as ideas about a knowledge economy took root (Office of the Parliamentary 
Budget Officer 2016).
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In the 1990s, Ottawa provided tax incentives to encourage parents to save 
for their children’s post secondary education. These tax measures are now a 
complex policy area (Parkin 2016). In the 1990s, the Chrétien Liberal govern-
ments implemented major new PSE programs. The Canada Foundation for 
Innovation was created to fund university infrastructure ideally in partnership 
with the provincial governments and/or the private sector. A Canada Research 
Chairs program was established to repatriate outstanding Canadian research-
ers and to help outstanding young researchers. The Canada Millennium Schol-
arships Foundation was founded.
Another major development was Ottawa’s 2003 entry into funding the indirect 
costs of federal research funding. Originally established as the Indirect Costs 
Program, Ottawa provided $369 million in 2017 under the Research Support 
Program (RSP). The RSP is administered by the three federal granting coun-
cils who transfer funds directly to universities on the basis of their share of 
federal research funding.  For decades universities and provincial govern-
ments complained that Ottawa’s insistence on funding only the direct costs of 
research obliged universities to pay for costly research overhead by transfer-
ring money from teaching.
Federal and provincial governments heavily shape Canadian post secondary 
education policy. Equally important is an active policy community that lobbies 
governments, coordinates the sector and tries to educate public opinion. PSE 
policy communities and civil society organizations are found in Ottawa and in 
the provincial capitals. They reflect the federal nature of Canadian PSE.
Noteworthy in the policy community are national organizations for university 
teachers, for universities and colleges and for students. Major national bodies 
include the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT), Universi-
ties Canada, Colleges and Institutes Canada and the Canadian Federation 
of Students, the largest national student organization. Other bodies include 
the Canadian Association of Business Officers that represents senior univer-
sity financial officers and the U 15 group that speaks for the large research 
universities.
Interest associations abound in the provinces. In Ontario, the Council of 
Ontario Universities represents universities while colleges have Colleges 
Ontario. CAUT’s Ontario counterpart is the Confederation of Ontario Faculty 
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Associations. Ontario undergraduate students and graduate students have 
provincial associations that are confederations of individual universities’ 
student organizations. In turn, pan-provincial associations are federated with 
the national students’organizations. British Columbia, whose PSE system 
differs from Ontario’s, has two university associations, one for the research 
universities and the other for smaller teaching oriented institutions, and an 
active association for its colleges.
Many academic disciplines have national associations that disseminate infor-
mation about public policy and discuss government initiatives. National and 
provincial meetings are fertile grounds for policy debates and information 
diffusion. Higher education research institutes and groups are also active 
although they are not as well developed as in other countries (Clark and Norrie 
2014). Canada has a PSE consulting industry whose significance and impact 
have yet to be studied.
In summary, analysts of Canadian post secondary education policy have 
stressed federal and provincial government policy. Much less attention has 
been paid to the non-governmental policy community that flanks governments 
and interacts with them. Is it possible that the non-governmental sector acts, 
or could act, as a source of policy coordination and a consensus builder? As 
Wallner (2014) has shown, such wider policy communities have played a key 
role in fostering national policy convergence in the absence of formal coordi-
nation in K-12 education. After looking at current federal policy, we return to 
this theme later, making the case for a broadly based pan-Canadian dialogue.
THE TRUDEAU GOVERNMENT AND PSE
Canadian universities are likely happy to see the return of the federal Liberals 
to power. Whether fairly judged or not, the Harper governments were seen 
as at best indifferent to universities and research. They were criticized for 
denying federal scientists the necessary freedom to conduct and communi-
cate their research. Conservative university research policies were decried as 
disinterested in fundamental research. These views are in stark contrast to the 
important and popular policies introduced by the Chrétien governments. The 
politics of post secondary education policy have changed.
The 2016 and 2017 Trudeau budgets stress PSE affordability especially for 
students from lower income families. The 2016 budget made major changes to 
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the Canada Student Loans program and to the tax incentives that encourage 
parents to save for their children’s post secondary education. Ottawa’s commit-
ment to university research infrastructure was reinforced by the establishment 
of a three year $2 billion Post Secondary Institutions Strategic Infrastructure 
Fund. The Liberals provided a total of $95 million new funding for the three 
federal research granting councils, an amount that Universities Canada said 
was the largest increase in ten years. In its words: “Between 2006 and 2013, 
research funding in Canada fell from 3rd to 8th among OECD nations. Today’s 
news is an important step toward returning to globally competitive research 
funding levels”(Universities Canada 2016,3).
The 2017 budget stressed the 2016 themes although no new money was 
provided to the granting councils (Higher Education Research Associates 
2017). Further changes were made to the Canada Student Loans program 
that improved the programs available for adult learners, part time students 
and students with dependents. The budget also provided $221 million over 
five years for student work placements. These funds, heavily weighted toward 
future years, are to be administered by Mitacs, a not for profit that specializes 
in work place placements for graduate students (Ibid,11).
The 2016 and 2017 budgets outline the Trudeau government’s pse priorities 
for its term. PSE affordability is part of the government’s emphasis on income 
equality. University research and infrastructure support are already estab-
lished federal roles with which the Liberals are comfortable and closely iden-
tified. Increased emphasis on federal funding for university work experiences 
is another area of legitimate federal interest especially given Mitacs expertise 
in programs for university graduate students (Higher Education Research 
Associates 2017). Importantly, the Trudeau Liberals have shown no interest in 
playing a larger role in education. Theirs is a well-known agenda that reflects 
established federal PSE roles.
A remaining issue for the Liberals is the 2017 Naylor report, an inquiry into 
research funding whose report was released in 2017 (Advisory Panel for 
the Review of Federal Support for Fundamental Science 2017). Headed by 
Tom Naylor, a former president of the University of Toronto, the nine person 
panel called for an increase of $1.3 billion over four years for federal research 
funding. It also urged $485 million for basic research arguing that too much 
money was going to “priority-driven” research. The federal granting councils 
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were to be better co ordinated and the overall federal research system was to 
be governed by a new body, the National Advisory Council on Research and 
Innovation.
Observers lamented that the government deliberately delayed the Naylor 
report’s release until after the 2017 budget and that this delay suggests a lack 
of commitment to university research. A different perspective is that the core 
subjects of the Naylor report, federal research funding and administration, are 
topics that the Liberal government has been publicly committed to over a long 
period. Naylor’s recommendations will be the benchmark against which the 
government’s research funding performance will be evaluated. The Trudeau 
government is well aware of this reality – its future budgets will deal with the 
Naylor panel recommendations one way or the other.
THINKING ABOUT THE CANADIAN POST SECONDARY 
EDUCATION SYSTEM
Canada’s PSE system is often portrayed as poorly coordinated. Ottawa is said 
to provide the vast majority of research funding while the provinces admin-
ister ten diverse systems. Canadian PSE is also thought to suffer as a result of 
the lack of central direction. Two general solutions have been advanced over 
time. Some observers have called for a more extensive role for the Government 
of Canada. Others have called for tighter intergovernmental co ordination. 
Our view is that neither option is currently feasible or perhaps desirable. We 
argue that Canada should try a different approach through a focused national 
dialogue that engages a broad set of actors.
A 2014 report by Paul Cappon on a national education strategy for Canada 
reflects established thinking. Commissioned by the Canadian Council of Chief 
Executives, Cappon reviewed the policy status quo for education at all levels 
from elementary schools to universities and colleges. He concluded that inad-
equate Canadian policy co ordination and/or superior policy co ordination in 
other countries explain, as he sees it, Canada’s poor educational outcomes. 
He advanced three reforms (Cappon 2014). First, Cappon called for vigorous 
leadership from Ottawa if a necessary national education strategy was to 
become a reality. “The federal government is the only actor capable of leading 
to the creation of this pan Canadian strategy” (Ibid.6). Second, he recom-
mended new intergovernmental coordinating machinery, specifically a feder-
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al-provincial-territorial Council of Ministers to determine national targets and 
outcomes. Third, he urged the greater involvement of business but not other 
civil society actors.
Cappon’s arguments are flawed. First, no government, certainly not the 
Trudeau Liberals, appears committed to an explicit national education strat-
egy. Second, is Canada’s educational system as mediocre and as poorly co ordi-
nated as Cappon suggests? A contrary perspective could certainly be advanced 
for PSE at least. Third, federal leadership is limited by Ottawa’s singular lack of 
policy and administrative capacity in most aspects of education policy. As the 
Trudeau Liberals show, Ottawa has focused on post secondary education and 
even within PSE in only a few areas, notably research, research infrastructure 
and student loans.
FROM FEDERALISM TO MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE
Moving forward, the question becomes one of how PSE policy might be better 
developed in a pan-Canadian context. What is desirable?  What is possible? 
The scope and limits of the problem to be addressed need to be specified. We 
reject the alarmist views of observers such as Cappon, who see an impending 
crisis in Canadian (higher) education. On the whole, Canadian PSE institu-
tions perform well, both sustaining comparatively high rates of participation 
and (insofar as this is a gauge of institutional quality) attaining a satisfactory 
spectrum of results in international rankings. At the same time, the sector 
continues to be hampered by a pattern of “uncoordinated entanglements” 
(Tupper 2009).  As the federal government has increasingly assumed the 
driver’s seat in research policy while the provinces retain jurisdiction over the 
wider operation of PSE systems, the framing of “joined up” or “holistic” poli-
cies in the sector has become increasingly difficult. In consequence, individual 
PSE institutions are often asked to carry the burden of reconciling mis- or 
un-aligned policy choices.
The central governance issue is thus that of creating a more structured policy 
space. While respecting existing jurisdictional divisions, clear evidence points 
towards the desirability of some form of pan-Canadian policy arena that would 
allow the principal PSE actors to interact more productively with one another. 
Such an arena would take as its starting point the indelible character of Cana-
dian pse as a “system of systems” in which the provinces exercise a broad 
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jurisdiction over the basic structuring of those systems. It would, however, 
move beyond a rigid, binary conception of federalism towards a richer under-
standing of multi-level governance that stresses meaningful policy dialogues 
across jurisdictional boundaries and the broadening of participation to incor-
porate more stakeholders.
THE “BOLOGNA MODEL”
In the development of such a pan-Canadian arena, lessons can be drawn from 
the extensive European experience of “soft law” governance instruments over 
the past two decades. This concerns both the general development by the 
European Union of the “Open Method of Co ordination” (OMC) and, more 
specifically in the higher education sector, the pan-European (48-member) 
Bologna Process. In both cases, scholars have already probed the limits and 
possibilities of these models in Canadian contexts. As regards the OMC, con-
tributors to a special 2013 issue of Canadian Public Administration (Verdun 
and Wood 2013) highlighted the limited applicability of OMC models to Cana-
dian practice because of a pattern of executive federalism which concentrates 
power in the core executive at each level of government, thereby placing partic-
ularly tight constraints on wider stakeholder participation. We argue, however, 
that overcoming this limitation requires only a modest act of political will, and 
that the OMC toolkit could correspondingly provide useful instruments for 
opening up wider, more participatory policy spaces and policy dialogues on a 
pan-Canadian basis. Commentators have similarly stressed the limited appli-
cability of the Bologna Process in the Canadian context (Haskel 2013; Usher 
and Green 2009). Rightly, they underline that the core problem addressed by 
the Bologna Process – that of building of trust and facilitating the readability 
of qualifications across a bewildering diversity of national systems – has little 
or no relevance in those terms in the Canadian case. Yet, the same commen-
tators have also noted that as a governance process Bologna offers interesting 
insights for the establishment of a pan-Canadian policy dialogue.
Bologna is a working PSE example of “experimentalist governance”(Harmsen 
2015). Centrally, the objective of such “soft” governance is to create a policy 
arena that facilitates policy learning across jurisdictions within the framework 
of a complex system of multi-level governance, while itself having no direct 
regulatory or (re-)distributive function. Such an arena is thus dedicated to dia-
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logue, allowing for co ordination and learning across levels by engaging both 
governments and wider stakeholder communities. In the case of European 
higher education, the combined development of the Bologna Process together 
with EU involvement has correspondingly seen the emergence of a structured 
“European policy space” in the sector where none existed before.
In practice, what does this mean in the Canadian context? If one could con-
ceive of the similar emergence of a “pan-Canadian policy space”, what would it 
look like and what might it do? The increasingly important issue of PSE inter-
nationalization illuminates the possibilities.
A PAN-CANADIAN PSE INTERNATIONALIZATION FORUM
Internationalization is now a central PSE policy concern worldwide as the 
attractiveness and competitiveness of national higher education systems 
become more important for national economic competitiveness. Relative to 
these challenges, Canada certainly does not lack PSE internationalization 
strategies. It has at least two, if not several (cf. Viczko and Tascsón 2016). At an 
interprovincial level, the Council of Ministers of Education of Canada (CMEC) 
produced an international marketing action plan for the Council of the Fed-
eration in 2011 (Council of the Federation 2011). Not to be outdone, Ottawa 
responded in 2014 with its own international education strategy (Canada 
2014). Other groups, such as the Canadian Bureau for International Education 
(CBIE 2013), have also produced strategic documents.
These international strategy documents converge on several important points. 
All, for example, are concerned with maintaining a consistent national “brand” 
in the marketing of Canadian higher education abroad. All see attracting 
talented international students as essential for national prosperity. All focus 
on the outward mobility of Canadian students. Yet, despite substantive conver-
gence, such reports have not had a major impact. Apart from the usual obsta-
cles encountered by such reports, there is – quite literally – nowhere for their 
recommendations to go. There is no policy arena corresponding to the policy 
area at a pan-Canadian level in which the recommendations might be followed 
up on a co ordinated basis and in which meaningful dialogues could take 
place. Moreover, diverse provincial strategies are being developed in parallel 
and with relatively little apparent cross-jurisdictional interchange.
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To address this situation, we propose the creation of a pan-Canadian forum 
on PSE internationalization that takes its inspiration from the Bologna model. 
The forum would thus be an instrument of “soft governance” – i.e. it would 
have no decisional authority, but rather would be dedicated to furthering 
policy dialogue and learning. Governments might choose to issue declarations 
or to establish forms of peer review or benchmarking exercises, but this is 
something to be determined within the forum itself. An intergovernmental 
(federal/provincial) dimension would form the core, but it would be opened 
out to structured stakeholder participation. Bodies such as Universities 
Canada, Colleges and Institutes Canada, and the Canadian Association of 
University Teachers, as well as business and labour organizations would be 
(associate) members of the forum with the right to speak and make propos-
als. Ideally, provincial delegations would extend beyond ministry officials to 
include representatives of PSE institutions, students and faculty. Following the 
Bologna model, the forum could further be structured in terms of a plenary 
conference meeting every two to three years, fed by the work of follow-up 
or working groups that would bring together governmental and stakeholder 
representatives to work on specific thematic areas on an ongoing basis.
The overall structure as briefly outlined above should allow for the emergence 
of a more structured dialogue about PSE internationalization, both providing a 
venue in which intergovernmental co ordination issues might be resolved and 
allowing for the enrichment of debate through stakeholder participation (not 
least moving beyond a marketing focus to encompass a concern with curricu-
lar and research-related themes). As such, the forum may, if successful, extend 
its coverage to the wider PSE sector over time – being careful to do so in ways 
that maintain its light touch structures.
CONCLUSION
Our policy brief argues that Canadian PSE policy making should move beyond 
a primarily intergovernmental focus and begin to think in terms of a pan-Ca-
nadian dialogue involving the wider sector. Canadian PSE has generated 
well-developed networks of actors, including both peak associations and PSE 
institutions themselves which do not find a corresponding national policy 
arena. Our policy brief proposes that such an arena be shaped along the lines 
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of Europe’s successful “Bologna model”, creating a distinctive forum for policy 
dialogue and learning that leaves existing jurisdictional divisions undisturbed.
The emergence of such an arena requires political will. Ottawa must assume a 
posture of modest ambition, facilitating dialogue without seeking a dominant 
steering role. The provinces too must be willing to break with traditional prac-
tices of executive federalism so as to open up space for dialogue. We do not 
doubt that even these modest steps may prove difficult. Yet, if governments are 
to champion the idea of disruptive innovation, it would not seem unreasonable 
to demand that they are open to it themselves.
As we write in 2017, the Trudeau Liberal government is well positioned to seize 
the initiative in fostering the development of such an innovative pan-Canadian 
policy arena. International post secondary education is an area that it has 
already engaged and universities themselves are certainly interested. More-
over, in the short to medium term, the Trudeau Liberals are unlikely to have 
budget surpluses that will allow significant increases in research funding. A 
federal initiative working collaboratively with the provinces and stakeholders 
to establish a serious dialogue on pse internationalization would, at low cost, 
allow the Trudeau Liberals to advance an inclusive national agenda in an area 
of long term significance for Canada’s pse sector.
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Chapter 3 
OVERHAULING NAFTA: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADIAN 
TRADE POLICY
By Natalia Boliari
INTRODUCTION
Protectionist sentiments have always been present in the U.S. but they have been particularly strong since the 2008 presidential campaigns when trade became a most contentious issue for all Democratic Party 
candidates. Existing trade agreements and particularly the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came under fire in many of the heated 
debates between such high-profile politicians as Hilary Clinton and Barack 
Obama. Both of them made statements that it was a big mistake, a flawed 
and disastrous agreement which needed to be renegotiated or else termi-
nated. Although, after elected, President Obama did not act on his multiple 
statements to unilaterally renegotiate NAFTA, his administration did stall 
other trade agreements or raised tariffs during the first half of his presidency. 
It was only after re-election in 2012 that he openly supported a freer trade 
agenda. The 2016 presidential primaries brought back trade as one of the most 
important issues on the nation’s agenda as candidates now on both sides of the 
political spectrum expressed strong opposition to trade agreements (existing 
or planned) and some to globalization, in general. NAFTA became one of the 
most frequently debated topics and was continuously described as a big failure 
for the American nation and a disaster for blue collar workers and the manu-
facturing industry. Hilary Clinton renewed her 2008 promise to renegotiate 
NAFTA if elected and Donald Trump went further to say repeatedly that he 
will “rip it up” if he could not renegotiate a better deal.
Watching the 2016 election primaries, observers suspected or, perhaps, hoped 
that candidates’ NAFTA rhetoric was a continuation of the 2008 political 
theater, to be forgotten by many after Election Day. After all, opposition to 
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free trade sells well with voters but trade agreements are not really viewed as 
issues of high priority on a newly formed administration’s agenda.
Not this time. It appears that President Trump meant what he said when it 
comes to trade. One of his very first actions after inauguration was to with-
draw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a flagship trade agreement 
(waiting at the time to be ratified by Congress) between the U.S. and 11 other 
Pacific Rim countries, including Canada and Mexico. In the few months 
since the new administration took office, trade and trade policies have been 
re-examined by pundits and warnings against expected radical changes in 
the direction of U.S. trade policy prevail in the news and academic media. 
NAFTA has frequently and contentiously been in the news. We have witnessed, 
for example,   the cancelled late January meeting of the President of Mexico, 
Enrique Peña Nieto with President Trump. The cancellation came after days 
of hostile exchanges over the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico and whether 
Mexico would pay for President Trump’s proposed building of a wall on the 
U.S./Mexico border. We have witnessed the meeting between Canadian Prime 
Minister Justin Trudeau and President Trump in February in which President 
Trump stated his administration’s intent to make some modest adjustments 
to U.S./Canada trade relations under NAFTA. The two leaders also pledged 
to work together on cross-border commerce and security issues. Noting that 
millions of Canadian and American jobs depend on the smooth and easy flow 
of goods, services and people, Mr. Trudeau stated that “by working together, 
by ensuring the continued effective integration of our two economies, we are 
going to be creating greater opportunities for middle-class Canadians and 
Americans now and well into the future.” Notwithstanding this overall friendly 
meeting, in late April, a draft announcing the intent of the U.S. administration 
to withdraw from NAFTA was leaked. Subsequently, with suggestions of back 
channel communications between Canada and Mexico and the Trump admin-
istration, President Trump reversed this plan but he has subsequently kept 
NAFTA high on the agenda by repeatedly stating the necessity to either reform 
or terminate it.
At the time of submission of this brief, Ambassador Robert Lighthizer has for-
mally notified Congress of the administration’s intention to renegotiate NAFTA 
with Mexico and Canada after just a couple of days of being sworn in as the 
U.S. Trade Representative. Renegotiation talks can, therefore, be initiated as 
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early as mid-August. From a Canadian perspective, rising U.S. protectionism 
and potential threats of a changed or terminated NAFTA could be problematic 
because the United States is a huge exports market and a major source of 
imports for Canada. This brief will take a close look at the meaning of NAFTA 
for Canada; assess the U.S. administration’s concerns with and approach to 
NAFTA, and evaluate possible strategies that can be used in response to a new, 
more protectionist U.S. administration.
HOW IMPORTANT IS NAFTA FOR CANADA?
The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), which went into effect in 
January 1989, marked the beginning of a movement toward greater regional 
trade and economic integration between Canada and the United States. It 
also paved the way for the formation of the trilateral NAFTA, which included 
Mexico and has been in effect since January 1994. NAFTA is the largest free 
trade area in the world in terms of population, GDP, and GDP per capita, com-
parable to the European Union (EU) in all three indicators1.  Its main, visible 
results are the elimination or significant reduction of tariffs and non-tariff 
trade barriers (NTBs) and the creation of cross border supply chains which in 
turn, greatly increased the volume of trade and investment among the three 
member countries.
Economic theory predicts that trade liberalization (whether multilateral as 
embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO) or preferential as occurring 
under regional trading agreements such as NAFTA) are beneficial because 
they lead to efficiency gains and economic growth as a result of reallocating 
resources to their more productive uses. Thus, trade agreements are expected 
to reshuffle jobs across industries as a consequence of both loss in some 
and creation of jobs in other industries. Has this been the case for Canada 
as a result of NAFTA? Assessing the overall economic impacts of any trade 
agreement, including NAFTA, is challenging because trade and investment 
are macroeconomic variables influenced by other variables such as economic 
growth, price levels, currency fluctuations, interest rates, productivity, and 
technological change. No wonder then, that empirical accounts of the NAFTA 
1 The NAFTA region’s GDP and per capita GDP are higher than those of the EU. For example, in 2015,  
NAFTA GDP was more than 20.5 billions US$  and GDP per capita was about 45,000 PPP (Purchasing Power Parity 
dollars). For the EU those indicators were less than 16.5 billions US$ and about 38,000  PPP,  respectively (IMF, 
2017) . EU’s population (about 507 millions) is slightly higher than that of NAFTA,  about 484 millions.
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experience are mixed and somewhat contradictory, particularly with regards 
to efficiency gains, change in productivity levels, job creation, and job losses.
Looking at the academic literature on the economic impacts of NAFTA, it is 
surprising that there is relatively little focus on Canada. Studying the com-
bined impact of the CUSFTA and NAFTA between 1989 and 1996, Trefler 
(2004) estimates short-run adjustment costs of 100,000 lost jobs which cor-
respond to about 5% of manufacturing employment in Canada. In industries 
that faced larger tariff cuts employment declined by up to 15%. At the same 
time, new jobs were created elsewhere in manufacturing so that in the long 
run there were no net job losses as a result of CUSFTA/NAFTA. The study of 
Trefler is best known for its findings of large positive effects on the productiv-
ity of Canadian firms. A compound growth rate of 2.1% per year is estimated 
for industries most affected by tariff cuts and 0.7% per year for manufacturing 
overall. As a result of this productivity growth, real earnings of workers are 
reported to have increased by a modest 0.3% per year.
However, a more recent and most comprehensive study on the economic 
effects of NAFTA on all three member countries estimates overall economic 
welfare losses for Canada of 0.07% (Caliendo and Parro 2015)2.  This contra-
dicts both trade theory and Trefler’s (2004) widely cited results. Decomposing 
those welfare effects into terms of trade (the exchange ratio measuring the 
relation between a nation’s export prices to prices paid for its imports) and 
volume of trade effects, Caliendo and Parro find that the welfare gains from 
trade creation with NAFTA members are 0.08% and welfare losses from trade 
diversion with other countries are 0.04% for Canada, bringing a net gain of 
0.04 percent from volume of trade effects. On the other hand, the terms of 
trade for Canada deteriorated by 0.11%, mostly due to reduction in its NAFTA 
export prices, leading to an overall welfare loss of 0.07%. Given that terms of 
trade also deteriorated for Mexico, one can conclude that part of the reported 
small aggregate welfare gains for the U.S. are not really efficiency gains but 
rather income gains at the expense of Canada and Mexico. The study also finds 
that NAFTA led to an increase in real wages for all three countries, the gain 
being 0.32% for Canada.
2 The study actually reports welfare losses of 0.06% for Canada but it is obvious from Table 2 that the 
authors made a calculation mistake. The right number is 0.07, which is the summation of -0.11 (worsening terms 
of trade) and 0.04 (gains from increased trade volumes). A nation’s terms of trade is expressed as the ratio of the 
export price index to the import price index.
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Further studies on the effects of NAFTA are necessary. It is somewhat dis-
appointing that 23 years into its implementation we still cannot state with 
certainty the precise extent to which NAFTA benefited or harmed its members 
and if it met economic expectations. Reported efficiency results in these and 
other studies for all three countries seem to be small, much smaller than what 
would be expected given the frequently cited increase in trade volumes.
Additionally, the academic literature says little about the distributional 
impacts of NAFTA in the Canadian labour market. There is compelling evi-
dence that the aggregate effects of NAFTA on local labour markets in the U.S. 
are small but quite severe (in the form of large absolute decline in real wages 
or substantially lowered wage growth) across many economic sectors, directly 
and indirectly affected by NAFTA (Hakobyan and McLaren 2016). The authors 
report that there are directly affected communities in many states including 
Georgia, Indiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Michigan, Pennsylvania, 
and others. Not surprisingly, those are usually the states which oppose NAFTA 
and trade liberalization in general.
It would be interesting to have empirical evidence showing the extent to which 
distributional impacts are similar or different in Canadian labour markets 
at the local level. Looking at various news and media commentaries, one 
can expect similar results. Judging by the statement of the Canadian Labour 
Congress sent to Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland in January, 2017, 
NAFTA has been a failure for working Canadians. The later states that “far 
from generating good jobs and prosperity, NAFTA has undermined secure, 
well-paid employment and devastated manufacturing and processing indus-
tries and the communities that depend on them,”
At a Metro Morning program of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) 
in November 2016, the President of Canada’s largest private sector union, 
Unifor’s Jerry Dias pointed out that “NAFTA has been a disaster for Canada.” 
He reports the loss of 50,000 direct auto jobs, the most recent closing of two 
assembly plants in Canada while opening of eight in Mexico, and the loss of a 
half a million manufacturing jobs (McGillivray 2016) According to a Toronto 
Sun article, General Motors’ cutting of 625 jobs at its assembly plant near 
London, Ontario, in January, 2017 was viewed by union officials as a move that 
demonstrated “why NAFTA has been a bad deal for the Canadian automotive 
industry as jobs have migrated to lower-cost jurisdictions such as Mexico.” 
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The article points that, according to Mr. Dias, the move “is a shining example 
of everything wrong with NAFTA.” Suggesting that it must be re-negotiated, 
he also points that it is imperative that trade rules help ensure good jobs in 
Canada.
In general, Canada’s benefits from NAFTA come mostly in the form of safe-
guards (Carbaugh 2016, 290). That is, maintaining its status in international 
trade, Canada keeps free trade preferences in the U.S. and Mexican markets 
and is a part of any process that would eventually broaden market access to 
Central and South America. Although benefits from trade with Mexico have 
not realized as hoped, Canada achieved some economies of large scale produc-
tion which permit for more competitive price policies.  As an U.S. Congressio-
nal Research Service report observes, from a Canadian perspective, the most 
important outcome of freer trade within CUSFTA and NAFTA may have been 
what did not happen. Canada did not become an economic appendage of the 
U.S. It remained competitive in manufacturing and did not lose control over its 
water or energy resources. Further, it did not jettison its social programs. All 
of these feared outcomes were suggested in the Canadian NAFTA debate.
To conclude this section, it is difficult to make the argument that NAFTA is of 
utmost and critical importance to Canada; there is no solid evidence to suggest 
that. At best, NAFTA’s aggregate impacts seem to be modest. Most often cited 
benefits of the agreement are the increase in trade and investment volumes - 
more than a threefold increase in merchandise trade between the three part-
ners since 1993; growth rate of Canadian exports to the U.S. of 4.6 percent per 
annum; a dramatic increase of Candaian stock of investment in Mexico and so 
on, as cited by Global Affairs Canada. But those impressive statistics can only 
suggest correlation and certainly not causation. The literature does not support 
the expectations from such statistics that significant economic growth, effi-
ciency gains, or other big economic benefits have been obtained from NAFTA.  
Similar trade relations and outcomes might have been achieved in the absence 
of NAFTA and under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) or 
WTO’s multilateral trading system.
UNDERSTANDING THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S APPROACH 
TO NAFTA
In the turbulent weeks since Inauguration Day, the new administration made 
clear that it will pursue openly nationalist and protectionist trade policies. 
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Starting with the immediate withdrawal from the TPP, President Trump 
repeatedly called for made in America and made by Americans products. 
He threatened American companies with taxes and tariffs if they were to 
invest abroad instead of in the U.S. Most importantly, he labeled NAFTA the 
worst agreement ever made by the U.S., one that has resulted in continuously 
increasing U.S. trade deficit with its NAFTA partners, particularly with Mexico 
and one that devastated U.S. manufacturing.
At first glance and as usually portrayed in the media, President Trump appears 
to be the typical protectionist; that is, someone who believes that trade is a 
zero sum game and is therefore deeply concerned with achieving trade surplus 
or eliminating trade deficits, protecting domestic industries and jobs, or bring-
ing back those already lost to foreign competition. This is, however, a superfi-
cial and incomplete description of his vision of trade. A better understanding 
of that vision can be obtained from a bestselling book published in 2000 as 
well as from his less publicized statements at interviews, speeches, and other 
venues. Trump (2000, 145-146) states that “We need tougher negotiations, not 
protectionist walls around America. We need to ensure that foreign markets in 
Japan and France and Germany and Saudi Arabia are as open to our products 
as our country is to theirs... We need to renegotiate fair trade agreements.” 
Continuing further, he asserts: “What I would do if elected president would be 
to appoint myself U.S. trade representative; my lawyers have checked and the 
president has this authority. I would take personal charge of negotiations with 
the Japanese, the French, the Germans, and the Saudis. Our trading partners 
would have to sit across the table from Donald Trump and I guarantee you the 
rip-off of the United States would end.”
The key in all is his belief and seemingly genuine concern that trade, as pres-
ently implemented, is unfair to Americans and unfree; that the U.S. is open to 
trade but its major competitors are not quite, that trade laws and agreements 
are ill defined or unenforced, and that, as a result, other countries gain at the 
expense of the U.S.
In other words, the typical protectionist concerns are really the by-products of 
his major concern which is that the setting for the game of trade in the current 
global order is unfair and that the established rules of the game are not 
enforced. It is, therefore, not a coincidence that, the new 2017 Trade Agenda of 
the United States, announced in early March by the United States Trade Rep-
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resentative (USTR), “reinforces the Administration’s commitment to defend 
American interests through the promotion of truly free and fair trade.” It 
outlines four trade priorities: promoting U.S. sovereignty, enforcing U.S. trade 
laws, leveraging American economic strength to expand exports, and protect-
ing U.S. intellectual property rights (USTR 2017a). While the officials chosen 
to lead this agenda are known as prominent advocates of protectionism, they 
deeply share the key aspect of the president’s view on fairness and reciprocity 
in trade. Key Trump trade officials include the economist Peter Navarro as 
Director of the newly established White House National Trade Council, bil-
lionaire investor Wilbur Ross as Secretary of the Department of Commerce, 
and trade attorney and former deputy USTR (under President Ronald Reagan) 
Robert Lighthizer as the U.S. Trade Representative. None of these officials is 
against trade or advocates raising barriers in order to protect industries nega-
tively affected by NAFTA or trade in general. In statements given on different 
occasions, all three point to inadequate and unfair governance of global trade 
as a major concern and the necessity to establish better rules. To give just one 
example, according to a National Public Radio (NPR) interview, Mr. Navarro 
insists that gains from trade “are undermined when other countries unfairly 
subsidize exports, manipulate currency, steal intellectual property, or require 
American firms to transfer technology as a cost of doing business.” Seeing 
unfair trade practices and bad trade deals as the “biggest piece of the action’, 
Navarro suggests that new trade deals preventing such practices are necessary. 
He also points to the political character of trade noting that “A lot of these 
trade deals that we enter into are done not to create jobs here in America, not 
to boost our income, but to forge alliances and to address things other than the 
economy.”
Given the concern for fairness in trade, it is not surprising that the new admin-
istration does not fundamentally oppose trade or trade agreements but rather 
stresses the importance of new or renewed agreements so long as they are 
negotiated on a bilateral and reciprocal basis. In its embrace of a different way 
of conducting and governing trade the new administration demonstrates its 
concerns about the distributional impacts of trade rather than trade’s overall 
economic gains to society – a major departure from the conventional view 
which emphasizes overall gains. A global economic system based on dysfunc-
tional multilateralism is viewed as one that harmed American workers and has 
led to unnecessary losses in economic activity. Bilateralism, supposedly, will 
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allow for a level playing field and for a greater leverage in sharing the gains 
from trade. It is, therefore, fair to say that the new administration is not pro-
tectionist in the traditional sense of the word.
What does this shift in U.S. trade policy mean in the context of NAFTA? 
The new administration may seek to transform NAFTA by following mostly 
one-on-one, industry-by-industry or product-by-product negotiations with 
Mexico and Canada. The issues with Mexico are, certainly, more complex and 
beyond the scope of this brief. In the case of Canada, it means that the new 
administration will look carefully into the U.S.’s trade relations with Canada 
and will identify and address any existing Canadian barriers to trade with 
the U.S., tariff or non-tariff. While trade in goods and services with Canada is 
mostly free, there are sectors such as soft lumber, dairy, telecom, and trans-
portations which are viewed as problematic by the U.S. It is likely that the U.S. 
administration will try to target these sectors.  Also, as stated in a letter from 
Ambassador Lighthizer to congressional leaders, renegotiation talks are likely 
to focus on modernizing NAFTA in areas such as intellectual property rights, 
digital trade, regulatory practices, services, state-owned enterprises, customs 
procedures, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, small and medium busi-
nesses, and labour and environmental protection (USTR 2017b).
In short, the Trump administration will seek to establish openness to trade 
conditional to an equal degree of openness on behalf of its trading partners. 
Establishing and even defining equality in openness is of course a challenging 
matter but one that can, perhaps, be achieved by well-defined and enforceable 
trade provisions, rules, and regulations. Within this general approach to trade, 
NAFTA’s existing provisions may undergo deep scrutiny and, some, may sub-
sequently be redefined. NTBs such as subsidies, food and health measures and 
the like will most likely be given special attention and be subject to harsher 
regulations.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADIAN TRADE POLICY
As mentioned above, on May 18,2017 Ambassador Lighthizer formally notified 
Congress about the administration’s intent to renegotiate NAFTA. This means 
that Canada has less than 90 days to prepare for the earliest possible start of 
renegotiations.
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The above discussion leads to the following suggested course of action for 
Canada:
First, it is important to better establish the degree to which NAFTA, in its 
current form, is important for Canada. Within this context, it is important 
to better understand the good and harm (as claimed by labour unions) that 
NAFTA has done to Canada. This will assist in providing evidence to better 
inform policy but also support the process of renegotiation. This requires a 
fresh, comprehensive study/report on the welfare, distributional, and other 
economic impacts of the agreement on Canada. In the case of the U.S., most 
recent studies point to significant losses that some industries and states 
incurred as a result of NAFTA (Caliendo and Parro, 2014; Hakobyan and 
McLaren 2016)3.  It is precisely the pains from these losses that the President 
and his administration have capitalized on during and after elections. It is 
likely that the administration will seek to restrict imports or otherwise protect 
these industries and states. Canada should be prepared to point to its own 
losses or weaker industries and present its own demands in return for the 
demands of the administration. Proper studies and measurements of distribu-
tional and other effects of NAFTA on Canada are imperative in order to know 
what to bargain for on the renegotiation table.
Second, Canada should take this seemingly unfortunate development as an 
opportunity to look at NAFTA with modern eyes, re-evaluate its provisions 
and assess the ways in which NAFTA can be improved and made more bene-
ficial for Canada. It’s a fairly outdated agreement which needs to be changed 
to address the economic, political, and business life of today. Therefore, it is 
important to know what Canada wants to keep of NAFTA and what it wants 
from a renewed agreement. The letter of Ambassador Lighthizer to Congress 
seems more rational and reasonable than many have expected. It is written in 
the context of modernization, and a search for new and better opportunities. 
It speaks of setting a better regulatory framework for governing trade between 
the three members. It is, therefore, essential that Canada remains open to 
suggested plans and proposals of the U.S. administration but also have a list 
of priorities of its own. For example, it is well known that labour and envi-
ronmental aspects were only included as side agreements of NAFTA and thus 
3 See also the analysis of Dani Rodrik at an interview with editor-at-large John Judis of Talking Points 
Memo and Rodrik’s comments and discussions elsewhere; see also commentaries and publications by Dean Baker 
of the Center for Economic and Policy Research.
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difficult to enforce. Both issues are contentious and matter today more than 23 
years ago. Addressing the two issues could be made a priority.
Third, given the many uncertainties and frequent changes in the new admin-
istration’s priorities and agenda, it is best to remain calm and avoid getting 
caught in the political and trade rhetoric of the Trump administration. 
Johnson (2017) suggested that Canada might be side-swiped “if the Trump 
administration chooses to take trade action against other U.S. trading part-
ners… This would be in addition to the likelihood that the fresh countervailing 
duty (CVD) actions by the US lumber industry will feed into the narrative.” 
Indeed, there was a period of increased tensions after the imposition of the 
highly expected CVDs on Canadian soft lumber in late April. Prime Minister 
Trudeau immediately signalled retaliation by announcing his consideration 
of banning exports of U.S. thermal coal via British Columbia (BC) ports and 
raising duties on exports from Oregon in return. Retaliation is a risky strategy 
and unnecessary in the short term and particularly not for the reason of CVDs 
on soft lumber. They were expected and nothing new and they can be dealt 
with in a different way (by imposing export quotas, for example), without neg-
atively affecting Canadian workers and businesses at BC ports.4  The adminis-
tration’s attitudes can be perceived as irritating and bullish so it’s very easy to 
overreact. It is best to remain passive but prepared to stand ground until the 
administration makes clear its intents at the negotiating table.
Fourth, in the more general sense, Canada should be careful with the policy of 
retaliation. Given North American economic integration and supply chains, it 
is true that all three NAFTA members need each other and retaliation can be 
considered a potentially effective way of punishing an opponent or reversing 
an unfavourable trade decision.  But this is not a game theoretic environment 
with all partners being equal. In the context of international trade, the U.S. is 
a large country which can retaliate against its smaller trading partners without 
being too affected. As a small country, Canada should avoid retaliation and 
look for a different type of leverage in the short and long terms. Such leverage 
can include convincing American law makers and officials against the raise 
of tariffs on Canadian exports or reaching an agreement that will satisfy the 
4 Export quotas imposed on Canadian soft lumber can provide significant windfall profits for Canadian 
and some to American producers, all at the expense of the American consumer. While inefficient, export quotas 
seem to be, in this case, a better way for Canadians to deal with the issue, particularly if they can share the windfall 
profits with every stakeholder in the industry.
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interests of both countries without the need to retaliate. If chosen as policy, it 
is best to ensure that the benefits of retaliation exceed its costs at home. Those 
costs may be devastating for a small country which is still dependent on U.S. 
for majority of its exports.
The following are some specific policy options that can be given priority and 
used to better leverage trade and investment for Canadians on the negotiating 
table.
• Given the level of current integration, it is best that the agreement is made 
on a trilateral basis. Canada should team up with Mexico and make every 
effort to keep it as such.
• As mentioned above, it is likely that the administration will seek access 
to Canadian markets which are currently protected, such as dairy and 
poultry. If protecting these industries is critical for Canada, it must 
convince the U.S. to leave them exempt from NAFTA provisions. On the 
other hand, access to these markets can be granted in return for the U.S.’s 
removing of barriers from some of its own sectors.
• It is important to include labour and environmental standards in the actual 
NAFTA agreement. Labour and environmental agency representatives 
should be consulted in drafting the desired policy framework.
• Remaining open to U.S. demands for change in NAFTA provisions is 
important but if they are unreasonable or unacceptable to Canada, refusing 
to reach an agreement should not be viewed as a disaster. The worse case 
scenario is to return to bilateral negotiations most probably with provisions 
similar to those under CUSFTA or to withdraw from NAFTA and thus 
establish relations under the WTO’s framework.
CONCLUSION
Adjusting to President Trump and his administration has brought a range of 
uncertainties and challenges which in some cases affect deeply not only the 
U.S. but other countries, particularly its neighbours. In the case of NAFTA, 
there are many reasons to remain optimistic. The plans and agenda of the 
USTR do not present any troubling signs with regards to NAFTA and renegoti-
ation is an opportunity to modernize and improve the agreement. It is also an 
opportunity to better study and understand its impacts. All three countries are 
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also WTO members. In the case of terminating NAFTA they are bound by the 
WTO’s multilateral trading system which is viewed, in many ways, as superior 
to trade under preferential agreements.
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Chapter 4 
SCIENCE AND INNOVATION 
POLICY FOR CANADA’S NEXT 150 
YEARS
By Peter WB Phillips, Graeme Jobe, Adity Das Gupta, Sarah Juma, Paul Trujillo 
Jacome, Samuel Kanyoro Karba, Achint Rastogi and Michael Horvath
Johnson Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy
INTRODUCTION
The Trudeau era science and innovation policy is emerging in fits and starts. The government got elected in late 2015 with a mandate that advocated a stronger and more dynamic science and innovation agenda 
(Phillips & Castle 2016), but delivery has been complicated. While quite a few 
pronouncements were made in the 2016 budget, delivery was spotty and slow. 
This current budget is in some ways trapped by its circumstances: measures 
from last year are still rolling out; prognostications from the new US Admin-
istration raised the possibility of substantial changes in the US tax code and 
US trade agreements; and the study on fundamental science (aka the Naylor 
Report) was still pending when the Minister of Finance stood up in the House. 
These three pressures made an aggressive science and innovation policy more 
important, but also made it more complicated to actually construct a set of 
measures that would stand the test of time.
In many ways, the 2017 budget muddled through, both advancing the impor-
tance of innovation, without fully defining its scale and scope, and introducing 
a range of reforms of various policy and program spaces in preparation for 
greater funding in future years. The fundamental question is whether the mea-
sures promoted will remain relevant and supported, and most importantly for 
the Trudeau government, whether they may deliver any real and measurable 
impacts before the next election, expected in late 2019.
CANADA’S INNOVATION ECONOMY AT 150
A stocktaking of Canada’s capacity and performance at its 150th anniversary 
offers both some bragging opportunities and reasons for despair (see Doern, 
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Castle and Phillips 2016 for a review of the past 50 years). As it reaches this 
milestone, Canada is ranked as 10th in the 2016 United Nations Human Devel-
opment Index of 188 countries (some more popular rankings by think tanks 
and new organizations place us between 1st and 15th in their rankings), with 
annual per capita incomes in excess of C$60,000, which puts us about 20th in 
the global income league in purchasing power terms. In many ways, Canada’s 
current prosperity is a product of many world-first innovations and adaptions, 
including insulin, standard time, rust resistant wheat, the process to make 
wood pulp, the Robertson screw and canola, to name but a few.
While we can and should congratulate ourselves on our accomplishments, it 
has long been a practice of scholars and think tanks in Canada to see the glass 
as half empty, with many opportunities either not fully realized or simply 
ignored. The contemporary evidence shows that there is more that Canada 
could aspire to. Using the internationally recognized benchmark of Gross 
Expenditure on R&D as a percent of GDP (GERD), as of 2014 Canada had 
slipped back to about 1.6%, down from over 2% in the early 2000s. This puts 
Canada’s effort well below the average OECD effort.
Table 1: Key S&T performance indicators, Canada, US and OECD
Canada 2014 US 2015 OECD 2015
Gross expenditure on R&D US$ billion current 
prices and PPP
$26 $503 $245
$ per capita at current prices and PPP $724 $1,563 $975
% GDP 1.61 2.79 2.4
% GDP, average 2010-14 1.74 2.74 2.34
% financed by Industry 45 64 61
% financed by government 35 24 27
% performed by Industry 50 72 69
% performed by higher education 40 13 18
% performed by government 9 11 11
FTE researchers, 000, 2014 159 (2013) 1,352 4,651
FTE researchers per thousand total 
employment
8.8 (2013) 9.1 8.1
In spite of uplifting stories of Canadian business success, as a whole indus-
try has a comparatively poor innovation track record compared with other 
advanced countries, and in particular compared to the United States. Cana-
dian government and non-business enterprises fund about 55% of total R&D 
in Canada while business funds almost two-thirds of R&D in the US and other 
OECD nations. The most dramatic difference is in who performs R&D. In 
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Canada, about 40% of the R&D is undertaken in higher education institutions, 
which is more than twice the amount in the OECD, three times the amount in 
the US and the highest among OECD countries, except a few of the recently 
admitted Eastern European countries. The federal Science, Technology and 
Innovation Council (STIC, 2015) and others have asserted this heavy reliance 
on universities to conduct research. This explains why Canada is among the 
top producers of peer-reviewed published work—Canadian researchers, ranked 
ninth out of the 34 OECD countries for the number of top-cited publications—
yet lags on the number of triadic patents and commercialization of research.
For those that only read government of Canada policy documents, the rather 
bleak picture painted above may be a bit jarring. This government is more 
prone to the glass half-full approach, preferring to accentuate the positive. 
The data cited in the 2017 federal budget would appear to place Canada in the 
lead in innovation circles. The government cherry picked the best performing 
clusters and ignored the downward trends in actual investments in R&D. For 
instance, the budget notes that Canada is listed as first in OECD with the most 
highly-educated workforce, first for overall business cost competitiveness, 
second in the G7 for openness to trade and investment, top five for access to 
training to start a business, third in the Global Entrepreneurship Index and 
sixth for highly cited scholarly research. The problem is that none of this can 
compensate for low government expenditure on research and development 
(GERD) (largely attributed to weak business expenditure on R&D) and weak 
productivity growth. The latest OECD numbers show Canada’s multi-factor 
productivity rose an anemic 0.5% per annum between 1985 and 2015. This 
contrasts with average increase of 0.7%, 0.9% and 1.1% per annum in the same 
period in Australia, the US and Germany, respectively. While the differences 
may seem minor, accumulated over that period Canada advanced our pro-
ductivity only about 16% in aggregate, while Australia, the US and Germany 
advanced their productivity 21%, 31% and 36% receptively. Clearly, Canada is 
in need of recasting its efforts.
PRE-BUDGET CONSULTATIONS AND ADVICE
Every government, especially a new one, gets lots of free advice on what to do 
when and how to do it. This government was bombarded by all camps (e.g. 
Nicholson 2016; STIC 2015), but science and innovation policy was a clear 
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target of three motivated commentators. Two expert groups in particular were 
expected to receive particular consideration from Liberal Finance Minister 
Bill Morneau. The first was, the Advisory Council on Economic Growth (the 
Council), formed following the late-2015 Canadian Federal Election and 
chaired by McKinsey and Co. Managing Director Dominic Barton. The second 
was Canada 2020, founded by Tom Pitfield, the spouse of Liberal Party Presi-
dent Anna Gainey, and with reputed close ties to the Liberal Party. In a report 
published slightly before Morneau’s delivery of the 2017 budget speech on 22 
March, the Council laid out five key recommendations. Similarly, a 180-page 
paper from Canada 2020 published in early February 2017 detailed ten ‘Big 
Ideas’ to firmly establish Canada as a global leader in innovation. Near budget 
date, the Institute for Fiscal Studies and Democracy (IFSD), led by Kevin Page, 
former Parliamentary Budget Officer, also waded into the discussion about the 
budget’s priorities for science and innovation.
The Council report focused on the broad themes of increasing productivity, 
driving inclusive growth and helping to create conditions for entrepreneurial 
companies to scale up and become global champions. The Council recom-
mended five innovation-specific actions to the government, all deeply inter-
related and suggestive of a comprehensive Canada-wide innovation strategy. 
Specifically, the report proposed: catalyzing the formation of business-led 
‘innovation marketplaces’ in sectors and technologies where Canada has 
momentum and where market participants need new solutions; creating addi-
tional pools of growth capital to ensure promising companies have sufficient 
capital to scale-up (The Council identified a $600-850 million funding gap in 
venture capital funding for Canadian companies in and between the early and 
growth stages of company development); modifying government procurement 
policy to enable government and other public sector players to become import-
ant first customers to test and validate Canadian innovations; reviewing and 
rationalizing government innovation programs, while scaling up those that 
have proven impact; and expediting entry for top talent through immigration 
to reduce the talent shortfall for high-growth companies.
The Canada 2020 Report meanwhile focused on ten ‘Big Ideas’ that all in one 
way or another addressed various aspects of the innovation agenda. These 
ideas include: creating a Parliamentary Coherence Office to coordinate and 
direct innovation policy; providing open, shared, stewarded and transparent 
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data; fostering labour markets able to adapt to changing technologies and 
markets; developing new firm and infrastructure financing mechanisms; 
undertaking financial regulatory reform; establishing a set of Canada 150 
Goals and Canada 150 Prizes; promoting a Canada-wide transformation of 
numeracy skills; building a Network of Cluster Research Centres; reforming 
immigration to focus on tradable sectors; and developing sector specific inno-
vation accords.
Perhaps the most fundamental and insightful of all the commentaries was the 
brief report on skills and innovation spending produced before the budget by 
the IFSD (2017). The report accepted that a focus on innovation and skill devel-
opment is a proper response to the weak multifactor productivity and ageing 
demographics that now plague the economy. However, the report noted that 
large investments are already being made that are not especially well orga-
nized, focused or managed. The Institute estimated that the government spent 
approximately $22.6 billion on innovation and skills development and training 
across 147 activities (programs and tax expenditures) in 2016/17. Over 60% 
of the money ($14.2 billion) was spent on 57 programs and tax expenditures 
for skills development and training activities, including $1.7 billion on the 
Canada Student Loans Program and $2.1 billion on various federal-provincial 
labour market agreements that exclusively target skills. It also identified $8.3 
billion allocated for innovation, through 82 programs and 8 tax expenditures. 
The most damning critique was that none of the 21 tax expenditures had any 
publicly available performance metrics and only a small number of the 126 
program activities had strong metrics. One might infer that without some 
sense of why the existing investments either work or fail to work, it would be 
foolish to spend money on hope rather than evidence of impact.
While it is difficult to assign influence, one might conclude that The Council 
seemed to be closest to the mark, as all five of their core recommendations 
found their way in some way into the 2017 Budget. Meanwhile, none of Canada 
2020’s ten ‘Big Ideas’ appeared explicitly or substantively, though traces of 
their influence could still be detected. The challenge from the IFSD and Kevin 
Page appears consistent with the creation in the budget of Innovation Canada 
with a mandate to undertake further reviews of program activity and impact.
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THE BUDGET PLAN AS ANNOUNCED
The 2017 Canadian Budget, entitled “Building a Strong Middle Class,” was 
promoted beforehand as a bold statement outlining the trajectory of Canadian 
industry in a fast-changing global economy. As with most budgets, there are 
too many moving parts to do justice to all of the plans and changes. Instead 
of interrogating each item specifically mentioned in the budget speech, it is 
possible to get a sense of the scale, scope and direction of change by investigat-
ing the speech at three levels. First, we explore the overall rhetoric to discern 
how the 2017 budget cast science and innovation policy. Second we examine 
the aggregate effects of all the fiscal changes to determine the overall scope, 
direction and magnitude of the changes. Finally, we review the major budget 
initiatives (both new and recast) to explore the nuances of the strategic direc-
tion of government in this field.
Examining the rhetorical casting of the budget is revealing. Before the budget 
was announced, the government was hailing Canada 150 as an event to cel-
ebrate innovation and the budget as a fundamental shift in priorities in the 
federal sphere, and by extension a nudge to others – industry, the provinces 
and other actors to shift their focus towards more aggressive pursuit of 
innovation, albeit in ways that might deliver more inclusive results. The first 
surprise was that while innovation is woven throughout the budget, the key 
theme of the budget was bolstering the middle class through inclusive policies. 
A more fundamental concern is that while the budget is unquestionably cast in 
the verbiage of innovation, using the term more than 240 times, it offers little 
sense of what innovation is, what drives it and how it can contribute to eco-
nomic growth and social welfare, and ultimately to bolstering the middle class. 
The budget says:
[i]nnovation is, simply put, the understanding that better is always possi-
ble. It is the key that unlocks possibilities and opportunities. From urban 
centres to rural farms, from researchers looking to secure new patents to 
entrepreneurs working to bring their products to market, innovation is 
what allows Canadians to adapt to change and prepare for the future.
Innovation helps to create new jobs in growing industries and transforms 
jobs in existing ones. That means new and exciting job prospects for 
Canadian workers— good, well-paying jobs today, and even better oppor-
tunities for our children (Budget 2017, p. 17).
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This vague and rather utopian view of innovation is devoid of any appreciation 
for the different strands of theory and practice that underlie innovation poli-
cies and systems in other countries. The definition seems to focus narrowly on 
patented products. Over 80 years ago, Schumpeter (1934) offered a much more 
robust definition of innovation, including: introducing a new good or a new 
quality of an existing good; a new method of production; the opening of a new 
market; the introduction of a new supply of inputs to a production system; or 
a new organizational structure. Moreover, he got to the heart of the innovation 
challenge, asserting that innovation is simply “the setting up of a new produc-
tion function and ‘technical change’ is a shorthand expression for any kind of 
shift in the production function” (Schumpeter 1939).
In absence of anchoring innovation in a clear definition and causal theory, the 
rhetoric is thin and artificial (see Phillips 2007). To give a sense of the discon-
nect, a simple word count of the budget papers shows that ‘innovation’ is used 
241 times, ‘change’ 201 times and ‘technology’ 126 times with skills (183) and 
the middle class (130) presented as counterpoised realities. The actual process 
by which innovation generates outcomes is almost unexplored. Clusters, 
mostly in the context of ‘superclusters’ are cited 16 times, but technological 
change and productivity, the ultimate pathways to better prosperity and more 
jobs, are only mentioned twice each. This gives pause to think that whatever 
actions are pursued in the budget may have limited impact on the ultimate 
goals (see Phillips et al 2012 for an exposition of cluster and innovation policy).
Second, looking at the aggregate numbers one can see significant annual 
variance between the last Harper budget and the current budget. Overall, total 
program spending jumped about 11% in the first year of this current govern-
ment, but then settled back in the most recent budget.
Just more than half of the outlays are appropriated for the portfolio of pro-
grams and special agencies managed by the Ministry of Innovation, Science 
and Economic Development. Looking across the portfolio, appropriations for 
the Ministry and its programs have more than doubled, at least partly to fund 
the new superclusters and increased funding for venture funding through the 
Business Development Bank of Canada, for an artificial intelligence strategy, 
a new procurement plan and for various other new funding programs. Alloca-
tions for the Tri-Councils, the Canada Foundation for Innovation and National 
Research Council Canada are up, but less than the rate of inflation in research 
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and the other agencies have taken modest cuts. A range of other science based 
departments and agencies, including Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 
National Resources Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada and Health Canada, 
spend the bulk of the rest of the appropriations. The major tax expenditures 
for the Scientific Research and Experimental Development Investment Tax 
Credit, both the refundable and non-refundable portions, have risen at about 
the rate of inflation, in aggregate totalling an estimated $2.9 billion in 2018. 
Overall, the directed program-spending, while up since the last Harper year, is 
down in 2017/18 from the previous year, suggesting that while there a range of 
significant, new plans they will take time to mature and start spending at full 
capacity.
Table 2: Federal program and tax expenditures on S&T, by major department and 
agency
C$ millions 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 % change 
2015/16 to 
2017/18
All federal program spending 10,363 11,439 11,297 9.0%
ISED Portfolio
Department 366 558 855 133.6%
CFI 341 336 367 7.6%
CIHR 1,026 1,084 1,087 5.9%
Canadian Space Agency 389 383 333 -14.4%
NRC 981 1,094 1,002 2.1%
NSERC 1,115 1,196 1,207 8.3%
SSHRC 720 778 775 7.6%
Statistics Canada 640 864 583 -8.9%
Portfolio sub-total 5578 6293 6209 11.3%
Other science based departments and agencies
Agriculture and Agri-Food 496 492 447 -9.9%
Environment & Climate 
Change
621 658 652 5.0%
Fisheries and Oceans 235 300 299 27.2%
Global Affairs 456 486 453 -0.7%
Health Canada 373 381 386 3.5%
Natural Resources Canada 494 528 505 2.2%
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd 389 406 418 7.5%
National Defence 261 277 294 12.6%
Other departments and 
agencies
1,460 1,618 1,634 11.9%
Subtotal 4,785 5,146 5,088 6.3%
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Scientific Research and Experimental Development Investment Tax Credit
Non-refundable portion for CIT 1,385 1,445 1,500 8.3%
Refundable Portion 1,305 1,350 1,405 7.7%
Total Tax Credits 2,690 2,795 2,905 8.0%
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&id=3580163
Taking the rhetorical excesses and the declining appropriations in 2017/18 
together might lead one to suspect that the government was trying to under-
take a bait and switch, accentuating innovation without actually doing much 
new or more to realize the goal, but this budget actually introduces five new 
and potentially influential programs and activities. Interestingly the major 
initiatives directly map onto the advice from the Council, perhaps one of the 
first times one might see such direct influence of an advisory body on a budget.
First, in order to “catalyze the formation of business-led ‘innovation mar-
ketplaces’” the budget proposes to support the creation of ‘superclusters’ to 
support privately-led strategic sectors through a publically-coordinated effort 
to interconnect government, industry, and academia. Initially discussed in the 
2016 budget and economic statements, these superclusters are initially tar-
geted on six key innovation areas—advanced manufacturing, agri-food, clean 
technology, digital industries, health/bio-sciences and clean resources—closely 
mirroring where the Council recommended the development of innovation 
marketplaces. While the ultimate size, structure and focus of these superclu-
sters was left to be unveiled later, the budget allocated $950 million for super-
cluster development over five years, with a modest first allocation in 2017/18.
Second, to help fill the gap identified by the Council in available venture 
capital funding for Canadian companies, the Budget announced a $400 
million infusion to the Business Development Bank of Canada, starting in 
2017/18. Directed toward late-stage venture capital investment where the 
largest funding gap is supposed to exist, the Venture Capital Catalyst Initia-
tive is hoped to leverage another $1.1 billion private capital toward Canadian 
innovation.
Third, in response to both the Council and the Jenkins Report (2014) the 
budget proposes to make federal procurement more strategic through the 
formation of Innovative Solutions Canada, modelled on the highly successful 
US Small Business Innovation Research Program. Each federal agency will 
commit a fraction of its funding toward testing and validating Canadian inno-
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vations. The program is also designed to be scalable so as to include a broader 
group of public agencies if early activities prove successful. The budget allo-
cated $50 million in 2017/18 to get the initiative started.
Fourth, the budget responds to the advice it got from the Council, Canada 
2020 and the IFSD with its proposal to start the process of reviewing, sim-
plifying, rationalizing and coordinating Canada’s existing suite of innovation 
programs through Innovation Canada, a new platform entity. As a first step in 
this process, ISED is tasked with coordinating the reassignment of up to $1.26 
billion of existing programme funding over the next 5 years to support a new 
Strategic Innovation Fund, which will use targeted funds to accelerate firm or 
sectoral growth and exports.
Fifth, the budget announced a Global Skills Strategy focusing immigration 
policy to help attract foreign talent in order to further the growth of “high 
potential” small and medium sized enterprises. This strategy includes: $7.8 
million to remove barriers to short-term work arrangements and make per-
manent residence programs more responsive to needs of the Canadian labour 
market; $279.8 million over five years to continue the Temporary Foreign 
Worker and the International Mobility Programs; and $27.5 million over five 
years to support a Targeted Employment Strategy for Newcomers. Domes-
tically, the budget announced that the government would appropriate $225 
million over four years “to establish a new organization to support skills devel-
opment and measurement in Canada,” though the name and details of this 
organization were unclear.
Overall, the budget offered more of what Lindbloom (1959) called ‘muddling 
through’ than large-scale root change. Innovation is on the agenda, but in a 
muddled, soft, non-threatening way. While there are a number of what look to 
be large scale and potentially aggressive policy and program ventures—super-
clusters, vencap funding, strategic procurement, strategic investment and a 
global skills strategy—they are all accommodated within the broad program 
and institutional base of the existing budget framework. Money is moved 
around, but no new money is forthcoming. As these initiatives mature, there 
is promise of greater allocations but it is far from clear from the budget state-
ment whether those would be accommodated within the current S&T funding 
envelope or would involve new infusions. While better targeting is always 
welcomed, the evidence is clear that we absolutely need more investment in 
56 How Ottawa Spends
R&D—no countries with GERD at our level outperform Canada and almost all 
the countries with higher GERD have stronger performances.
PROSPECTS FOR DELIVERY
Budgets come and go. The real test for a government is whether the proposed 
policies and programs move the dial on targeted priorities and this agenda 
will tax the government to deliver. The first test has come with the superclu-
sters program. Even before the application process was unveiled, insiders 
reported that more than 40 unsolicited proposals were received in Ottawa. It 
has become clearer that candidate superclusters will need to be led by anchor 
firms or better yet regionally located sectors that will need to contribute 
significant funds to leverage federal dollars. Some suggest the ante could be 
as high as $200 million in industry funding over five years and that would 
then leverage matching amounts from the federal program. University and 
industry resources, while welcomed, may not be eligible for matching, unlike 
in most of the merit-based leveraging programs in CFI and the tri-agencies. As 
the program evolves, it may reveal a practical inconsistency—to assemble the 
$200 million grubstake to compete, most sectors will need to do a United Way 
campaign, which will lead to significant technological, geographic and market 
dispersion. Hence, we may be faced with funding ventures that are either 
super or clusters, but not both. Clusters rely on proximity but assembling the 
required capital may require drawing ever larger boundaries that ultimately 
undercut the implied benefits of investing in geographically concentrated 
industrial systems.
Other program initiatives will be equally challenged, given that the govern-
ment will soon cross the midway point in its mandate and start to look to mea-
sureable returns for its efforts. Strategic procurement has been a long-stand-
ing recommendation, but it will soon confront the reality that major materiel 
purchases (e.g. replacement military jets and frigates) and key infrastructure 
investments have long-standing supply chains and practices that could com-
plicate change. Vencap programs sound good, but the returns seldom match 
the ambitions of the investors; the money can probably be disbursed in the 
immediate period, but the returns will take quite a while to materialize. One-
stop access for government programs for business development is a 20-year 
project of governments in Canada (Atkinson et al 2012); pairing this with the 
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$1.26 billion Strategic Investment Program could create some sense of urgency 
and importance, but the relatively large scale of the resulting investments may 
not be scaled appropriately to SME acceleration. Finally, given the complicated 
engagement between provinces, industries, the higher education sector and 
the federal system, shifting the skills system will be important, but slow.
CONCLUSIONS
While the original idea was for Canada’s 150th anniversary celebration and 
the 2017 budget to be framed at least partly around innovation, the game 
plan changed significantly. The challenge for innovation policy is that any 
action often incurs significant up-front costs and delivers largely uncertain 
and indefinite benefits delayed by years, if not decades. For this reason, it is 
hard for governments to sustain their enthusiasm and dedication to the file. In 
the past year, the federal government has fallen victim to this challenge and 
has responded by avoiding fundamental change. In many cases, it has simply 
refocused effort from accelerating scientific advancement towards realizing or 
accelerating economic growth in the current government mandate. While that 
may be good politics, it has the undesirable effect of delaying or forestalling 
action that could change Canada’s lagging innovation performance and pro-
ductivity growth.
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Chapter 5 
PREDICTABLY UNPREDICTABLE: 
THE PROBLEM WITH 
EQUALIZATION FROM A 
PROVINCIAL BUDGETING 
PERSPECTIVE
By Erich Hartmann
INTRODUCTION
The Equalization program plays an important role in the fiscal arrangements 
that underpin Canada’s federal system. For some provinces, it is a significant 
source of revenue - representing, for example, over 20 per cent of Prince 
Edward Island’s total revenues. It is also instrumental in giving effect to com-
parability in government programs across the country. The redistribution of 
funds it engenders helps to ensure that all Canadians have access to quality 
provincial programs regardless of where they live. The principle that Cana-
dians should have access to public services of comparable quality no matter 
where they live is an important one, so much so that it has been enshrined 
in Section 36(2) of the Canadian Constitution. Equalization takes the form of 
a transfer from the federal government to eligible provinces. The funds are 
transferred unconditionally - that is, receiving provinces can spend the funds 
to address their own priorities in whatever manner they see fit.
The program is, and will continue to be, beset by challenges. From a provincial 
budgeting perspective, the unpredictable nature of Equalization revenues is 
the most problematic as it complicates budgetary planning in affected prov-
inces. Unpredictability in the transfer, whose main purpose is to enable the 
delivery of comparable services across provinces, is at best unnecessary, and 
at worst potentially harmful. Provincial governments are the sole clients of 
Equalization. The program can and should work better for them.
The issue of unpredictability in Equalization payments is not a new one. 
However, during the autumn of 2008, in the lead-up to the release of Equal-
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ization entitlements for the 2009-10 fiscal year, the federal government found 
itself confronted with challenges that would begin to undermine the afford-
ability of the Equalization program. Those challenges, and the ad hoc mea-
sures introduced to address them, have created their own suite of issues with 
respect to predictability of Equalization payments.
The most obvious of the challenges the federal government faced in late 2008 
were the economic and concomitant fiscal developments that were beginning 
to unfold. Two other factors, however, would also affect Equalization specif-
ically at that time. For the first time in the program’s history, Ontario was 
to receive Equalization payments in the 2009-10 fiscal year, putting fiscal 
pressure on the program. Secondly, rapidly increasing natural resource prices 
strained the role of the program as an agent of interregional redistribution in 
Canada.
Ontario’s qualification for Equalization presented the federal government with 
two main problems. First and foremost was cost. In simple terms, Ontario is 
very expensive to equalize because entitlements are measured as the variance 
of a province’s fiscal capacity – that is its ability to raise revenues if it were 
to tax at national average tax rates - from the national average in per capita 
terms. Ontario’s large population means it requires a lot of money to equalize, 
even if the province falls only slightly below the Equalization standard. In 
addition to the cost it represented, the qualification of Ontario for Equalization 
payments was doubly problematic for the federal government as the province 
has traditionally been the source of a large and disproportionate share of its 
revenues. As the fiscal well dried up in Ontario, it strained the federal gov-
ernment’s ability to finance many of its commitments including the recently 
enacted enhancements to Equalization.
At the same time that Ontario’s economy was in relative decline, the economic 
prominence of Canada’s “resource-rich provinces” (Alberta, British Columbia, 
Saskatchewan and Newfoundland & Labrador) was growing. The growth in 
the economies of the resource-rich provinces over that period was attributable 
largely to the sustained increase in commodity prices, especially oil. The rapid 
increase in commodity prices had a direct impact on the Equalization program 
in that it led to significant increases in fiscal capacity in the resource-rich 
provinces. Between 2003-04 and 2008-09, the combined fiscal capacity of the 
resource-rich provinces grew by 59.4 per cent, significantly faster than 17.7 per 
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cent growth experienced in the rest of Canada over that period. Perhaps most 
striking were Newfoundland & Labrador and Saskatchewan, which experi-
enced growth in per capita resource-based fiscal capacity of 982 per cent and 
268 per cent respectively over that period.
As this growth in resource wealth was limited to only a few provinces, the 
greater concentration of fiscal capacity in those provinces led to greater vari-
ances between all provinces writ large. Greater variance between provinces 
generally creates the need for more Equalization. The issue with variances 
related to resource capacity, however, is that the federal government does not 
have direct access to the royalty revenues that give rise to these variances. 
As such, it is on the hook for the increased Equalization costs that rises in 
commodity prices create, without having direct access to the revenue tool that 
would help finance those increased costs.
In response to these challenges, the federal government introduced changes 
to the Equalization program that would take effect for the upcoming 2009-10 
fiscal year. The most fundamental change was to cap the total size of the 
program to a “fixed envelope”, designed to contain the costs of the program in 
light of challenges posed by rising commodity prices and Ontario’s qualifica-
tion for payments. Starting in 2009-10, year-over-year growth in the program 
would instead be limited to a three-year moving average of GDP growth. 
Constraining the program to a fixed envelope has the effect of divorcing the 
Equalization standard from the determination of the total size of the program.
The GDP ceiling has produced significant cost savings for the federal gov-
ernment. Since 2009-10, the federal government has saved a cumulative 
$26.5 billion from the application of a fixed envelope, compared to what the 
uncapped program would have generated in its place.
In addition to containing the cost of the program, the GDP ceiling also gives 
the federal government more-or-less perfect certainty regarding the size of 
the Equalization program from year to year. However, the fixed envelope 
also creates a zero-sum game between receiving provinces. As a result, the 
two factors that caused the federal government to make the 2008 changes 
to Equalization in the first place - Ontario’s qualification for payments and 
natural resource prices - continue to create volatility and unpredictability in 
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the program. However, the volatility and unpredictability in the program is 
experienced not by the federal government, but by the receiving provinces.
Ontario’s status as an Equalization recipient has been destabilizing, especially 
in the context of a fixed envelope. Small shifts in Ontario’s fiscal capacity 
create big ripples for all receiving provinces, because of the zero-sum-game 
nature of the current program. For its first four years as a recipient, Ontario’s 
growing entitlement had the effect of crowding out the entitlements of the rest 
of the receiving provinces. In fact, Ontario was the only province to have a 
larger entitlement in 2012-13 than in 2009-10.  After Ontario’s entitlement had 
hit its peak of $3.3 billion in 2012-13, all provinces experienced large year-
over-year swings in entitlements. The greatest swings in this period, however, 
were experienced by Ontario, with year-over-year declines approaching 40 per 
cent on two separate occasions. The variability and unpredictability of indi-
vidual provinces’ entitlements contrasts starkly to the federal governments’ 
experience of stable and predictable growth in this period.
The volatility and unpredictability in the allocation of Equalization payments 
is further complicated by the reliability of the data inputs. The formula cur-
rently employs a two-year lag, and a three-year smoothing mechanism to 
improve the predictability of payments. For example, 2017-18 Equalization 
entitlements would rely on provincial fiscal capacity data for 2015-16, 2014-15 
and 2013-14, weighted at 50 per cent, 25 per cent, and 25 per cent respec-
tively. The use of lagged and smoothed data has decreased the volatility and 
improved the predictability of payments compared to the unlagged, multi-esti-
mate system that preceded it. However, the current approach to the use of data 
inputs still results in a considerable amount of volatility and unpredictability, 
stemming from two main factors.
The first is the data re-estimation process. The calculation of provincial 
fiscal capacity is done using a three-year rolling average of data. For each of 
the three times the data for a fiscal year enters the formula, it is revised for 
increased accuracy. These revisions can result in large and unpredictable 
swings in the calculation of fiscal capacity making individual province’s 
Equalization entitlements very difficult to forecast. From first estimate to 
final estimate, non-resource fiscal capacity data can vary by 3 or 4 per cent. 
The accumulation of the variances can lead to substantial and unpredictable 
swings in provincial entitlements, especially in a fixed envelope framework 
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where increases in one province’s entitlement necessarily come at the cost of 
those of other provinces. Natural resource revenues are susceptible to much 
larger re-estimations. Variances of 5 per cent to 20 per cent from first estimate 
to final estimate are common, and much larger variances are not unheard of 
(Hartmann 2017, 22). The unpredictable nature of these variances contrib-
utes significantly to the difficulty in forecasting Equalization entitlements for 
individual provinces.
The second and related factor contributing to the volatility and unpredict-
ability of payments for individual provinces is the delayed availability of new 
data inputs for the calculation of entitlements. Equalization entitlements for 
a fiscal year are typically released in mid- to late-December in the previous 
year. For example, the 2017-18 entitlements were communicated to provinces 
mid-December 2016. The first time provinces would see data for the 2015-16 
input year - contained in the Fiscal Arrangements Certificates produced by 
Statistics Canada - is the week prior to the release of entitlements. The lack of 
reliable data prior to the release of these certificates is a significant contributor 
to the difficulty in forecasting individual province’s Equalization entitlements. 
Furthermore, data for the t-minus 2 fiscal year (2015-16 for the 2017-18 enti-
tlement year) is weighted at 50 per cent, resulting in the least predictable data 
receiving the highest weight.
This unpredictability makes provincial budgetary planning more difficult. 
Most, if not all provinces would be in the middle of their budget process in 
mid-December. Unpredictable year-over-year variance in Equalization pay-
ments can put a province in a difficult fiscal position that adds uncertainty to 
fiscal planning, especially for provinces that rely heavily on Equalization as a 
percentage of revenue. While any budget process is subject to unpredictability 
on a number of fronts, unpredictability in the transfer whose main purpose is 
to enable the delivery of comparable services is at best unnecessary. At worst, 
this unpredictability can harmfully lead to inefficient spending, revenue and 
borrowing decisions on the part of the provinces.
Looking forward, unpredictability in Equalization could persist or worsen if 
trends in Ontario’s relative fiscal capacity continue. According to the latest 
available data, Ontario’s fiscal capacity is very close to the national average. 
Indeed, for the 2015-16 fiscal year - the most recent data-input year used for 
the lagged calculation of 2017-18 fiscal capacity - Ontario’s fiscal capacity 
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was 99.9 per cent of the average. The Conference Board of Canada projects 
this upward trend to continue, raising Ontario’s lagged and weighted fiscal 
capacity above the national average for the calculation of 2018-19 Equalization 
entitlements (Fields 2016). This could lead to Ontario exiting the Equalization 
program as early as 2019-20. The province’s potential exit from receiving 
status may prove as disruptive as its unforeseen qualification for Equalization 
nearly a decade ago.
While Equalization is notoriously difficult to forecast, it is entirely possible that 
after 2019-20, Ontario’s fiscal capacity will continue to hover near the national 
average. This could give rise to a situation where Ontario seesaws between 
recipient and non-recipient status from year to year. The issues of both cost 
and uncertainty that this would cause would mirror the experience of 2008 
when Ontario first received Equalization payments.
The implication for Ontario would be that, despite the presence of the two-
year data lagging system, it would not know if it was in or out of the program 
from year to year until it had already happened. This degree of uncertainty 
would be obviously problematic for Ontario from a fiscal planning perspective. 
Depending on how the federal government chooses to deal with this issue, the 
“Ontario in-and-out” phenomenon could be problematic for it, and the other 
receiving provinces as well.
Maintaining the current fixed-envelope approach would continue to provide 
the federal government with cost-certainty. Total Equalization payments 
would be predictable for the federal government. However, a situation in which 
Ontario unpredictably drops in and out of recipient status would once again 
lead to crowding out other provinces’ entitlements, but in an unpredictable 
fashion from year to year. To militate against the crowding out effect, the 
federal government could choose to provide provinces with protection pay-
ments to ensure provinces did not experience year-over-year declines in enti-
tlements as it has in the past. A protection payments system, however, would 
add both cost and uncertainty for the federal government.
Returning to a system that attaches the size of the program to variance in 
fiscal capacity between provinces – such as the ten-province standard – may 
be less expensive over the long term than allowing the fixed envelope to con-
tinue. In fact, by as soon as 2018-19 the costs of the fixed envelope system may 
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exceed that of a program whose size is determined by the ten-province stan-
dard (Fields 2016). Letting that go into the future may be expensive and lead 
to over-equalization. Returning to a ten-province standard may be best for the 
federal government and the receiving provinces, especially if reforms to the 
program are made to increase predictability for both provinces and the federal 
government.
The first step in this process would be to extend the data lagging mechanism 
from two to three years for non-resource revenues. A three-year lag would 
significantly enhance the program’s predictability for both the federal govern-
ment and the provinces. For the federal government, it would lengthen the 
horizon for fiscal planning to mitigate the effect of returning to open-ended 
program. For the provinces, the current problem of delayed availability of data 
inputs for the calculation of entitlements would be resolved. This would create 
too far greater certainty around provincial entitlements, leading to improved 
fiscal planning.
Addressing the volatility of natural resource revenues will be a key element 
in increasing the predictability of Equalization payments. Natural resource 
revenues are volatile, which can contribute significantly to unpredictability in 
Equalization payments. Compared to non-resource fiscal capacity, resource 
revenues are subject to much larger year-over-over swings on average (see 
figure). Resource revenues are also subject to greater variances from estimate 
to estimate as discussed above.
Figure 1
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Resource revenues are certain to be a continued source of volatility for Equal-
ization payments. Part of the solution would be to introduce further smoothing 
to natural resource revenues data in the calculation of fiscal capacity. Smooth-
ing mechanisms such as moving averages over a number of years help even 
out fluctuations in payments, reduce variability in year-over-year entitlements 
and provide greater predictability and stability because entitlements are 
adjusted gradually with changes in economic circumstances and new data 
(Canada 2006, 119). Currently, both resource and non-resource revenues are 
subject to the same three-year smoothing mechanism. Further smoothing of 
resource revenues, however, would allow weighting of data at a substantially 
lower ratio. Currently, the 50 per cent weight allotted to the first year of input 
data allows temporary fluctuations in resource revenues, either positive or 
negative, to create volatile and unpredictable increases or decreases in Equal-
ization payments. Equal weighting over three years, rather than the front-end 
loaded weighting in the current system would reduce volatility. However, an 
extended smoothing mechanism, for example one that spanned over five years, 
would allow for a 20 per cent weighting across all five years, and would enable 
for reductions in volatility not possible with a three-year mechanism. In an 
open-ended system, the reduction in volatility would be particularly appealing 
for the federal government in the event of a sudden commodity price spike. 
Conversely, in the event of a sudden and precipitous drop in commodity prices, 
receiving provinces would be afforded more protection from sharp year-over-
year declines in payments. In both instances, the reduction in volatility would 
provide more predictability for budgeting.
The second part solution to address the unpredictability of resource revenues 
would be to further extend the lagging of resource revenue data. As discussed 
above, the data re-estimation system used for the calculation of fiscal capacity 
can lead to considerable variances from estimate to estimate. For non-resource 
revenues, most of the variance from the final data is sorted out by the second 
estimate. The same is not the case for resource revenues. Large variances from 
the second to final estimate, while less frequent, are still possible (Hartmann 
2017, 22). Lagging resource revenue data for an additional year, thereby using 
final estimates of resource revenues, would eliminate unpredictable esti-
mate-to-estimate variances.
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Taken together, the adoption of a three-year lag for non-resource revenues, and 
a four-year lag, five-year smoothing for resources revenues would protect both 
the federal government and receiving provinces from the unpredictability that 
can come with an open-ended program. The resulting framework would afford 
both orders of government near-perfect predictability of Equalization entitle-
ments which will be especially important to all parties concerned should the 
federal government return to a formula driven system for deriving size of the 
program at the start of the next five-year renewal cycle.
The increased emphasis on predictability that would be brought on by an 
extended data-lagging framework would entail a reduction in the responsive-
ness of the Equalization program. While the issue of responsiveness cannot be 
completely dismissed, it is worth pointing out that the purpose of Equalization 
is to ensure provinces can offer reasonably comparable levels of service at 
reasonably comparable levels of taxation. Program spending in provinces 
tends to be far less variable year-over-year than provincial fiscal capacity, 
which suggests that there is scope for foregoing some responsiveness in Equal-
ization (see Figure 1). Equalization is not meant to equalize fiscal disparities 
in revenue-raising capacity for their own sake. It equalizes revenue dispar-
ities because those disparities lead to divergences in service levels between 
provinces.
To better address the issue of responsiveness to economic conditions, other 
policy tools should be examined. It is important to distinguish between the 
short-term stabilization and the long-term redistribution functions of federal 
fiscal systems (von Hagen 1992, 342). A sudden and non-structural drop in 
provincial revenue, brought on by an economic recession for example, does not 
necessarily mean that a province needs Equalization. Equalization need not 
have a role in stabilizing provincial revenues as that is not the purpose of the 
program.
However, Canada’s framework of fiscal federalism does not stabilize provincial 
revenues particularly effectively. In fact, “there has been a virtual abandon-
ment of meaningful fiscal stabilization arrangements within the current fiscal 
arrangements agreements,” (Selinger and Neumann 2005, 262). The Fiscal 
Stabilization program, the federal program intended to provide provinces with 
revenue stabilization in the event of economic shocks is far from a reliable 
countercyclical tool. The simple evidence of this is that between 1994 and when 
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Alberta qualified for a payment in 2016, no province received payments under 
this program, an era that notably included a very deep recession in 2008. The 
federal government should revisit this program to ensure that the fiscal risks 
associated with idiosyncratic economic shocks are more fairly and effectively 
shared across the federation. Equalization should be left to play its role of long-
term redistribution to enable the comparability of provincial programs.
CONCLUSION
The overall system of fiscal arrangements therefore should be reformed to better 
balance predictability and responsiveness. The primary role of the Equalization 
program is, and should continue to be, to ensure that provinces have the capacity 
to provide reasonably comparable services. That role is degraded if unpredictable 
swings in Equalization payments undermine the provincial budgeting processes 
that underwrite the provision of those services. Reforms to the program should 
complement provincial budgeting processes with improved predictability in mind. 
If following the 2018-19 renewal of the program, Equalization returns to a formu-
la-driven determination of the envelope, the federal government will have a much 
greater incentive to introduce measures that would increase the predictability of 
payments for both itself and for the provinces.
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Chapter 6 
THE POLITICS OF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
TRANSFERS IN CANADA
By Andrew Seto and Christopher Stoney
INTRODUCTION
The Canadian Federal Government provides annual grants to the provinces to support the delivery of public services, and to bridge fiscal imbalances between both levels of government. The most prom-
inent interprovincial grant programs of interest in this policy brief are the 
Canada Health Transfer, and the Equalization Program that are set to reach 
$55.4 billion in the 2017-18 fiscal year (Department of Finance 2017). This 
brief examines the potential for political factors to influence the allocation 
of these Federal transfer programs. By political factors, we refer specifically 
to federal spending and allocative decision-making that has the potential to 
be influenced primarily by partisan interests, and advantage as opposed to 
other criteria (equity, need, effectiveness, value for money, etc.) synonymous 
with ‘good’ public policy, and the public interest. While obvious empirical 
challenges mean we are unable to identify specific funding that is politically 
motivated in pursuit of furthering partisan interests, we attempt to illustrate 
the discretionary scope and potential for political advantage to influence who 
gets what, when and how and refer to this as ‘politicization’ for ease of use. To 
this end, we focus on examining what program traits of the Canada Health 
Transfer (CHT), and the Equalization Program create opportunities for federal 
and provincial governments to engage in politicization, when this may have 
occurred recently, and a possible policy approach the Government can con-
sider for mitigating this.
While politics inevitably and legitimately drives public financing decisions 
(Lasswell 1936), we argue that the practice of politicizing fiscal transfers for 
partisan aims warrants special attention. Within Canadian politics, there has 
traditionally been broad, cross-partisan consensus that Equalization and the 
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CHT serve distinct purposes as nation-building instruments meant to promote 
a pan-Canadian identity. Even the harshest critics of Equalization acknowl-
edge its fundamental role as a nation building exercise through the pursuit of 
interprovincial equity, while defenders characterize it as “the glue that holds 
the federation together” (Marchildon 2005, 20). Negotiating Equalization for-
mulae and payments with provinces is clearly part of the political process, but 
its real and symbolic importance to a still young nation enabled it to transcend 
conventional partisan considerations. Its elevated status as the backbone of 
Canada made Equalization a Constitutionally-prescribed responsibility of the 
federal government, constrained by mechanisms designed to promote impar-
tiality such as empirically driven calculations, and fixed renewal dates.
 The CHT serves a similar nation-building function in funding Medicare, 
which is commonly understood by Canadians as both a source of pride and 
national identity, being guided by fundamental principles of universality, 
national consistency in quality of service, and being provided on a basis of 
need (Mendelsohn 2003). Consequently, whereas spending areas like infra-
structure or defence procurement could be expected to be relatively politicized 
due to the large degree of discretion involved, Equalization payments and the 
CHT program were designed to limit politicization, and trigger greater scru-
tiny when partisanship appears to be the driving influence and motivation.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
The Canada Health Transfer (CHT) is an annual “block grant” issued to prov-
inces by the federal government to support health services, and is regulated 
under the Canada Health Act (CHA), which allows the federal government to 
make dollar-for-dollar deductions to a province’s CHT if it is found to be either 
charging user fees or extra-billing patients, and provides latitude for discre-
tionary penalties for failing to uphold the CHA’s five national principles for 
health care delivery (Madore 2005).1
1 The five principles of the Canadian Health Act include: 1) The public administration of health care by provinces 
on a not-for-profit basis; 2) provinces must ensure “comprehensiveness” and be certain that all procedures are 
medically necessary; 3) that there be universality insofar as all citizens have access to health care insurance 
and access to uniform terms; 4) That there be portability, or that provinces cover the health care of citizens 
while absent from their home province; and lastly 5) that citizens have access to uniform levels of services, “free 
of financial or other barriers.” Refer to the Library of Parliament paper (Madore 2005) for more analysis and 
information.
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Equalization serves a quasi-redistributive purpose in ensuring comparable 
level of services across all provinces, by providing grants to provinces that fall 
below an average revenue capacity threshold (Department of Finance 2015). 
Grants are calculated by assessing multiple tax bases using standardized tax 
rates to determine a province’s fiscal capacity. Provinces falling below a reve-
nue-raising threshold, defined by the average of all 10 provinces’ fiscal capaci-
ties, receive the difference in Equalization. Methodologies for Equalization and 
CHT are typically re-evaluated quinquennially and after a pre-determinate 
number of years, respectively, by the federal government to adapt to contempo-
rary macroeconomic trends and avoid policy drift, but also partly as a measure 
to safeguard against politicization and ensure predictability (Joanis 2014; 
Cesar 2013). However, despite standardized renewals and sophisticated empir-
ical calculations, politicization is still possible due to key program features of 
intergovernmental transfers.
WHAT OPPORTUNITIES EXIST FOR POLITICIZING TRANSFER 
PROGRAMS?
Specific elements of the CHT and Equalization carry the most significant risks 
for politicization. Of interest is the degree of executive control over transfer 
programs and poor public understanding of these programs and of the deci-
sions made by politicians. The extensive federal government control over the 
administration of transfers provides the main lever and flexibility for pursu-
ing political advantage. In the case of Equalization, quinquennial timelines 
for program renewals can be highly variable and subject to ad hoc political 
decisions (Feehan 2014). This degree of executive discretion limits the effec-
tiveness of renewal dates and the empirical formula applied to reduce the risk 
of politicization. While we might expect provinces contest the extent of federal 
control, Beland and Lecours (2013) argue that provinces were only willing to 
support an Equalization arrangement at the outset that ensured federal discre-
tion or ‘wiggle room’ for unilateral ‘side-deals’. With respect to Equalization, 
executive discretion appears to exist as a result of mutual agreement between 
both levels of government, presumably to ensure flexibility for individual 
deals to be brokered. The same rationale is also likely to apply to block grants. 
Consequently, executive discretion over transfer programs and the freedom to 
negotiate with individual provinces increases the potential for transfers to be 
subject to political pressure and influence.
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The federal government’s discretion also extends to penalizing provinces for 
infringing on the CHA with CHT deductions. Madore (2005) notes that “At one 
extreme, Cabinet could decide to withhold all CHT cash transfers, and … at the 
other extreme, the federal government could decide not to impose any finan-
cial penalty and to confine its action to persuasion and negotiation.” While 
withholding CHT grants to such an extreme has never been contemplated, 
executive discretion has still led to CHT deductions being used to pursue polit-
ical ends more covertly, which further undermines the credibility of penalties 
as a valid and impartial enforcement mechanism for the CHA.
Finally all transfer programs are susceptible to political “spin,” due to their 
complex nature that makes programs poorly understood by the public.2  
The difficulty for the public to navigate the technocratic jargon of transfer 
programs has long been a defining feature of these programs, especially for 
Equalization. As recently as 2006, Equalization used 33 different tax bases to 
calculate fiscal capacity, along with various exceptions, entitlement caps, pro-
visions for side-deals, and ad hoc changes in entitlements due to lags in avail-
able data (Feehan 2014).3 Despite rationalizing Equalization to five tax bases 
in 2007, many scholars have remarked on the limited success of demystifying 
Equalization since the original complexities of the program were retained and 
new ones were added (Feehan 2014).   Block grants are also not immune to 
criticism of being too complex. As Maslove (2005) points out, confusion and 
ambiguity persist over each level of government’s role in administering health 
care through the CHT that is typical of a de facto joint policy area like health. 
Consequently, the complexity of intergovernmental transfer programs along 
with widespread ignorance also enables governments to potentially misinform 
and obfuscate the facts about these programs for their own political ends 
(Beland and Lecours 2010).
It is important to note that despite opportunities for politicization it is by no 
means guaranteed that politicians and parties will take advantage of them, 
especially since convention and norms matter; and doing so risks provoking 
intergovernmental discord and provincial criticism. Nevertheless, established 
2 The Expert Panel on Equalization’s Report (the O’brien Report, 2006, p. 7) was particularly caught off guard by 
the lack of public knowledge on equalization, remarking that, “the Panel was struck by how little is known about 
the Equalization program and how few people across the country are interested in it, even though it involves 
billions of taxpayers’ dollars.”
3 Added complications to equalization include caps on equalization entitlements, and different conditions for 
assessing resource revenues for fiscal capacity. See Joanis (2014) for further information.
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intergovernmental norms have not prevented either level of government 
from exploiting political opportunities at times that executive discretion and 
program complexity have facilitated to grave consequences. In addition to 
the potential for politicization to produce equity drift in Equalization, and 
deflect the CHT from its nation-building objectives, creeping politicization has 
obvious implications for accountability as an already complex process becomes 
increasingly “messy.” Politicization of the process inevitably increases the 
potential for obfuscation, blame avoidance and strategic posturing.
PARTISANSHIP, OBFUSCATION AND STRATEGIC POSTURING
Evaluating intergovernmental transfers within the context of partisan self-in-
terest highlights the growing prominence of electoral politics and increasing 
federal discretion over Equalization. Arguably the most prominent example 
was the Atlantic Accord when then-Prime Minister Paul Martin agreed to 
provide grants offsetting clawbacks on Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and 
Labrador’s Equalization grants from offshore oil revenues, (Metz 2006). The 
Atlantic Accord was widely seen as a profoundly partisan move for not only 
its suspicious timing weeks before the federal election, but also for supposedly 
catering to several key ridings in the Maritimes for the Liberals and for using 
executive discretion to circumvent established norms for renewing Equaliza-
tion (Metz 2006).4 As further indication of this, Metz (2006) points out that 
Saskatchewan did not receive the same deal for its own oil reserves during 
that election due to the lone Liberal seat in the province at that time.5 This 
tendency to apparently administer transfers in a partisan-influenced manner 
was also captured by Joanis (2014), who found a strong statistical significance 
between seat share of a sitting federal party in a province and larger transfer 
amounts.
Provincially, premiers have also appeared willing to use transfers with the 
clear aim of pressuring the federal government to use its discretion over trans-
4 The Atlantic Accord has been widely seen as a partisan move by scholars. Garth Stevenson (2006, pg 11) viewed 
the Atlantic Accord an “ill-advised” and “politically-motivated agreement.”  As for the Atlantic Accord’s break from 
established norms with equalization renewals, Hjartarson et. al (2010, pg 13) singled out the bilateral deal-making 
behind the affair as “muddy[ing] the waters” of fiscal federalism. Courchene (2010) echoed similar sentiments in 
chastising then-Prime Minister Paul Martin for making the deal and other “arbitrary changes” to equalization, 
which departed from traditional means of administering the program.
5 Rasmussen corroborated the belief that equalization and transfer deals had partisan underpinnings when 
observing in the 2008 election that “if it’s the Liberals, they don’t have any support here and if it’s Conservatives, 
they have all the support here, so ... we’re not a battleground province like other ones that need a little more care 
and feeding.” (Wood, 2008).
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fers to their advantage and advance their own ambitions. Danny Williams ini-
tially mobilized his base against the Liberal government by advocating “fairer” 
treatment for Newfoundland and Labrador under Equalization through grand 
public gestures such as removing the Canadian flag from provincial buildings 
– which allowed his approval ratings to soar from 39 to 86% (Metz 2006)  
Later, in response to broken Conservative election campaign promises on the 
Atlantic Accord, he coordinated the “Anybody but Conservative” media cam-
paign against the Federal Conservative Party in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
Then-Ontario premier Dalton McGuinty used similar rhetoric over the unfair-
ness of transfer programs for Ontario, in one federal election staking his party 
endorsement on this issue, which was perceived by journalists at the time as 
an attempt to emulate Williams’ success.6  These instances demonstrate the 
apparent readiness of both premiers and the federal government to use trans-
fers for strategic political ends and to pursue partisan aims within an electoral 
context, as well as the extent of executive discretion over transfer programs.
As discussed earlier, another mainstay of transfer politics is the frequent use 
of obfuscation or blame avoidance, which exploits limited public understand-
ing of transfer programs as the basis for often inaccurate but effective political 
rhetoric. For Equalization, this typically involves rhetoric from policymakers 
premised on federal decisions being “unfair” to their province. One way of 
achieving this is to misrepresent Equalization as a province-to-province trans-
fer to elicit negative comparisons by the public with welfare programs (Beland 
and Lecours 2016). For example, Premier McGuinty complained that Ottawa 
should “let [Ontario] hang on to a bit of our own money” and Williams com-
mented when Ontario was eligible for Equalization that Newfoundland was 
ready to “help our weaker sisters in their time of need” (Denley 2005; The Star 
2008). Like their federal counterparts, premiers have sought to use federal 
discretion and public ignorance to generate political support by exercising 
blame avoidance tactics and organizing robust media campaigns such as those 
6 During the 2008 federal election, Premier McGuinty had asked all candidates “If Ontario qualifies for the 
Canadian Equalization Program, will you ensure that Ontario will receive no less that its full share of funding 
payable under the Equalization Program as it exists today?” See Macgregor 2005; Denley 2005; Beland and 
Lecours 2009, 20 for the above quote.
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organized by Nova Scotia, Ontario and Saskatchewan pressuring the federal 
government to treat them “fairly” under Equalization.7
The CHT is also subject to both obfuscation and blame avoidance played out 
through competing political narratives. Notable cases of blame avoidance 
include during the 1990’s when the federal government met provincial criti-
cism over cuts to the CHT that healthcare was a provincial jurisdiction, not 
a federal one and again in 2004 when the Council of Federation outreach 
campaign argued that the federal government only supported 16% of health-
care expenditures (Maslove 2005; Health Canada 2004).8  CHT renewals also 
provide fertile ground for blame avoidance, which typically unfolds with prov-
inces denouncing the federal government for perceived cuts to the CHT and 
the federal government accusing provinces of fiscal irresponsibility. Misinfor-
mation and partial facts are also a common part of counter narratives such as, 
for example, the provincial preference to frame any changes to CHT escalators 
as nominal changes instead of annual growth rate changes9  (Chronicle Herald, 
2016).
Another recent phenomenon in the politics of transfer programs has been the 
use of CHT deductions as framing devices for the federal government’s health 
agenda.10  Characteristic of this approach is the selective enforcement of the 
CHA’s dollar-for-dollar deductions, considering the extensive user fee regimes 
7 In addition to Danny William’s “Anyone But Conservative Campaign,” the Hamm Government from 2000-4 in 
Nova Scotia ran the “Campaign for Fairness” that included articles on equalization and a signature campaign to 
pressure the federal government at the time to open up the Atlantic Accords. In 2008, Premier McGuinty launched 
“fairness.ca” with similarly provocative content and in Saskatchewan premier Lorne Calvert launched the “Raise 
the Flag for Fairness campaign” to protest the Atlantic Canada offshore oil deals. See CBC News 2005; Metz 2006; 
Beland, and Lecours 2009.
8 The actual value of federal support was argued as being closer to 30% by Health Canada in a 2004 report issued 
to address the CoF’s claim, “Federal Support for Health Care: The Facts - Fact Sheet - First Ministers’ Meeting on 
Health
9 The federal government and provinces trading barbs over CHT transfer renegotiations have been seen in the last 
two negotiations for renewals of the Health Accord. For example, during the 2011 CHT renewal, which saw the 6% 
escalator eliminated after 2017, provinces denounced the measures as “an attack on public healthcare” and starkly 
“un-Canadian”; meanwhile then-Finance Minister Jim Flaherty shifted blame back to the provinces in saying 
that “we can’t pretend to spend money we don’t have” (Payton 2011; Whittington 2011; Shaw, and Spalding 2011). 
Moreover, the most recent CHT negotiations saw almost identical rhetoric to that of the 2011 renewal, with one 
minister arguing that the new 3% annual CHT increase deal put “the status of health care in Canada…in jeopardy.” 
Liberal Health Minister Jane Philpott responded with similar platitudes in saying that the government was not 
prepared to “simply open up the federal wallet” to provinces (Raj 2016; Macleod 2016).
10 Provincial politicians have often been quick to denounce changes to the growth rate of CHT grants as nominal 
cuts. Quebec health minister Gaetan Barrette labelled the 2016 CHT proposal a “$60 million cut” and Ontario 
Finance minister Dwight Duncan also called the 2011 CHT renewal a “serious cut” (Chronicle Herald 2016; 
Whittington, and Benzie 2011).
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in provinces like Quebec, Saskatchewan and Ontario that go unpunished and 
CHT deductions constituting a tiny fraction of health transfers since 2002 
(Meili 2016).11  Considering the discretion available to the federal govern-
ment over CHT penalties and the variable level of enforcement of the CHA 
by various federal governments, it is plausible to see this as part of a broader 
strategy to frame the political agenda with respect to Canadian federalism. For 
example, the current Liberal government is transparent about their proactive 
health care agenda and the CHT’s part in supporting it. As Health Minister 
Jane Philpott outlined, “I believe an engaged federal government has a role 
to facilitate the changes that can move Canada from the middle of the pack to 
out in front.” Furthermore, the CHT renegotiations were a “rare opportunity” 
to make changes to health care delivery (Picard 2016). Emanating from this 
was a more robust effort at enforcing the CHA, albeit stopping short of out-
right deductions and instead issuing highly publicized letters to Quebec and 
Saskatchewan outlining potential penalties for user fees for medical services, 
which shortly afterwards saw the abolition of user fees in Quebec (Shingler 
and Montpetit 2016;12 Grant 2016).
The recent use of CHT deduction threats can be viewed as the Liberal gov-
ernment’s attempt to assert its role in health delivery and as an example of 
strategic posturing in anticipation of ongoing Health Accord renegotiations 
from 2016. Its activist inclinations were made more apparent by its preference 
for conditional spending on palliative care (Fogarty 2016; Galloway and Grant 
2016). This stood in stark contrast to the previous Conservative Government’s 
limited uses of CHT deductions and overall reluctance in health care delivery, 
11 Certain provinces have a thriving medical user fee industry, which has not been met with punitive CHT 
deductions. Provinces like Quebec’s have maintained an extensive user fee industry, in Ontario dozens of reported 
cases of charged services in 2014 were reported alone, and Saskatchewan has retained pay-per-use MRI services 
since 2015. Moreover, transfer deductions have represented a negligible proportion of CHT cuts since 2002. A total 
of 0.00003% of CHT grants since 2002 have been subject to CHT deductions, or $10.3 million. This is calculated 
by taking a total of 10.3 million/ 374,904 million = 0.0000269 * 100 = 0.00275, or 0.003%, using Health Canada’s 
latest CHA report, Statistics Canada data on the CHT from 2002 till 2007 and the Department of Finance’s data 
on CHT from 2007 to 2015. Department of Finance data is in fiscal years, whereas statistics Canada data is in 
annualized data, which results in a slight discrepancy transitioning to Department of Finance data. Given the 
significant sizes of grant amounts, this is unlikely to dramatically alter the calculated amount. See (Derfel et. al 
2016; Department of Finance 2016; Statistics Canada 2011; Health Canada 2015).
12 There are conflicting narratives about the impact of CHT deduction warnings on Quebec’s decision to abolish 
user fees. Barrett claims that the Quebec government had contemplated removing fees as early May 2016, four 
months before Health Canada’s letter threatening deductions in September, and accused the federal government of 
taking credit for the decision. However, the letter sent by Philpott indicates that she had discussed fees with Barrett 
in March, two months before the supposed commitment by Quebec on eliminating user fees, which would have also 
been a radical about-face for the Quebec government, which passed the controversial Bill 20 codifying the charging 
of user fees in the prior Fall. See Shingler and Montpetit (2016).
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which dovetailed with the Conservative’s decentralized vision for health care 
(Maslove 2012).13  Thus, the use of CHT cuts can serve a deliberate political 
purpose – in this case to pursue the Liberals’ broader policy agenda on health, 
enabled by the scope and degree of executive discretion over these programs.
THE WAY FORWARD?
Given the widespread impact of ‘transfers politics,’ we believe serious consid-
eration should be given to reform the current status quo based on criteria that 
limits the scope for politicization and introduces greater accountability and 
clarity with respect to objectives, distribution and equity. To be effective, any 
mitigation strategy revisiting transfers needs to reduce the potential for the 
insidious politicization of block transfers and Equalization calculations.
One commonly proposed reform aimed at reducing politicization that the 
federal government could consider seriously is a nonpartisan commission 
consisting of experts with the goal of advising the federal government of how 
to proceed on transfers. The idea of a nonpartisan commission for distribut-
ing transfers is already in use for Equalization payments in federations like 
Australia, and to a lesser extent in South Africa and India. It would also not be 
unreasonable to allows matters related to CHT, such as grants and deductions, 
to fall under the purview of this institution like in Australia, where health 
transfers are distributed through its nonpartisan commission (Goertz 2016; 
Beland and Lecours 2012). Moreover, the body could also be mandated to 
increase public knowledge and awareness to ensure that the public is better 
informed about intergovernmental transfers and to prevent misinformation 
and misleading narratives from governments (2012).
The idea of a non-partisan body is the preferred option for being the most 
viable and for directly addressing politicization without fundamentally dis-
rupting the status quo of fiscal federalism in Canada. By removing federal 
involvement in calculating transfers, a nonpartisan commission blunts politi-
cization and partisanship by diminishing executive discretion while providing 
technical advice to the government, which makes it politically difficult to 
reject. Moreover, a non-partisan body would benefit both levels of government 
by reducing accusations of political interference in the same way an indepen-
13 See the most recent 2015-16 Canada Health Act Annual Report by Health Canada (2016) which outlines 
transfer cuts made by the Conservative government of $3.57 million to BC from 2006 – 15, and $0.38 million 
Newfoundland from 2010-14.
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dent Bank of Canada has been used to depoliticized interest rate decisions. 
This option is clearly viable given that bodies providing technical advice 
already exist in Canada as seen in the Canadian Institute for Health Informa-
tion (Beland and Lecours 2012; 2016).
Despite the benefits of this policy proposal, it is not without problems. Spe-
cifically, convincing governments at both levels to relinquish their influence 
over transfers that comes with executive discretion could be a major obstacle. 
A cross section of federal and regional/provincial representatives may help 
to assuage some of the concerns and help to gain support from both levels of 
government in a manner similar to the Canadian Pension Plan Board, which 
maintains federal-provincial composition of membership while managing 
assets significantly greater than Equalization and CHT combined (2016). 
Lastly, a non-partisan body might be unsuccessful if its neutrality is not per-
ceived as credible by the provinces. To mitigate this, the federal government 
would need to show deference to this body’s advice to legitimize its non-par-
tisan nature, which could be difficult given the considerable political stakes 
involved. However, there may be reason to be optimistic, given the Liberal 
government being seemingly open to experimenting with de-politicizing pro-
cesses that conferred obvious political advantages, such as the senate and its 
appointment processes, and the recent announcement of a federal infrastruc-
ture bank.
CONCLUSION
This Policy Brief has highlighted opportunities for politicization that are 
built into major intergovernmental fiscal transfer programs. It has illustrated 
how public officials can use transfers to pursue partisan advantage including 
selective redistribution of federal funds, obfuscation and blame avoidance. We 
argue that this can result in a misuse of public funds and sub-optimal policy 
outcomes for citizens, and propose the adoption of a non-partisan commission 
in charge of the CHT and Equalization for limiting these practices to better 
serve the public interest and enhance accountability. Finally, we argue that 
reversing the insidious politicization of public policy and spending is critical 
in this context, as it undermines the purpose of transfers as nation-building 
tools and promotes public cynicism. With Canada’s 150th  anniversary, and 
the next Equalization renewal rapidly approaching in 2019, comes a symbolic 
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and timely opportunity to contemplate the role of the CHT and Equalization in 
strengthening the federation.
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Chapter 7 
INVESTING IN INDIGENOUS 
YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN 
CANADA: SETTING POLICY 
PRIORITIES STRAIGHT
Senada Delic
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Over the past few decades, the problem of Indigenous employment in Canada 
has captured the attention of many policy leaders and decision makers in 
both the private and public sector, and efforts have been made to deal with 
the problem at all levels of government. Recognizing the fact that Indigenous 
youth are becoming the fastest-growing demographic group in the country 
(Statistics Canada 2015), recent policy discussions have started revolving 
around finding avenues for their successful integration into the Canadian 
labour market (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2016; Canadian 
Polar Commission 2014; Government of Canada 2014a, 2008; Abele and Delic 
2014; Bruce and Marlin 2012; Martin 2011; Hull 2009, 2008). Most recently, 
the federal government has announced its renewed commitment to invest in 
the future of Canadian youth, including Indigenous youth, through its Youth 
Employment Strategy (YES), a program originally designed in 1997 to elimi-
nate barriers to youth employment and help youth obtain the skills and experi-
ence they need to transition into the workplace. As announced in Budget 2016, 
the Government of Canada has made a sizable increase in the amount of funds 
set aside for the YES, making it the largest investment since its introduction, 
with an additional pledge to make more investments in 2017-18 and 2018-19, 
targeted specifically towards supporting employment opportunities for vul-
nerable youth. It is expected that these investments will significantly improve 
employment prospects of Canadian youth (Government of Canada 2016).
For most Indigenous youth, however, this optimism is likely to be an overstate-
ment, unless serious measures are taken simultaneously to rectify the over-
looked, deeply-rooted historic problems and systemic challenges prevailing in 
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their communities. These challenges may prevent them from competing on par 
with the rest of Canadian youth for opportunities created by such employment 
initiatives. This policy brief discusses the key employment challenges faced 
by Indigenous youth in Canada1, that must be addressed for their successful 
integration into the Canadian economy.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Latest data from Statistics Canada indicate that the Indigenous identity popu-
lation constitutes about 4.3% of the total Canadian population. In comparison 
to the non-Indigenous population, the Indigenous population is relatively 
younger in every province and territory and is growing at a faster pace. Based 
on 2011 enumeration, more than half of Inuit (54%) and more than half of 
First Nations living on-reserve (52%) were under the age of 25. Similarly, in 
2011, the Métis population contained a significant proportion (41%) of indi-
viduals under the age of 25. For the general non-Indigenous population, this 
proportion was 30%. Indigenous youth, aged 15 to 24, accounted for 18.2% of 
the total Indigenous population, while the non-Indigenous youth represented 
12.9% of the total non-Indigenous population (Statistics Canada 2013).
Significant population increases were recorded from 2006 to 2011 among all 
three Indigenous groups; the First Nations population increased by 23%, the 
Inuit population increased by 18%, and the Métis population increased by 16%. 
The non-Indigenous population increase for the same time period was 5.2% 
(Statistics Canada 2013).
The distribution of Indigenous population remained relatively unchanged; the 
largest numbers of Indigenous peoples still live in Ontario and in the western 
provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia) while 
Nunavut and Northwest Territories have the largest shares of Indigenous 
population. In terms of numbers, the First Nations population is concentrated 
in three provinces: Ontario (23.6%), British Columbia (18.2%), and Alberta 
(13.7%). However, First Nations people represent the largest shares of the total 
population in the Northwest Territories, Yukon, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan. 
The majority of Métis people (84.9%) live in either the western provinces or in 
1 Indigenous youth here refers to the young individuals who reported identifying with at least one of the three 
distinct groups of Indigenous people in Canada (North American Indians, Métis, and Inuit) recognized by 
Canadian Constitution (the Constitution Act, 1982).
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Ontario while the majority of Inuit (73.1%) live in the four Inuit regions, collec-
tively called Inuit Nunangat (Statistics Canada 2013).
For several years now, this young and growing Indigenous population has been 
identified in various media and in policy discussions as a potential solution 
to fill in the growing gaps in the projected labour shortages in the Canadian 
labour market, especially in the northern Canadian labour market (Howard, 
Edge, and Watt 2012; Martin 2011; Sharpe, Arsenault, and Lapointe 2007; 
Anonson et al. 2008; Hull 2008). Concurrently, however, various employers 
and Indigenous community leaders were raising serious issues concerning 
widening imbalances between the skills that these labour markets demand 
and the skills that this ‘potential workforce’ was equipped with, in addition to 
the imbalances between where the jobs were made available and where these 
diverse groups of populations prefer to reside (MacKinnon 2015; Abele and 
Delic 2014; Bruce and Marlin 2012; Delic 2012). This has inspired the develop-
ment of various targeted skills training programs.2 These programs, however, 
are not likely to be as effective as they are for the non-Indigenous youth pop-
ulation because the issues here are rather complex, involving multiple factors, 
including education and other community aspects as well as the nature of the 
current labour market and employment programs related to the Indigenous 
youth.
STAKEHOLDERS INTERESTS IN THE PROBLEM
Successful participation of Indigenous youth in the Canadian labour market is 
of primary concern not only for the economic development in Indigenous com-
munities but for the Canadian economy at large. Left unaddressed, the current 
youth employment issues can quickly transmute into the employment issues of 
young adults, and inevitably into the employment issues of prime aged individ-
uals, thus playing into the cycle of disadvantages faced by Indigenous peoples. 
As pointed out in Budget 2016, Canada’s long-term prosperity relies on the 
labour market participation of all Canadians; however, “as Canada’s popula-
tion ages, its prosperity will increasingly depend on young Canadians getting 
the education and training they need to prepare for the jobs of today and 
tomorrow. Now more than ever, it is important that post-secondary education 
remains affordable and accessible, and that young Canadians have access to 
2 These programs are offered through large initiatives such as the Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training 
Strategy (ASETS) and the Youth Employment Strategy (YES), details of which are discussed here.
85 How Ottawa Spends
meaningful work at the beginning of their careers. The future of young Cana-
dians—and indeed, the future of all Canadians—depends on it” (Government 
of Canada 2016, 65).
Indeed, existing estimates suggest that stakes are high and that addressing 
some of the key barriers such as the quality and the level of educational 
attainment among Indigenous youth requires immediate attention (National 
Aboriginal Economic Development Board 2015; Abele and Delic 2014; Hull 
2009; Sharpe et al. 2007). The potential of Indigenous youth to contribute to 
the Canadian economy is not negligible. It has been estimated that “with an 
increase in educational attainment, this workforce could [have] contribute[d] 
up to $71 billion to the Canadian economy over the period 2001-2017. The 
results could [have] be[en] even greater if the [systemic and institutional] bar-
riers holding back Aboriginals [were] simultaneously addressed” (Government 
of Canada 2010). Capturing this potential economic gain in the coming years 
would serve best interests of all Canadians.
EXISTING YOUTH EMPLOYMENT POLICY
Regardless of economic conditions, historically, Canadian youth aged 15 to 
24 have consistently been at a higher risk of unemployment, compared to 
prime age workers aged 25 to 54. During the 1976-2013 time period, the 
youth unemployment rates have consistently been around twice as high as the 
unemployment rates of the prime age workers (Government of Canada 2014b). 
During the same time period, however, the Indigenous youth unemployment 
rates have consistently exceeded the unemployment rates of non-Indigenous 
youth. Also, during economic downturns, employment prospects of Indigenous 
workers tend to be disproportionately more impacted than the prospects of 
non-Indigenous workers (Government of Canada 2014b; Lamb 2015; Delic 
2012; Delic and Abele 2010). According to the Centre for the Study of Living 
Standards, the unemployment rates of Indigenous youth rose 3.0 percentage 
points during the latest recession (Centre for Study of Living Standards 2012).
Indigenous youth, however, are not a uniform group as their labour market chal-
lenges differ in many regards, including their Indigenous identity, gender, and 
place of residence. For instance, the 2006 data show that in 2006 unemploy-
ment rates of First Nations youth living on-reserve and the unemployment rates 
of Inuit living in Inuit Nunangat were significantly higher than the unemploy-
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ment rates of Métis youth and of other Indigenous youth living in urban areas, 
and particularly higher than the unemployment rates of the non-Indigenous 
youth (Statistics Canada 2010). There is also a greater variation in unemploy-
ment rates between the genders within the Indigenous youth categories, relative 
to the non-Indigenous youth category.3 The 2011 data paint a similar picture, 
with the unemployment rate of First Nations youth living on-reserve coming 
close to 42% while the unemployment rate of non-Indigenous group was just 
over 16% (National Aboriginal Economic Development Board 2015, 50).4
In recognition of the unique challenges faced by unemployed Canadian youth, 
in 1997, the federal government started introducing its skills development 
agenda and programming, targeting improvements in employment opportu-
nities for youth. In addition to delivering a range of employment programs 
designed specifically for youth, in 2007 the government also started providing 
funding to the provinces and territories, through its Labour Market Devel-
opment Agreements (LMDAs), to assist them in delivering their own skills 
and employment initiatives, some of which may benefit youth (Government of 
Canada 2014b).5
The main youth employment program, the Youth Employment Strategy 
(YES), consists of three distinct components and is delivered by 11 federal 
departments and agencies. The first component, the Skills Link, offers funding 
to different organizations that provide activities such as training and men-
torship that support youth employment. The second component, the Career 
Focus, offers funding to employers and organizations that deliver activities to 
help youth make more informed career decisions. The third component, the 
Summer Work Experience, offers funding to public sector employers and to 
small businesses as an incentive to hire youth through the Canada Summer 
Job Program (Government of Canada 2014b).
The First Nations and Inuit Youth Employment Strategy (FNIYES) targets 
individuals aged 15 to 30, and is organized into two key components. The first 
component, the First Nations and Inuit Summer Work Experience Program 
3 Charts illustrating details of these discrepancies are available, upon request.
4 It is important to note here that the 2006 data are derived from the 2006 Census and the 2011 data are derived 
from the 2011 National Household Survey; due to major methodological differences, the two data sets are not 
directly comparable.
5 Each year, the federal government provides over $2 billion in funding to provinces and territories through its 
LMDAs.
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(FNISWEP), is designed to assist initiatives that help First Nations and Inuit 
youth obtain skills and experience through summer jobs. The second compo-
nent, the First Nations and Inuit Skills Link Program (FNISLP), is designed 
to support initiatives that help First Nations and Inuit youth obtain skills and 
experience and to prepare them for employment and career development. The 
FNIYES operates on an annual budget of $24 million and each year more than 
600 First Nations and Inuit communities design and implement these initia-
tives (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2015).
The federal government also delivers specific programs that address the 
temporary, part-time and co-operative employment needs of Canadian post-
secondary students (Government of Canada 2014b).6 To assist Indigenous 
postsecondary students, in 2016 the federal government launched the Indig-
enous Youth Summer Employment Opportunity (IYSEO). This program was 
designed to attract young Indigenous Canadians into the federal public service 
as part of the priority to renew Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples 
(Government of Canada 2017a).7
Indigenous youth can also access some of the employment-related assistance 
through the Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training Strategy (ASETS), 
which is offered by the federal government in partnership with Indigenous 
communities to all Indigenous people, including Métis, regardless of their 
status or place of residence. The unique value of this program is that, although 
the guidelines stress the development of the demand-driven skills, the Indig-
enous agreement holders are given the freedom to decide on the type of youth 
programs to deliver, based on the needs of the Indigenous youth they serve. 
It also allows for provision of child care support for the participating First 
Nations and Inuit parents (Government of Canada 2017b).
CHALLENGES IN EXISTING YOUTH EMPLOYMENT POLICY 
PROCESSES
While in the short-term, existing youth employment programs can be ben-
eficial to some Indigenous communities, much more fine-tuning is needed 
to arrive at a long-term policy solution to the Indigenous youth employment 
6 These include the Federal Student Work Experience Program (FSWEP), the Research Affiliate Program (RAP), 
and the Co-operative Education and Internship Program (CEIP).
7 The program is intended to offer Indigenous postsecondary students up to 3 months of meaningful work 
experience in the National Capital Region to enable them to obtain transferable skills.
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problem. Research interviews conducted with Indigenous community leaders 
and with some industry representatives reveal that there is general lack of 
understanding of the socioeconomic conditions under which Indigenous 
‘potential workers’ are being raised. Further, they suggest a low level of aware-
ness of the complexities involved in assessing Indigenous youth’s readiness for 
skills training, for work itself or for ensuring their retention (Delic 2012). As 
echoed in a recent case study, some employers base their recruitment efforts 
on unrealistic assumptions where “it seems what [they] are naively looking for 
are Aboriginal people who have escaped colonization unharmed—fully assimi-
lated” (MacKinnon 2015, 169).
Driven by the attractiveness of the incentives set out by governments, some 
employers concentrate their efforts primarily on increasing hiring from 
surrounding Indigenous communities, with little regard for training and 
retention. But the willingness to participate in the paid labour market among 
Indigenous working age population does not appear to be questionable (Delic 
2013). The policy challenge is not to ensure Indigenous labour supply; it is to 
ensure their readiness to participate in the labour force. And this entails a 
fundamental shift in policy, the shift that takes discussions away from patch-
ing up the consequences of colonial legacy that are now reflected in the labour 
market outcomes of Indigenous population to comprehensively addressing the 
roots of those consequences, starting with the K-12 education system.
Statistical evidence persistently suggests that Indigenous youth are much more 
likely to leave school earlier than non-Indigenous youth. In 2006, for example, 
the proportion of First Nations youth living on-reserve with a completed 
high school diploma (38.9%) was strikingly different from the proportion of 
non-Indigenous youth with a completed high school diploma (87.5%). A similar 
statement can be made about Inuit youth, where only 39.8% of them had a 
completed high school diploma in 2006 (Statistics Canada 2010). Although 
slightly improved, the high school completion outcomes in 2011 still reveal 
large discrepancies between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous youth. At the 
postsecondary education level, the outcomes appear to have deteriorated for 
the most marginalized Indigenous youth group, the First Nations living on-re-
serve (National Aboriginal Economic Development Board 2015, 53).8
8 Charts illustrating this are available, upon request. It is likely that these discrepancies are understated, due to 
major methodological differences between the 2006 Census data and the 2011 National Household Survey data.
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Policy discussions about Indigenous education have focused primarily on 
inventing new ways to keep the Indigenous youth in school. With the exception 
of discussions related to the importance of including cultural aspects in the 
school curriculum, there has been very little discussion about keeping schools 
relevant and thus attractive to Indigenous youth. This ‘school-relevance’ 
stretches from the quality of the K-12 educational infrastructure and teacher 
turnover to the harsh and complex living conditions in Indigenous commu-
nities, particularly in the on-reserve communities and the communities in 
remote northern areas.
Research interviews suggest that harsh living conditions faced by many 
parents in those communities make the school-related tasks simply not a pri-
ority. These parents have little capacity to help their children with school and 
most do not even have a quiet place to offer them to complete their homework. 
In the words of one resident of the Inuit Nunangat, “it’s like, how can you study 
if there’s 15 people in a 3-bedroom house; and if your bedroom is a closet, how 
can you, you know, lead a normal life”. Another participant, an on-reserve 
resident in southern Canada, pointed out the importance of accounting for 
the contribution that the inadequate school infrastructure has on the school 
dropout tendencies among Indigenous youth. “[I]t’s not just, you know, I 
wanna quit school; it’s the quality of education, the consistency of teachers, the 
consistency of access to resources, you know, to support education – all these 
elements are part of that education gap and so it’s not just a small issue, it’s a 
huge issue.”9
All of the interviewed industry representatives also stressed the importance 
of addressing the quality of education and school infrastructure in Indigenous 
communities. In one instance, a representative from the mining industry 
urged that governments “do less skills training and more education upgrading” 
so that the mining companies can take over and effectively train the workers 
into their chosen fields. In elaborating on this, the representative referred 
to cases from remote northern communities, stating that the official school 
system there is so different from what they are used to that “if they have 
completed grade 8 in their home community [they] are generally functioning 
at about Grade 5 or Grade 6 education level” which is the benchmark actually 
9 In order to uphold my commitment to preserve the privacy of the interview participants, it is necessary to present 
these quotations without precise references.
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used to assess the level of training required. Similar concerns were expressed 
by the representatives from the construction sector who found that selected 
local youth often lack the academic prerequisites for apprenticeship programs, 
which negatively impacts the effectiveness of their initiatives designed to 
increase the number of Indigenous youth in the construction workforce.
Policy developers in general have no comprehensive insight into what Indige-
nous youth really want as there is very little research inquiry into the career 
aspirations of Indigenous youth (Abele and Delic 2014; Bruce and Marlin 
2012). What exists suggests that, while fewer Indigenous youth aspire to 
pursue postsecondary education than non-Indigenous youth, “the educational 
goals of both groups who wish to pursue some type of postsecondary educa-
tion are quite similar. The findings from one survey of Aboriginal youth (aged 
12-18) demonstrated a wide interest in professional careers and a low interest 
in trades. The most popular career choice among the respondents was business 
owner, followed by doctor, lawyer, teacher, and engineer” (Bruce and Marlin 
2012, 2-3). The existing policies, however, place considerably stronger empha-
sizes on skills training for the natural resource sector than on postsecondary 
education (Abele and Delic 2014). Yet, postsecondary education at higher levels 
is generally required to prepare youth to gain employment in their preferred 
professional career disciplines. Gathering and incorporating this knowledge 
into existing skills training and into educational support programs would 
undoubtedly have a significant positive effect on the effectiveness of those 
programs.
There are other important areas where more comprehensive research knowl-
edge would make the development of policy and programming more effective. 
For instance, we know from previous research that Indigenous women have 
consistently been more successful at completing their postsecondary education 
and at finding employment, relative to their male counterparts (Delic 2012). 
However, we do not know if this applies to all age groups. It is likely that 
young Indigenous women are faced with different barriers than the prime 
aged Indigenous women. For instance, existing literature suggests that young 
Indigenous women are more likely to experience early parenthood than are 
other young women in Canada (Quinless 2013; Guimond and Robitaille 2008). 
While not a barrier in itself, early parenthood, in the context of the paid labour 
market, does create additional challenges to be overcome. In this case, the 
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policy challenge would be to provide access to affordable childcare and other 
support required for successful participation in the paid labour market. This 
might help address the ‘readiness’ of Indigenous female youth to join the work-
force. There is, however, no current research and no policy discussion about 
the degree of support that is available to these young and potential workers 
nor about the extent of consequences that early parenthood may have on their 
employment prospects (Abele and Delic 2014).
In addition, labour market intervention is characterized by remarkable 
complexity, with multiple governmental and non-governmental agencies and 
actors involved in the intervention. This is particularly true in the North where 
educational funding, training programs, and recruitment are all controlled by 
different governments and corporations, who are driven by their own needs 
or national imperatives (Abele and Delic 2014). There are no research insights 
regarding the impact this complex opportunity structure might have on the 
employment prospects of Indigenous youth and on the economic development 
in their communities. Gathering and incorporating those insights into existing 
policy might improve its effectiveness.
Finally, the remoteness and the infrastructure deficit in many Indigenous 
communities is an old issue, still pending adequate policy intervention. Over 
the years, it has resulted in an uneven distribution of employment opportuni-
ties (Canadian Polar Commission 2014; Martin 2011) and created a significant 
challenge both for the Indigenous youth who prefer to live in their small home 
communities and for the resource development and other employers, generally 
situated in larger urban centers, who are struggling to develop a skilled and 
self-renewing local workforce (Abele and Delic 2014). Addressing these issues 
would substantially improve the effectiveness of existing policy.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Successful integration of Indigenous youth in the Canadian labour market is of 
primary concern both for the Indigenous communities and for the Canadian 
economy at large. The three policy recommendations presented here pertain to 
a variety of areas, which speak broadly about ensuring ‘readiness’ of the Indig-
enous youth to actively and successfully participate in the Canadian labour 
market. The key objective is to enable Indigenous youth to make informed 
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choices about their preferred careers and to obtain the skills and expertise that 
employers in those careers are seeking.
Although beneficial for the short-term, none of the existing employment pro-
gramming can deliver the needed long-term solution to the Indigenous youth 
employment problem. Existing skills training and other labour market pro-
grams cannot be expected to bring the labour market outcomes of the Indig-
enous youth on a par with those of the non-Indigenous youth because they 
simply cannot make up for what many Indigenous youth have not received, 
prior to reaching their youth stage. Hence, the first and the most important 
recommendation is that the government makes synchronized efforts to effec-
tively address the issues in the area of early education and in the area of stan-
dard of living in the affected Indigenous communities.
The second recommendation is that government works on correcting the 
imbalance in the policy emphasis by strengthening its programming related 
to postsecondary education, which would potentially raise the educational 
and career aspirations among the Indigenous youth and open the doors for 
them to prepare to gain employment in the public and para-public sectors. 
Current projections suggest that approximately two-thirds of job openings 
from 2013 to 2022 will be in high skilled occupations that require university 
or college education, an apprenticeship, or managerial skills (Government of 
Canada 2014a). With this future in mind, it is imperative that the Indigenous 
children receive the elementary education that is on a par with the education 
provided to the non-Indigenous Canadians so that at the youth stage they are 
able to make informed choices about enrolling in postsecondary training that 
would prepare them to compete with other Canadians for these job openings. 
Correcting this imbalance in the policy emphasis would not only benefit 
Indigenous youth in the sense that it would expand the range of career options 
available to them but would also benefit Indigenous communities through 
the support it would provide for democratic development and Indigenous 
self-determination.
The third recommendation is that government works on simplifying the exist-
ing opportunity structure in relation to funding and intervention and accounts 
for variation across regions and within regions across localities. Indigenous 
communities need to be empowered and enabled to implement their own 
long-term educational and labour force development plans in a holistic and 
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integrated manner that takes into account all important factors, including ade-
quate housing, improved community-school relations, community initiatives 
to support youth career planning, support for harvesting sector, and more 
community level control of terms of grants. This would ensure sustainable 
and balanced economic development and self-sufficiency in the Indigenous 
communities.
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Chapter 8 
A MODEST PROPOSAL TO 
STRENGTHEN THE HEALTH OF 
CANADIANS
By James McAllister
INTRODUCTION
This policy brief argues, instead of further large-scale increases in major federal transfers to other levels of government for health care, additional fiscal resources could better be used for specific programs 
and transfers. Through the Council of the Federation, Canada’s Premiers 
have urged “the federal government to commit to increase the envelope of the 
Canada Health Transfer so its share of health care costs represents a minimum 
of 25 per cent of all health care spending by provinces and territories” (2015).  
This is not an unreasonable request given that more than a decade of six per 
cent funding increases have boosted the federal share of health spending to 
nearly 25 per cent or more in many provinces.  Nevertheless, this brief will 
argue that there are better ways to improve the health of Canadians than a 
large increase in the Canada Health Transfer (CHT).
Major federal transfers come to over $72 billion annually and support health 
care, postsecondary education, social services and income maintenance, as 
well as fiscal equalization among provinces and territories. The largest of 
these block transfers, as shown in Table 1, is the CHT.  It is intended to assist 
provincial and territorial governments in financing universal, public, medical 
and hospital insurance. The Canada Social Transfer (CST) and its predecessor 
programs were originally designed to help provinces and territories meet the 
costs of postsecondary education and other social programs. The Equalization 
program provides financial assistance to provinces whose fiscal capacity is 
below the national average.  Territorial Formula Financing (TFF) has similar 
goals as the Equalization program and is received by all three northern 
territories.
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Table 1
Major Federal Transfers to Provinces and Territories, 2017-18 ($ millions) 
Equalization Territorial 
Formula 
Financing
Canada 
Health 
Transfer
Canada Social 
Transfer
TOTAL
British 
Columbia
0 0 4,865 1,800 6,666
Alberta 0 0 4,376 1,620 5,996
Saskatchewan 0 0 1,182 438 1,620
Manitoba 1,820 0 1,355 502 3,677
Ontario 1,424 0 14,331 5,304 21,058
Quebec 11,081 0 8,491 3,142 22,714
New 
Brunswick
1,760 0 768 284 2,813
PEI 390 0 152 56 599
Nova Scotia 1,779 0 967 358 3,096
Newfoundland 0 0 539 199 738
Yukon 0 919 38 14 972
NWT 0 1,232 45 17 1,295
Nunavut 0 1,530 38 14 1,582
CANADA 18,254 3,682 37,150 13,748 72,826
Source: Department of Finance Canada, Federal Support to Provinces and 
Territories.
FEDERAL SPENDING ON HEALTH CARE
The federal government first established a Dominion Department of Health 
in 1919, even though the Constitution Act of 1867 clearly placed health care 
under provincial jurisdiction (Bryant 2016, 11).  In 1943 and 1944, a “charter of 
social security for the whole of Canada” was promised and, in 1945, the federal 
government proposed a national system of public health insurance, covering 
both hospital and medical care.  The federal government was to cover 60 per 
cent of the cost of the program, with provinces responsible for the remaining 
40 per cent and for administering the program (Johnson 2004, 313).
Rejection of the federal charter by provincial governments led the Saskatch-
ewan CCF government of Tommy Douglas to go it alone and provide hospital 
insurance, beginning in 1947.  A decade later, the federal government intro-
duced the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act, which provided 
federal funding to help cover the cost of hospital stays.  After Saskatchewan 
introduced medicare in 1962, the federal government passed the Medical Care 
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Act of 1966.   It provided cost sharing for any province that agreed to imple-
ment medicare and, by 1972, all provinces and territories were participating 
(Fierlbeck 2011, 18).
Beginning in 1977, federal funding for hospitals and medical care was bundled 
with postsecondary education under the Established Programs Financing 
(EPF) arrangements.  The federal government made an annual basic cash 
transfer and a transfer of personal and corporate income tax points to prov-
inces and territories.   The formula the federal government used for distribut-
ing funds among provinces and territories meant the per capita cash transfers 
to some provinces, usually BC, Alberta and Ontario, were significantly less 
than to other jurisdictions (McAllister 2011, 494).
The 1995 federal budget brought the amalgamation of the EPF and the Canada 
Assistance Plan (CAP) into the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) and 
cuts of billions of dollars of federal transfer payments.  This led to a decade of 
acrimony, much of it centered on health care and the fiscal imbalance between 
the federal and provincial governments.  Provinces claimed the federal gov-
ernment’s commitment had been eroded to such an extent that Ottawa was 
supporting significantly less than 20 per cent of health care costs.  In the early 
years of the 21st century and in response to provincial demands, the federal 
government committed to transfer additional funds under the CHST, provide 
support for primary health care, home care and catastrophic drug coverage 
and split the CHST into the CHT and the CST. In 2004, it implemented a 
10-Year Plan to Strengthen Health Care that increased base CHT funding 
immediately, escalated that base by six per cent each year for the next decade 
and established a Wait Times Reduction Fund (Canada 2004).  Meanwhile, 
CST funding was to increase by three per cent annually.  During these years, 
the federal government also moved toward an equal per capita distribution of 
cash transfers, for both the CHT and the CST (McAllister 2011, 494).
In 2011, the Harper government announced that, at the end of the 10-Year 
Plan, the CHT would only increase at a rate of six per cent each year for two 
additional years.  Beginning in 2017-18, provinces were guaranteed CHT 
cash transfer increases of at least three per cent each year, but the actual rate 
of growth would be tied to the expansion of the Canadian economy.  These 
arrangements have largely been left in place by the Trudeau government.  It 
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also proposed to transfer funds specifically for home care and palliative care, 
mental health initiatives, prescription drugs and health innovation.
PROVINCIAL AND TERRITORIAL SPENDING ON HEALTH CARE
Health care is always the largest spending area in provincial and territorial 
budgets.  Although subject to the requirements of the Canada Health Act, each 
province and territory operates its own health system and assiduously guards 
its constitutional powers.  As a result, jurisdictions can be compared in terms 
of the relative effectiveness of their health care systems.  The highest spending 
jurisdictions are the three territories, followed by the three prairie provinces 
and Newfoundland.  Quebec spends the least on health care, with BC and 
Ontario spending just slightly more (Statistics Canada 2010).  One explana-
tion for these differences is that the provinces with the largest populations 
benefit from economies of scale, which help, keep their health care costs below 
average (Orr 2010, 10).  Age and gender differences also have been identified 
as important cost drivers (Canadian Institute for Health Information 2013).  
However, while the average age is highest and the share of the population 65 
years of age or older is greatest in BC, Quebec and the 4 Atlantic provinces, the 
first two of these jurisdictions are among the lowest spenders.  Cost pressures 
because of population aging are likely to be the least in the Prairie Provinces 
and the territories, but they are among the highest spending jurisdictions.
The largest number of physicians and surgeons relative to each jurisdiction’s 
population are practicing in Quebec, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland (CIHI 
2012a). Saskatchewan, Ontario, PEI and the territories are all below the 
national average.  Meanwhile, the largest number of nurses, relative to the 
population of the jurisdiction, are working in the six smallest provinces and 
the territories.  The fewest nurses are in BC and Ontario (CIHI 2012b).
EFFECTIVENESS OF HEALTH CARE
Measures of the relative effectiveness of health care systems show, in the 
words of one Canadian commentator, “compared with the systems of our 
European counterparts, ours is less timely, less efficient and less comprehen-
sive” (Lewis 2015, 12).  The Commonwealth Fund’s ranking of 11 industrialized 
countries showed, although Canada ranked fifth in spending per capita, the 
only country ranked below it in terms of the quality of its health care was the 
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US (2014; Mossialos 2014).  The Conference Board of Canada’s comparison of 
health outcomes among provinces and territories and 15 advanced, industrial-
ized democracies ranked BC at the top, with outcomes similar to Switzerland 
and Sweden as having the healthiest populations.  Not quite as good were 
Alberta, Ontario, Quebec and PEI.  At the other end of the spectrum, with the 
poorest scores, were Newfoundland and all three territories.  Only slightly 
better off were people living in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Nova Scotia 
(2015).
A major indicator of the health care system’s success, infant mortality, reflects 
the quality of health care for a population, as well as the effectiveness of 
preventative care, maternal and child health care.  The infant mortality rate 
is the highest – the worst - in the territories, especially Nunavut, and in the 
three Prairie Provinces.  It is the lowest – the best outcome – in BC and the 
Maritimes.  In fact, the infant mortality rate is about eight times as great in 
Nunavut as in PEI.
Another major indicator of a health care system’s success is the average life 
expectancy of an individual at birth, the number of years a person is expected 
to live.  In Canada, people living in the largest provinces, BC, Alberta, Ontario 
and Quebec have the longest average life expectancies.  BC and Ontario are 
comparable to Switzerland, Japan and France, where life expectancies are 
the longest. People living in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and the 
territories have life expectancies much lower than in the rest of Canada (CIHI 
2012c, 10ff).  In the words of the Conference Board, with a life expectancy of 
71.8 years, “a child born today in Nunavut is expected to live about 10 years 
less than a child born in British Columbia” (2015, Life Expectancy).  Within 
some of the provinces, there also exist disparities between urban, rural and 
remote parts of the province and between southern and northern regions.  In 
northern Ontario, for example, people are more likely to die younger and have 
life spans 2 or three years less than in the rest of the province (Health Quality 
Ontario 2017).
These comparisons suggest the primary basis for some jurisdictions’ relative 
infant mortality or life expectancy is the presence of large numbers of Indig-
enous people.   Poverty, poor living conditions and sub-standard health care 
are well known facts of life for many Indigenous people.  They are a majority 
of the populations of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, represent about a 
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quarter of the population of the Yukon and just under a fifth of the population 
of Manitoba and Saskatchewan (Statistics Canada 2011).
FEDERAL TRANSFERS, PROVINCIAL SPENDING AND HEALTH 
OUTCOMES
There are very few direct linkages between federal transfers, provincial and 
territorial spending on health care, the number of medical doctors or nurses 
and the health of each jurisdiction’s population.  The largest and most prosper-
ous provinces of BC, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec achieve better health out-
comes than the smaller, less prosperous jurisdictions.  This occurs even when 
smaller jurisdictions spend more money on health care. Federal funding is just 
part of the mix of factors that determine the quality of health care provided to 
the residents of each jurisdiction.
This policy brief is not proposing any significant changes to the design of the 
existing federal block transfers.  In the words of Paul Pierson, “once a country 
or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high.  There 
will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional 
arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice” (2000, 251).  It 
is easier and less costly – in a number of ways – to continue to do what has 
been done in the past or to simply modify or improve what is already in place.  
Too many stakeholders rely on the existing block transfers to make significant 
change possible.  Federal transfers currently contribute close to 20 per cent 
of provinces’ and territories’ total revenues.  Those provinces’ and territories’ 
finances and economies would be significantly and negatively affected by any 
cutbacks.
Rather, the federal government should adopt other social policy priorities that 
would yield more tangible results in strengthening the health of Canadians.  
In fact, additional fiscal resources for health care may not be a necessary or 
positive development.  A case in point was during the past decade when CHT 
funding increased by six per cent annually, but much of that increase went to 
improved compensation for health professionals.  In the words of one analyst, 
“most of that money…did not end up in service improvements but in higher 
pay for service providers” (Saillant 2016, 83).  Today, many supporters of 
medicare recommend “not putting more money into the system…but deploying 
existing resources more efficiently” (Bryant 2016, 182).
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ALTERNATE PRIORITIES
The current government should pursue other, alternate priorities.  It is 
launched on a more interventionist course than its immediate predecessor, 
and the following should be given careful consideration.
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S HEALTH CARE
The most crucial suggested initiatives involve additional funding for Indige-
nous health care, both on and off reserve.  The life expectancy of Indigenous 
people is, on average, about a decade less than for the rest of the population, 
infant mortality is about three times the rate of non-Indigenous people, the 
suicide rate is six times higher and the diabetes rate is three to five times 
higher (Canada 2007, 62).  First Nations people suffer a disproportionately 
higher rate of morbidity from diabetes, heart disease, tuberculosis and HIV/
AIDS (Assembly of First Nations 2013, 4).  The health needs of Indigenous 
peoples could be more effectively addressed by improving the medical and 
hospital facilities serving them.  It is also crucial to recognize the need to 
improve the social determinants of health, such as improved water and sewer 
systems, housing, and education (McNally and Martin 2017).
Federal, provincial and territorial governments and Indigenous peoples’ orga-
nizations announced the Kelowna Accord more than a decade ago and released 
a Blueprint on Aboriginal Health (Canada 2005).  It entailed an agreement to 
reduce the gap in health outcomes between Indigenous peoples and the rest 
of the population (Canada 2007, 6).  The Accord was never implemented, but 
in its first budget the current government recognized some of these needs.  A 
promise was made of $8.4 billion over five years in investments on Indigenous 
issues and the Trudeau government’s first budget claimed “this represents a 
significant increase over the investments that would have been made under the 
Kelowna Accord” (Canada 2016, 134).
However, a more precise focus on the health care needs of Indigenous peoples, 
for example those identified by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, is 
warranted (2015, 2).  Indigenous peoples’ organizations have complained that 
governments have not moved quickly enough and “we are still too far from 
completing these very important Calls to Action” (Assembly of First Nations 
2017). Instead, the federal government has been engaged in a long legal battle 
over the correct interpretation of “Jordan’s Principle”, the precedent that says 
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that Indigenous children should have equal access to care whether they live on 
or off reserve and the “government of first contact” should be responsible for 
the costs.
EXTENDING MEDICARE
The federal government also should be involved in meeting specific health 
needs not directly covered by medicare or only partially supported by federal 
funding.  These would involve a national pharmacare program, more adequate 
funding for long term care, home care, dental and vision care and for address-
ing mental health problems.  These are all missing pieces of Canada’s universal 
medicare.
A federally funded universal pharmacare program would mean working with 
provinces and territories to provide prescription drugs to all Canadians. One 
journalist who specializes in health matters points out that “no one really 
knows precisely how many people have no drug coverage, though it is esti-
mated that roughly six million Canadians are uninsured or underinsured” 
(Picard 2017, A13).  Canada is the only country with universal public health 
insurance but without universal public drug coverage (Morgan and Boothe 
2016).  Indeed, as far back as 1964 the Royal Commission on Health Services, 
the Hall Commission, recommended Canada implement a universal, public, 
pharmacare program cost shared equally between the federal government and 
the provinces.  In 2004, provinces and territories invited the federal govern-
ment to take responsibility for a nationwide pharmacare program, but Ottawa 
refused (Courchene 2015, 43).  More recent studies have shown it could be an 
effective way to control costs while improving redistribution to low income 
Canadians (Morgan, Law et al. 2015; Morgan, Martin et al. 2015).
There is also a significant and urgent need for more financial support to 
address mental health issues (Bartram 2016).  Only 7.2 per cent of health 
spending in Canada goes toward mental health care, compared with 11 per 
cent in Sweden and New Zealand, 10 per cent in the UK and 8 per cent in 
France (Jacobs, Dewa et al. 2010, 15). The federal government recognized some 
of the current problems in its 2016 budget, but much more needs to be done 
and any additional funding must be targeted towards specific research and 
treatment projects in the mental health field (Canada 2016, 178).
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SOCIAL PROGRESS
The social determinants of health could be addressed more effectively if high 
quality early learning and child care also could be made more easily available 
at a lower cost.   As the federal government admits, “affordability of child care 
also remains a top concern for many families; in Toronto, for example, average 
annual child care fees can reach, and in some cases exceed, $20,000 per 
year” (Canada 2017, 234). The 2017 budget promises $7 billion over 10 years 
to support up to 40,000 new subsidized child care spaces, but this commit-
ment does not begin until 2018-19, is contingent on reaching agreement with 
provinces and territories and will still not come near to providing the sort of 
government support needed (Anderssen 2017, L5).  Eliminating college and 
university tuition fees, including for students in the health sciences, also would 
make education more accessible, reduce social inequalities and follow the lead 
of many other countries, including Germany, France, Norway and Sweden.
The social determinants of health also would be improved if the supply of 
affordable housing was increased to deal with homelessness and poverty. 
Budget 2017 does propose a National Housing Strategy and an extension of the 
Homelessness Partnering Strategy; however, the demand for such housing is 
enormous and will not be met by current federal efforts.
CONCLUSION
Federal funding for health care through the EPF and the CHST was distrib-
uted so that Quebec, the 6 smallest provinces and the territories received more 
than their per capita share of federal cash. Most of those same jurisdictions 
also receive either Equalization or TFF payments.  Yet some of those same 
provinces and territories continue to have some of the worst health indicators 
in the country.
So what is to be done?  This paper has argued that selective transfers and 
selective spending on the part of the federal government are more likely to 
bring positive results. In contrast, the “open federalism” of the Harper govern-
ment sought to limit the use of the federal spending power in areas of pro-
vincial jurisdiction, but provinces and territories had access to the additional 
funding obtained in the 2004 10-Year Plan.
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The Trudeau government appears to be returning to the days when the federal 
government provided a range of specific transfers and trust funds to finance 
health and social policy initiatives.  The current government is taking a more 
interventionist approach in fields as disparate as mental health, pharmaceu-
ticals, home care, palliative care and Indigenous health.  However, this policy 
brief has shown that much more needs to be done in these and related social 
policy areas.
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Chapter 9 
THE STATE OF CANADA’S 
PENSION POLICIES: WHAT TO DO 
AS THE NUMBER OF RETIRED 
PEOPLE GROWS?
Allan Moscovitch and Richard Lochead
INTRODUCTION
Canada’s economic, social and demographic landscape has changed dra-
matically since the 1960s but Canada’s pension policy is still framed by the 
assumptions from that period. The new landscape is characterized by the 
demographics of aging, an increase in precarious work, and a rise in income 
inequality
Up until now, the pension debate has been focused on updating the various 
components of the existing programs, rather than rethinking the whole 
pension design to fit the new economic realities.
We argue that examination of the recent debates over the Canada Pension Plan 
and the Old Age Security reveals outdated assumptions which have resulted in 
major issues unaddressed and overlooked.
Here we intend to address the inadequate consideration, which has been given 
to the following four issues. Subsequently, we will provide a sketch of the 
direction that we believe should take in pension policy reform.
1. The implications of a workforce characterized by precarious labour includ-
ing part-time and low wage self-employment particularly in the Canada 
Pension Plan (CPP) debate;
2. The mandate and governance of the Canada Pension Plan Investment 
Board (CPBIB), which has become a major investment fund;
3. The decline of private workplace pensions, a major component of Canadian 
pension design, which requires new thinking about pension strategy.
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4. The continuing needs of a major part of the population for pension assis-
tance currently provided through the Old Age Security (OAS) and the 
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), especially in light of the inability 
of lower income people to participate adequate in savings regimes like the 
Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP).
PRECARIOUS LABOUR AND THE CPP
The 2016 expansion of the Canada Pension Plan, “An Act to amend the Canada 
Pension Plan, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act and the Income 
Tax Act” (Bill C-26); was widely viewed as a political success for the Liberal 
Government. It gained support from provinces for a middle course between 
Conservative opposition to CPP expansion and the NDP’s call for doubling the 
CPP’s benefits. The agreement raised the ceiling for pension coverage by 14% 
from $54,900 to $62,500 in 2016 dollars (but cited as $82,700 in 2025 dollars 
when implemented) and the replacement rate from 25 to 33%.  These increases 
fell short of proposals by the Ontario and P.E.I. governments, which advocated 
raising the ceiling to $90,000 (2016 dollars) and a replacement rate of at least 
40% to cover the looming pension gap for middle-income earners, prompting 
the Globe and Mail to describe C-26 as a modest first step (McFarland and 
McGugan 2017). The CPP debate revealed differences between business and 
labour and within the ranks of labour itself. The Canadian Labour Congress 
(CLC) opposed any Canada Pension Plan provisions, which could encourage 
employers to hire part time instead of full time workers. Therefore, it opposed 
raising the exemption for CPP contributions (Yearly Pension Exemption or 
YPE) from $3,500 to $25,000. Youth groups and some business organizations 
supported this approach, which was ultimately rejected. Thus, a new policy 
challenge was introduced: How to devise a pension policy, which protects 
precarious labour, but does not encourage it?
The CPP amendment raises other problems. It is not clear that raising the 
Working Income Tax Benefit to offset increased contributions for lower income 
earners will compensate for reduced GIS income. Indexing of Old Age Security 
(OAS) payments to prices rather than wages is projected to erode a major 
portion of the CPP benefit for those retiring in 20 years.1  Since the returns to 
1 The Office of the Chief Actuary (OCA) has projected, due to population aging, that wages will increase faster than 
prices eroding the price indexed OAS which, in turn will reduce a significant portion of the added CPP benefit for 
those retiring in 20 years. Cited in: Baldwin and Shillington (forthcoming) IRPP 2017.
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capital in a Tax Free Savings Account are not taxable, and do not count in the 
calculation of eligibility for the OAS and the GIS, more people will be able to 
access them at higher income levels as a result of these conditions (Kesselman 
2015).
 THE MANDATE AND GOVERNANCE OF THE CANADA PENSION 
PLAN INVESTMENT BOARD (CPPIB)
Unlike the OAS and GIS, the CPP is financed by contributions from employees 
and employers, not federal government revenues. Like private company plans, 
contributions not immediately needed for benefits provide a large fund, which 
can be used for investment.
The creation of the CPPIB in 1998 represented a major shift in the financing 
of the Canada Pension Plan. Previously pension money not needed to pay 
for immediate benefits would be loaned to provinces at low rates of return. 
Now new funds would be used by the CPPIB to actively invest in global stock 
markets. This approach was taken to generate more revenue which would 
offset the need for higher contribution rates. This type of financing model 
was not new as Quebec had established La Caisse de dépôt et placement du 
Québec in 1965 to invest the contributions of the Quebec Pension Plan (La 
caisse, history), but the mandates of the two bodies are quite different. While 
the La Caisse mandate is “to achieve an optimal return on the deposits of our 
clients, or depositors, while contributing to Quebec’s economic development“, 
the CCPIB defines its mandate simply as “achieving a maximum rate of return 
without undue risk of loss” (La caisse, mandate).
The CCPIB is administered much like a private pension fund and views itself 
as independent from government. As such it does not consider its operations 
as a matter for public debate. Indeed the role of the CCPIB was not highlighted 
in any political debates surrounding CPP expansion.
The CPPIB is often cited by proponents of CPP expansion as superior to a 
private company and individual retirement plans due to its size and lower 
Management Expense Ratio (MER). However, the existing CCPIB policy of 
maximizing returns can lead to investment decisions without regard for other 
objectives. These include investing in fossil fuels when government policy is 
to reduce the carbon footprint, funding mining companies with poor environ-
mental and labour records, and investing most of its funds outside the country. 
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As of March 31, 2016, 19.1% of the fund assets were invested in Canada while 
39.7% were invested in the United States, and 19.5% in the UK and Europe 
combined (CPPIB, Beneficiaries).
WORKPLACE PENSIONS
Canada has one of the highest percentages of private pensions among OECD 
countries (OECD). Unlike many other counties, private workplace plans are not 
compulsory or legally required, which creates major discrepancies in coverage.  
In the 1960s companies lobbied to keep their own workplace pensions so they 
could use the pension funds for investment purposes, but since the 1990s, 
pensions increasingly have become financial liabilities and companies have 
sought to reduce or avoid all pension commitments. Between 1977 and 2011 
the percentage of employees covered by registered pensions fell from 46.1 
to 38.4 (McFarland and McGugan 2017). Some companies adopted two tier 
pension plans by which new hires have the less remunerative market- based 
Defined Contribution (DC) plans while existing workers retain the stable ben-
efits of a Defined Benefit (DB) plan, resulting in generational inequity. From 
2011 to 2015, the number of defined contribution plan members rose steadily 
from 969,207 to 1,097,211 while the numbers in defined benefit plan fell by an 
amount close to the rise (Statistics Canada, RPP). Finally, many companies do 
not offer any pension coverage.
The wide range of private employment coverage creates pension disparity and 
pension envy as well as a myriad of pension systems, which are not portable 
in a rapidly changing workforce. Nevertheless, the Canadian government still 
encourages the creation of private employment pensions with a tax deduction 
policy established in the 1960s.
In 2012 the Conservative Government passed legislation to enable pooling 
of existing RRSP plans to provide what was suggested would be a low cost 
alternative to expanding the CPP (House of Commons). In 2016 the Liberal 
Government introduced legislation to support target benefits (TB) plans, a 
hybrid between DB and DC plans which shifts liability risk of DB plans away 
from employers to employees and retirees but provides a guaranteed return 
(Steele 2017).
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PENSION ASSISTANCE: THE OAS AND GIS
The Old Age Security (OAS) is an almost universal payment available on appli-
cation to all people 65 years of age or older who have lived in Canada for 40 
years since the age of 18 and a partial pension for those with at least ten years 
residency. The maximum OAS payment is $578.53 per month as of March 
2017. The OAS is taxable. For the tax year 2016, the level of income at which 
some of the OAS is recovered through taxation is $73,756. Taxation continues 
to increase up to $119,615 of annual income at which point the OAS payment is 
negligible (Government of Canada, recovery tax).
The Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) provides a monthly non-taxable 
income supplement to applicants receiving the OAS who qualify because they 
have an income below the maximum threshold. The threshold for a single 
person in 2016 was $17,544. Maximum benefit of GIS is $864.09 a month or 
$10,369.08. Maximum total benefit for seniors with no other income includes 
the OAS of $6942.36 and the GIS of $10,369.08 for a total of $17,311.44 (Gov-
ernment of Canada, payments).
The major issue facing the OAS and the GIS is the growth in the numbers 
of people over the age of 65 with eligibility for these programs, which will 
mean increasing expenditures over time. This will occur because of the large 
numbers of “baby boomers,” those born between 1946 and 1965 who will be 
reaching the age of 65 in the coming years. Those born in 1952 are now reach-
ing 65 with another 13 years of the baby boom expected to join the ranks of 
those reaching retirement age. With rising age at mortality, there will likely 
be more demand for the OAS and there may be greater demand for the GIS as 
well.  Recent CanSim data from Statistics Canada shows an average increase of 
close to 200,000 people who are over the age of 65 from 2010 to 2014 (Statis-
tics Canada, Table 280-0008).
Over the past twenty years, the data show that the combination of the OAS and 
GIS has lifted many seniors above the poverty line, reducing senior poverty to 
very low levels (Moscovitch et al. 2015). The previous government proposed 
increasing the age of access to 67 from 65; the change was cancelled by the 
present government but now the same idea is being proposed again by busi-
ness oriented organizations arguing that it will encourage more workers to 
remain later in the labour force.
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There are several issues to untangle. First, for many people at age 65 the issue 
is not having employment. The alternatives to employment are OAS and GIS 
or provincial social assistance. Provincial social assistance leaves more people 
dependent on a conditional program with benefit levels below the poverty line. 
Second, increasing the age at which full benefits are available is simply one 
method of reducing the cost of the OAS and GIS to which it is tied. However, 
if the goal is to reduce expenditures and keep poverty rates for seniors low, 
then there are other means than increasing the age of access to federal income 
assistance.
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
1. Recommendations to improve Pensions for Precarious Workers
Market instability does not guarantee pension security or sustainability for 
private companies. Neither of the Defined Benefit, Defined Contribution or 
the new Target Benefit plans will address the fact that pensions should not be 
dependent on the economic fortunes of private companies.
The CPP is the most cost effective approach to workplace pensions, but its 
coverage is undermined by a design based on a 1960s workforce of full time 
employment
Our recommendations seek to address this by fully expanding the CPP while 
making it more responsive to increasing precarious work and income inequal-
ity by extending its legislative reach and by integrating the CPPIB pension 
fund to support investments, which offset income inequality and increase 
Canadian economic development.
Although the rise of precarious labour is widely acknowledged by media and 
politicians, a key problem for pension designers is the incomplete picture of its 
range and extent in existing statistical data.
1. We recommend that Statistics Canada be authorized to develop survey 
questions to better document and track the different types of precarious 
labour.
The Canada Pension Plan is designed so that employee and employer divide 
the contribution costs. Yet employers can avoid paying their contribution by 
designating workers as independent contractors.  Pension policy in an age of 
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precarious work will need to better coordinate with other labour market poli-
cies and with provincial legislation.
2. We recommend that the federal government amend its labour legislation 
so that employees of federally regulated industries cannot be made into 
involuntary self-employed contract workers. Such a measure would reaf-
firm the employer–employee relationship as originally intended in the 
Canada Pension Plan legislation and allow for a successful implementation 
of proposals to assist low-income earners in an expanded CPP.2
3. We also recommend amendments to federal legislation requiring the public 
service and regulated employers to give part time or contract workers the 
same pay, vacation, and pension benefits as permanent workers. Such a 
policy, termed “flexicurity”, in place in several European countries, com-
bines flexibility for the employer to hire part time workers in return for 
guaranteed benefits and increased job training.
2. Recommendations to Ensure the Canada Pension Plan Invest-
ment Board Meets Economic and Social Criteria
An expanded CPP will increase the CCPIB pension fund, already one of the 
world’s largest with assets over $300 billion dollars. (CPPIB, CPP Fund) 
Although the CPP is considered a public plan, its contributors do not have any 
input into how the CCPIB invests their money. Furthermore, the CPP is income 
based and benefits workers with long periods of full time employment rather 
than those with interrupted work histories.
4. We recommend making the CPP more socially oriented and potentially 
re-distributive by dividing the CCPIB into separate investment funds with 
one targeting social investments such as lower and moderate cost housing 
in Canada. The Board should set a target of 5% of the fund in socially 
oriented investments.
5. In order to promote greater transparency and accountability, we recom-
mend that the CCPIB include representation from government, labour and 
community groups to provide public oversight.
2 Recently proposed Ontario legislation proposes to introduce some similar protections for precarious work. See 
“Ontario Introduces Legislation to Create Fair Workplaces, Better Jobs,” https://news.ontario.ca/mol/en/2017/06/
ontario-introduces-legislation-to-create-fair-workplaces-better-jobs.html
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6. We also recommend that a commitment of the CPPIB to invest in Canada 
be considered a part of its mandate, which would be rewritten to accommo-
date a more socially oriented fund. Less than 20% investment in Canada 
seems low for a fund, which is the largest investment vehicle in the country. 
We recommend that the fund be required to invest at least 40% of the fund 
in the country.
3. Recommendations to Improve Workplace Pensions
The Ontario Government Pension Plan proposal sought to address declining 
company plans by creating a mandatory government plan which would cover 
those not already in a company plan. A better direction would be phasing out 
private pension plans altogether and their replacement by the more cost effec-
tive and portable CPP.
The recent expansion of the CPP was very modest with its income thresholds 
raised to $62,586 in current dollars and its replacement rate to just 33%.
7. We propose the federal government and the provincial governments more 
fully develop the CPP in line with the U.S. and other OECD countries by 
increasing the income threshold to $100,000 and by raising the replace-
ment rate to 50%. Some of the costs of increased CPP premiums would 
be offset by the gradual elimination of contributions to existing company 
plans.
A fully expanded CPP would greatly reduce pension inequity between those 
who have additional company pension coverage and those who only have only 
the CPP. The CPP would become the core workplace pension with standard 
defined benefit coverage for all. It would also reduce pension administration 
costs for employers and eliminate pension envy among workers.
4. Recommendations to Improve Pension Assistance
We have recommended a substantially expended Canada Pension Plan. With 
the expended Canada Pension Plan in place, we recommend that the federal 
government consider making changes to the Old Age Security program.
8. We recommend slowly reducing the floor at which the tax-back of the OAS 
starts. By retaining the same tax-back rate, lowering the floor would be 
effectively lowering the ceiling above which all OAS payments are taxed 
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back. We also recommend using the increased revenues to cover the 
increasing cost of the OAS over time as larger numbers of the baby boom 
become eligible. This step will not disadvantage lower income retirees.
A recent report, titled The Precarity Penalty, examined the nature of precari-
ous labour, and recommends that governments consider ways of compensating 
low-income workers for the loss of current income because of obligations to 
participate in the expanded CPP (Lewchuk et al. 2015).
9. Although the federal government has committed to increasing the Working 
Income Tax Benefit to offset increased CPP contribution costs for low-in-
come earners, some analysts have pointed out that this measure may not 
offset losses to their GIS upon retirement due to expanded CPP payments. 
We recommend that the federal government commit to ensuring that the 
expansion of the Canada Pension Plan will not negatively affect the retire-
ment income of lower and moderate-income workers (Milligan and Schirle 
2016).
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Chapter 10 
CANADA’S FEMINIST 
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 
POLICY: BOLD STATEMENT OR 
FEMINIST FIG LEAF?
Stephen Brown and Liam Swiss
INTRODUCTION
On 9 June 2017, the Canadian government made foreign aid history by 
announcing the country’s – and probably the world’s – first “feminist inter-
national assistance policy”. Among other things, it promised that within four 
years, “at least 95 percent of Canada’s bilateral international development 
assistance investments will either target or integrate gender equality and the 
empowerment of women and girls”, an unprecedented commitment (Canada 
2017a).
As part of the international assistance review, Global Affairs Canada (GAC) 
held widespread consultations in 2016, in which over 15,000 people partici-
pated, across Canada and in 65 countries around the world (Canada 2017b). 
Repeated delays in releasing the result had left many observers sceptical about 
the process. However, its feminist approach was extremely positively received 
by Canadian development organizations, observers and the media.
This chapter examines the main components of the new aid policy, analyzing 
in turn 1) its focus on gender, women and girls, and the nature of the feminist 
approach; 2) some other key content, including priority areas and geographic 
focus, the role of the private sector and the issue of policy coherence; and 
3) the question of aid funding. It argues that, though the feminist focus is 
ground-breaking and welcome, it is hampered by some important challenges. 
The refocusing of aid is promising, as is the commitment to reduce bureau-
cracy, while the focus on the private sector is more problematic, including in 
its relationship to promoting gender equality. The value of the new document 
is also hampered by the lack of policy coherence for development. The policy’s 
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Achilles Heel, however, is the lack of financial resources to support it and 
provide a true platform for Canadian leadership in feminist foreign aid, as 
well as feminist foreign policy more broadly. While the feminist aid policy will 
buttress the Liberal government’s feminist credentials, it will also provide 
a convenient fig leaf for the lack of political will to expand aid funding and 
decidedly unfeminist policies in other areas.
HOW FEMINIST?
Canada’s recent approach to women’s empowerment and gender equality has 
oscillated between the more conservative Women in Development (WID) 
approach and more progressive Gender and Development (GAD) approach, 
with the Harper government era marking a period of WID ascendancy 
(Tiessen 2016). The new policy marks a significant return to a GAD approach, 
which takes more seriously issues of structural inequalities and unequal power 
relations between men and women, rather than just trying to integrate women 
into development programs.
Without ever defining feminism, the policy outlines GAC’s understanding of 
a feminist approach to international assistance as: human rights-based and 
inclusive; strategically focused on initiatives that best empower women and 
girls and reduce gender inequalities; challenging unequal power relations, 
discrimination and harmful norms and practices; and reliant on gender-based 
analysis while being accountable for results (Canada 2017a). Its focus on 
inclusivity, power, and even intersectional discrimination, make the policy 
as progressive a feminist document as one can imagine a federal government 
department could issue. Indeed, Canada is boldly positioned to become the 
feminist killjoy of international development assistance for years to come 
(Ahmed 2017).
As progressive and feminist as the policy is, some areas of concern remain; 
especially around the issue of instrumentalizing women and girls to achieve 
other development or foreign policy aims. This instrumentalist critique has 
been levelled at Canada’s aid program previously around issues of security 
(Swiss 2012; Tiessen 2015a) and maternal and child health (Tiessen 2015b). 
In the new policy, this instrumentalist approach has diminished, but still 
appears occasionally when describing the empowerment of women and girls 
as a means of achieving other aims like global economic growth, peace and 
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security, and combating poverty. Undoubtedly, gender equality contributes 
to these outcomes, but the policy walks a fine line between being feminist for 
gender equality’s sake and trying to convince others of the instrumental gains 
to be had from its feminist approach.
To implement the new feminist approach the policy commits to several new 
spending targets within the scope of the existing aid budget. Three directly 
relate to the feminist aims of the policy, while several others specify targets 
related to existing and ongoing aid priorities (such as maternal, newborn and 
child health, as well as climate change). The three targets related to gender 
equality are: 1) By 2021-2022, no less than 80 percent of Canadian interna-
tional assistance will integrate gender equality or the empowerment of women 
and girls to achieve the policy’s goals; 2) By 2021-2022, no less than 15 percent 
of Canadian international assistance will specifically target gender equality 
and the empowerment of women and girls; and (3) From 2017, $150 million 
will be allocated over five years to local organizations that advance women’s 
rights. Below, we briefly explore each of these in turn.
Figure 1. Past and Forecast ODA to Gender Equality
Source: OECD/DAC CRS Database http://stats.oecd.org/Index.
aspx?DataSetCode=GENDER#
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Gender-Integrated (Mainstreamed) Aid: The commitment to spend at least 
80 percent of Canada’s international assistance on initiatives which inte-
grate gender equality and women’s empowerment is in keeping with past 
Canadian support for gender mainstreaming, despite the policy omitting the 
mainstreaming label. Eighty cents of every Canadian aid dollar will support 
programs which integrate gender equality even if the program is not primarily 
a gender project. This corresponds to aid which the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC, the main 
body grouping bilateral aid donors) identifies as having gender equality as a 
“significant objective”. DAC statistics for past Canadian aid spending in Figure 
1 show that spending in this category ranged from about 38 percent in 2010 
to just over 50 percent in 2015. Projecting forward to the 80 percent target 
by 2022 means expanding the proportion of gender mainstreamed programs 
by 60 percent and reaching an unprecedented level among DAC members in 
recent data. This means many new programs that might not have had gender 
equality as an aim will now include it, making almost all of Canadian aid sup-
portive of gender equality and women’s empowerment in one way or another.
Gender-Targeted Aid: The more radical spending commitment in the new 
policy is to increase gender-targeted aid to 15 percent of all assistance by 2022. 
Figure 1 shows that in 2015 this category, which the DAC labels as having 
gender equality (GE) as a “principal objective”, amounted to just over 2 percent 
of Canadian assistance – in the bottom half of all DAC donors. Growing this 
amount more than sevenfold will make Canada the largest – by percentage 
– donor of GE-targeted aid in the world. To attain this target means both a 
greater number and larger scale of gender-targeted programming, though 
some of this may be achieved through targeted contribution to GE-specific 
multilateral or global funds dedicated to women’s rights and empowerment.
Combined, both commitments mean that by 2021-2022 no less than 95 
percent of Canadian assistance will address gender equality and women’s 
empowerment in some fashion – a level that will far exceed any other DAC 
donor’s current commitments to both forms of gender programming.
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Figure 2. ODA to Women’s Equality Organisations and Institutions (DAC Sector 
code 15170)
 Source: OECD/DAC CRS Database via QWIDS https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/
Aid to Women’s Groups: The third notable commitment in the new policy is 
to spend $150 million over five years through local organizations working to 
advance women’s rights and empowerment. This earmarking of approximately 
$30 million annually will enable Canada to continue and expand its tradition 
of supporting women’s groups in recipient partner countries, an approach 
that had fallen out of favour in recent years. Figure 2 shows DAC statistics for 
Canadian spending in the category of “Support to Women’s Equality Organ-
isations and Institutions” between 2002 and 2015. From a high of US$7.7 
million in 2008 to a recent low of only US$1.6 million in 2015, we can see that 
this approach to funding women’s organizations declined sharply during the 
Harper years (Swiss and Barry 2017). Increasing spending on women’s organi-
zations nearly fifteen-fold from 2015 levels is, thus, a significant shift.
No operational details for this $150 million are indicated in the new policy. 
It is likely it will be spread among many small gender equality funds admin-
istered at the country level to best connect with local organizations – an 
approach praised in the 2008 evaluation of gender policy and programming of 
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the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), which held primarily 
responsibility for aid at the time (Bytown Consuling and CAC International 
2008).
How will these new spending targets affect existing and future programming 
both within and outside these areas? In one sense, the policy provides oppor-
tunities to reshape some existing commitments of Canada’s aid programs in 
more feminist ways. For instance, it reiterates Canada’s Harper-era commit-
ment to invest $3.5 billion in maternal, newborn, and child health, but extends 
it further by investing $650 million over three years on sexual and repro-
ductive health and rights – an area that was constrained under the Harper 
government. In this way, the new policy is tweaking existing programming 
priorities to better fit the feminist positioning of the policy.
The question of how the new policy spending targets constrain Canada’s inter-
national assistance programming in areas that are neither gender-targeted nor 
gender-integrated is not answered in the policy. By committing to spend 95 
percent of Canada’s bilateral assistance on gender equality, this leaves only a 
small portion available to initiatives that do not address this concern. The con-
sequence of such constraints could be either the rejection of developmentally 
beneficial but non-GE-oriented programs, or the hollowing out of the meaning 
of gender-integrated programs such that any aid initiative is deemed within 
the 95 percent envelope if it ticks certain boxes. Both outcomes would directly 
challenge the value of a feminist approach to international assistance. As the 
policy is implemented, GAC will need to mitigate both such risks.
Can GAC deliver on these feminist results and spending targets? In the 1980s, 
CIDA was a world leader on gender and development issues (McGill 2012; 
Swiss 2012; Tiessen 2016). With a rhetorical shift away from gender equality 
under the Harper government, the support for and delivery of gender equality 
programming in Canadian international assistance diminished. With this 
shift, some of the expertise and institutional inertia that had made Canada a 
leader was lost, despite the resilience demonstrated by some gender experts 
and others within the former CIDA (Tiessen 2016; Swiss and Barry 2017). 
Likely, GAC will require an intensive internal process of training, retraining, 
and recruitment to ensure that it is equipped with the skills and expertise 
required to deliver the feminist development results outlined by the policy. 
If so, a fuller institutionalization of feminist principles in the bureaucracy of 
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Canada’s aid program could be a possible outcome of implementing the new 
policy, despite the challenges posed by the former CIDA’s recent absorption by 
the diplomatic and trade arms of GAC.
KEY CONTENT
Although the focus on women, girls and gender equality was the most notable 
innovation in the new policy, below we outline five other key issues that stand 
out: the thematic and geographic concentration of aid, the issue of donor-
driven aid, the role of the private sector, aid delivery, and policy coherence for 
development. Each is notable for what it says or does not say.
First, in the tradition of all new aid policy statements, the new policy lists a few 
overarching themes under which Canadian assistance can be placed. In the 
past, the government has called them areas of focus or priority themes. Now 
they are labelled “action areas”:
1. Core Action Area: Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 
Women and Girls
2. Human Dignity (health and nutrition, education, humanitarian action)
3. Growth That Works for Everyone
4. Environment and Climate Action
5. Inclusive Governance
6. Peace and Security
As in the past, the themes give the impression of focus but are in fact broad 
enough to accommodate virtually any activity that the government wants to 
undertake. The second one in particular, “human dignity”, is so wide-rang-
ing that it is a stretch to refer to it as a single area. The key difference in this 
iteration, however, is that, whereas gender equality had been a cross-cutting 
theme in the past, it has now been elevated to the single “core action area”. 
Otherwise, this organization of programming into six areas is unlikely to have 
much impact.
Since 2002, the Canadian government has always had a list of 8–25 priority 
countries in which aid was to be concentrated. It modified this list every few 
years, leading to volatility and unpredictability and thus hurting the effective-
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ness of Canada’s aid program (Brown 2015). The new aid policy abolishes this 
practice, committing instead to focus primarily on a single region. It presents 
the rationale as follows: “Half of the world’s poorest citizens live in sub-Saha-
ran Africa. For that reason, Canada will ensure that no less than 50 percent of 
its bilateral international development assistance is directed to sub-Saharan 
African countries by 2021–22” (Canada 2017a). Although the figures are hard 
to interpret, notably what is included under the rubric of “bilateral interna-
tional development assistance”, this commitment will require a significant 
redirecting of resources to the Sub-Saharan Africa from other regions, since 
the overall budget is to remain constant.
Second, the new policy gives a very strong sense of aid being donor driven. 
It does briefly recognize the importance of local ownership: “To be effective, 
international assistance must respond to local needs and priorities. Partner 
country governments at all levels establish these priorities and they are – and 
will continue to be – primary partners for Canada’s international assistance” 
(Canada 2017a). However, the policy very clearly sets Canada’s own “feminist” 
priority. At times, the language can be quite directive. For instance, “Canada 
will require that women participate actively in the design and implementation 
of any climate adaptation or mitigation initiatives”, even if Canada is only 
providing a fraction of the funding (Canada 2017a, emphasis added). Such 
conditions, not matter how well intentioned, could annoy partners and delay 
programs.
Thus, in some contexts, Canada’s priorities will not be welcome. In a further 
example, Canada’s new commitment to “the right to access safe and legal abor-
tions” (Canada 2017a) will not be well received by the governments of an over-
whelming majority countries in the priority region, Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
abortion is currently criminalized. It also remains to be seen what Canada’s 
response will be when developing country partners identify priorities that do 
not specifically address gender, women or girls. In the wake of economic and 
political conditionalities, which have had limited degrees of success over the 
past decades, this policy might launch a new form of gender conditionality and 
could lead to sham or tokenistic compliance.
Third, the new policy places much emphasis on the role of the private sector in 
development. The main instrument for promoting this seems to be the gov-
ernment’s planned Development Finance Institute (DFI). The DFI, as origi-
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nally announced by the Conservative government in 2015, will receive $300 
million over a five-year period and will lend funds to (Canadian?) companies 
to encourage them to invest in developing countries. Tellingly, the DFI will 
be a subsidiary of Export Development Canada and, moreover, built up from 
scratch in Montreal, rather than seek synergies with Global Affairs Canada in 
Ottawa-Gatineau. It is unclear whether the funding will be counted as ODA, as 
well as how much its work will contribute to poverty reduction in general and 
more specifically to the betterment of the lives of women and girls.
All over the world, government interventions rather than market forces have 
been the main promoters of women’s rights. The central goal of the private 
sector is to generate profit for company owners and shareholders. Corporate 
social responsibility and other voluntary charitable projects may generate 
some benefits for marginalized and disadvantaged people, but those are side 
activities, not core ones. The new aid policy expresses a desire “to encourage 
inclusive growth and create jobs and improve incomes – particularly for 
women and girls” (Canada 2017a). Nonetheless, beyond the promise of some 
assistance to women entrepreneurs, it will be a major challenge for the Cana-
dian government to ensure that the benefits from its promotion of the private 
sector accrue primarily to women and reduce gender inequalities. It will also 
be harder to ensure accountability, especially in cases of “blended finance”. 
The use of loans, rather than grants, could leave beneficiaries worse off if their 
ventures fail and they must still repay the capital provided from the Canadian 
government, with interest.
The policy does mention a commitment “to strengthening our policy frame-
work to ensure Canadian companies reflect Canadian values, respect human 
rights and operate responsibly”, but no detail is provided on how this will be 
achieved. Concretely, such measures could involve the creation of binding 
accountability mechanisms that would allow Canadian companies and their 
foreign subsidiaries to be sued in Canadian courts for acts committed in devel-
oping countries, where judicial remedies may be harder to obtain.
The appointment of an extractive sector ombudsman could serve as a useful 
mechanism in this regard, but the Trudeau government has so far shown 
little more enthusiasm for it than its predecessor has. Interestingly, the new 
policy makes no reference to the extractive sector at all, even though it was a 
significant policy plank of the Harper government’s approach to foreign aid. It 
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is unclear what changes will follow: The current extractive-focused programs 
might be left to quietly run their course and then fade away, or perhaps the 
mining sector will benefit from the renewed promotion of the private sector.
Fourth, the policy promises to reduce the red tape for which Canadian aid 
has long been known: “We will streamline and accelerate our funding and 
reporting procedures to reduce the administrative burden on our funding 
recipients” (Canada 2017a). It also contains encouraging language about will-
ingness to take “responsible risks” and base decisions on evidence. Little detail 
is provided, however, and to have a significant impact a basic change in culture 
will be required. GAC and its predecessor CIDA have been very bureau-
cratic, risk-averse and prone to political interference. No mention is made of 
decentralizing decision-making to the field, which had been raised numerous 
times during the consultations (Canada 2017b), suggesting that Canada’s aid 
program will remain one of the most centralized ones in the world.
The fifth and final issue area examined here is policy coherence for develop-
ment, that is to say the degree to which non-aid policies complement aid in the 
promotion of international development. Achieving such synergies was one of 
the main justifications for merging CIDA with the then Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade. Tellingly, the government has undertaken a 
review of its foreign aid, but not its broader foreign policy or its trade policy. 
The new policy acknowledges that, “When it comes to gender equality and 
the empowerment of women and girls, a more integrated approach is needed 
– one that also includes diplomacy, trade and the expertise of a wide range of 
Canadian government departments and agencies” (Canada 2017a). However, it 
does not specify how the government will ensure this integration – or specify 
that it should apply to more than gender-related issues. The policy men-
tions in passing that “Canada is committed to a progressive trade agenda” 
(Canada 2017a, emphasis in original), but it seems to pertain only to new trade 
agreements.
What impact will a feminist, pro-development perspective have on the Cana-
dian government’s international policies beyond aid? The fact that Foreign 
Minister Chrystia Freeland barely mentioned aid or development in her major 
foreign policy speech to Parliament a few days before the release of the aid 
policy suggests that development assistance is an add-on and not central to 
Canadian foreign policy (Freeland 2017). What’s more, her strong emphasis 
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on hard power and increased defence spending (see below) appear antithetical 
to a feminist foreign policy. This instance is consistent with the government’s 
previous decision to allow the sale billions of dollars of weapons to Saudi 
Arabia, one of the least respectful regimes of women’s rights in the word and 
despite the fact that the arms would plausibly be used to repress the country’s 
civilian population or to commit war crimes in neighbouring Yemen. Under 
the Trudeau government, Canada certainly talks the feminist talk, but it is 
reluctant to walk the feminist walk.
FINANCING
An aid policy’s impact is highly dependent on its level of funding. During the 
consultations, government officials stated that a strong new policy would help 
them make the case for a significant aid budget increase. Because the policy 
was much delayed, the federal budget was released first, and it allocated no 
extra money for foreign aid for at least five years.
The government had been careful to moderate expectations. For instance, 
its discussion paper, released just before the consultations began, stated that 
hopes for a significant increase were “unrealistic […] in the current fiscal 
context” (Global Affairs Canada 2016: 23). Nonetheless, the government’s own 
summary of the consultations recognized that participants repeatedly empha-
sized the importance of allocating more resources to foreign aid and recom-
mended reaching the UN target of 0.7% of gross national income (GNI), a level 
already met or exceeded by several European donors, including Denmark, 
Germany, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Canada 2017b; OECD 
2017). Canada’s contributions, at 0.26% of GNI, pale by comparison, and this 
ratio will fall in the years to come, as the Canadian economy grows.
Disappointment with a lack of Canadian generosity turned to outrage in the 
days preceding the release of the aid policy, when the Canadian government 
announced a massive increase in the defence budget. The media repeatedly 
highly the contrast, which the Globe and Mail pithily summarized as “Billions 
for the military and a lump of coal for foreign aid” (Clark 2017). Indeed, over 
a ten-year period, annual defence spending would rise from $19 billion to 
$33 billion, including $15–19 billion for 88 new fighter jets, a higher number 
than the previous Conservative government had planned to purchase (Reuters 
2017), while aid spending would remain frozen at $5 billion. Clearly, the gov-
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ernment could no longer use the fiscal context to support the narrative that a 
substantial aid budget increase was “unrealistic”, but finding a new justifica-
tion proved challenging.
After announcing the new policy, Minister of International Development 
Marie-Claude Bibeau stated that “Our partners were asking not for money; 
that was not the first thing they were asking (for)” (Blanchfield 2017). Perhaps 
the interlocutors were too polite to ask for money “first”, but – as noted above 
– the government had already recognized that consultation participants 
repeatedly did recommend a major budget increase, which the government 
refused to do. Participants could hardly have been any more vocal on this issue 
and Canadian NGOs kept up the pressure in the run-up to the release of the 
2017 federal budget, and subsequently protested the aid freeze quite visibly. As 
a result, the minister’s statement about the lack of pressure for more money 
seems rather disingenuous and misleading, if not an outright lie.
Instead, Bibeau’s added, partners “were asking for leadership. They said, ‘We 
need Canada around the table, we need Canada to speak loud and clear about 
progressive values’” (Blanchfield 2017). Although she presents an either/or sce-
nario between funding and leadership, the two components are not mutually 
exclusive. In fact, they are highly complementary, as money can significantly 
bolster leadership, while claims to leadership without a concomitant financial 
commitment lacks credibility and limits impact.
Bibeau herself and the new policy explicitly recognize the need for a massive 
increase in global development cooperation, “as much as US$7 trillion by 
2030”, to reach the Sustainable Development Goals (Bibeau 2017; see also 
Canada 2017a). However, despite the oft-repeated claims that “Canada is back” 
and “the world needs more Canada” (Bibeau 2017), the Canadian government 
is unwilling to carry its share the financial burden. Although the new policy 
refers to Canadian generosity (Canada 2017a), Canada’s official development 
assistance (ODA) is less generous than the average industrialized country’s, 
earning an unimpressive 15th place in 2016 (OECD 2017). Bibeau argued that, 
“It is essential to increase government contributions, but it is also especially 
important to step up our efforts to seek out new partners and new investors” 
(Bibeau 2017). Having decided reject the first option, Canada is instead turning 
to the second, hoping that other actors will increase their contributions. In 
particular, as discussed above, the Canadian government appears to be count-
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ing on the private sector to promote development, in particular gender equality 
and the role of women and girls. However, as argued above, it is not clear how 
strong an instrument private finance is for achieving those goals.
The government hopes that “new funding mechanisms to encourage more 
innovative and cost-effective private- and voluntary-sector solutions to sus-
tainable development challenges” will encourage “other donors to contribute to 
Canadian-administered initiatives” (Canada 2017a). Still, it is unclear to what 
extent other actors will be willing to contribute to Canadian efforts that the 
Canadian government is unwilling to finance itself. Canada wants to emulate 
Sweden’s leadership in putting in place an ambitious feminist foreign policy. 
However, unlike Sweden, it is not willing to support it with the aid funding it 
requires.
Without additional resources, the Canadian government won’t be able to 
promote its feminist agenda without it being at the expense of other areas of 
foreign aid. In addition, it will have to wait for current projects to wind down 
to free up funds for new initiatives. As a result, there is likely to be a relatively 
slow uptake of new programs put in place.
CONCLUSION
Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy promises a significant 
focusing of Canadian efforts on gender equality and the empowerment of 
women and girls across its aid programming, but may face significant imple-
mentation challenges. Such focus, despite the breadth of some of the “action 
areas”, has been uncommon in past Canadian aid policies. However, gender 
conditionality may run the risk of boxing Canada’s aid program into a corner 
when it comes to initiatives that do not address gender equality and by reduc-
ing the government’s flexibility to respond to the changing aid landscape 
over the next few years. The full extent of the Trudeau government’s feminist 
principles will be revealed in whether the new policy exists as a tokenistic 
feminist bubble, which allows use of feminist label and acts as a feminist fig 
leaf for major initiatives in other foreign policy areas (especially defence) that 
are not feminist, or if these principles are eventually extended to all parts of 
foreign policy, similar to the Swedish approach. Without additional funding for 
international assistance, and without extending feminist principles to the rest 
of Canada’s foreign policy, it remains to be seen whether the Feminist Inter-
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national Assistance Policy will mark a revolutionary change in Canada’s aid 
policy and programming, or be little more than a principled feminist statement 
without the will required to apply it more broadly.
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Chapter 11 
REPOSITIONING MAF FOR THE 
OPEN GOVERNMENT ERA
By Evert Lindquist
INTRODUCTION
Since 2003, the Treasury Board of Canada’s Management Accountability 
Framework (MAF) has monitored the management performance of depart-
ments and agencies across the Government of Canada. MAF’s origins can be 
traced back to the 1990s as part of muted, and less categorical responses to 
the tidal wave of the so-called New Public Management reforms lapping onto 
the Canadian government’s shores. An important under-current stemmed 
from the 1990s Modern Comptrollership initiative that sought to improve 
financial and non-financial reporting inside the Canadian government, later 
reinforced by the Results for Canadians, which sought to improve external 
reporting on results to ministers and citizens (Independent Review Panel 1997; 
Canada 2000; Lindquist 2009). These initiatives, after a succession of change 
and reforms across successive governments, were leavened by the laudable 
idea of then Secretary of the Treasury Board, Jim Judd, to encourage deputy 
ministers and agency heads to have discussions with their respective executive 
teams about ‘what kept them up at night’ regarding the state and capacity of 
the organizations they led. What emerged in 2003 was the Treasury Board’s 
Management Accountability Framework that, over fifteen years and many 
iterations – including more sophisticated ways to share and assess informa-
tion – has served has a key mechanism for monitoring the performance of 
departments and deputy ministers, as well as for stock-taking on the adminis-
trative systems of their organizations. It informs the annual review of deputy 
ministers and agency heads, and remains unique by international standards 
(Lindquist 2016).
MAF, though, has always had its share of internal and external critics.  First, 
it has long been seen as costly, requiring not only a dedicated MAF directorate 
in Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), but also demanding considerable staff 
involvement from departments, agencies, and central agencies to supply data 
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to inform upstream reporting and then to respond to the MAF assessments. 
Second, some cynicism emerged because departments and agencies which may 
have not done well one year, could work harder on reporting the next, ostensi-
bly improving their MAF results without materially changing practice. Indeed, 
Clark and Swain (2005) suggested that this was part of the ‘surreal’ reporting 
activities that deputies and agency heads should insulate their organizations 
from. Third, the number of ‘lines of evidence’ and indicators, and even the 
broader categories for monitoring, have shifted over the years. While this 
can be seen as a process of continuous improvement in reporting by TBS, it 
nevertheless has required departments and agencies to expend effort to collect 
and report on new data. Fourth, many top executives do not consider the MAF 
reporting system and its reports as fueling the kind of internal dialogue once 
envisioned by its progenitors. Finally, many scholars simply add MAF to their 
litany of acronyms encapsulating failed reform initiatives, but there has been 
surprisingly little systematic research of how the reporting system works, the 
indicators and their validity, nor the extent to which the results make a mate-
rial difference in assessments of deputy ministers and agency heads by the 
Committee of Senior Officials (COSO).
MAF is now under review for a third time,1  with the Treasury Board Secre-
tariat coordinating the evaluation through its Internal Audit and Evaluation 
Bureau and the MAF Directorate. The review has proceeded in the context of 
a Trudeau Liberal government elected in October 2015 emphasizing increased 
focus on results, as well as more open government. It has introduced a new 
Results Policy and, inspired by the precepts of ‘deliverology’ (Barber 2008), 
the Privy Council Office has been working with TBS to encourage depart-
ments and agencies to more systematically implement initiatives and measure 
outcomes. This paper seeks to contribute to this review by suggesting that 
MAF performs some crucial ‘latent’ functions in the monitoring and control 
functions of the Government of Canada, and, with relatively little investment, 
could create an information resource available to Parliamentarians, the media, 
and other outside observers. It introduces an ‘open government’ perspective 
on MAF (which includes facilitating rapid learning of analysts, Parliamen-
tarians, and outside observers) which stands in contrast to the results, cost 
1 The 2009 external evaluation suggested that MAF reporting was generally successful, but pointed to the costs 
incurred by departments and agencies when responding to data requests. It called for improving TBS’ internal 
coordination when dealing with departments/agencies, more balance and stability in indicators, more emphasis on 
outcome indicators, better governance and advisory mechanisms, and adopting a risk management approach.
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reduction, and risk management lens often applied when evaluating its worth 
and relevance. Moreover, adopting an open government approach along with 
social marketing and engagement with key external stakeholders might lead 
to increased managerial accountability, more interest in MAF and other forms 
of performance reporting, and a better sense of the demands on departments 
and agencies and the responsibilities of their leaders.
WHAT IS THE MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK 
AND PROCESS?
When MAF was first initiated, it sought to provide an overall empirical picture 
and assessment of the quality of management and systems of departments and 
agencies then associated with elements of what were considered “well-per-
forming” public organizations: governance and strategic direction; values and 
ethics; people; policy and programs; citizen-focused service; risk management; 
stewardship; accountability; results and performance; and learning, innova-
tion, and change management.  Efforts by TBS to operationalize what might 
be desirable practice and good (and often multiple) indicators of performance 
became legendary, with as many as 41 variables measured, and over 140 
measures.
Over many years, the broader categories have evolved as have the measures. 
The current system emerged after consultation with deputy heads, with the 
third year (2016-17) in this most recent three-year cycle recently completed.2  
All departments and agencies are assessed in four broad categories: Financial 
Management; Information Management and Information Technology Manage-
ment; Management of Integrated Risk, Planning and Performance; and People 
Management. The extent of reporting varies for large or small organizations; 
in the 2015-16 MAF round 37 large departments and 23 small departments 
and agencies participated. If relevant, certain departments and agencies 
are assessed according to one or more of the following categories: Manage-
ment of Acquired Services and Assets; Security Management; and Service 
Management.
The MAF cycle has lead-times not unlike that of the expenditure budget 
process; indicators and data have to be flagged well in advance, and depart-
2 See Government of Canada, ‘MAF Assessment Process’. Accessed on July 8, 2017. https://www.canada.ca/en/
treasury-board-secretariat/services/management-accountability-framework/assessment-process.html.
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ments and agencies are given opportunities and ‘windows’ in which to submit 
their data and reports. Few outsiders know that the Treasury Board Secretar-
iat has long had a dedicated ‘MAF portal’ to handle the flow data and other 
information moving back and forth between the departments/agencies and 
TBS, and to serve as a repository of reports and documents on which every-
one can draw. This includes many documents such as audits, evaluations, 
previous MAF reports, etc.  The MAF Directorate and various Treasury Board 
program and administrative policy analysts – as well as analysts working 
in other central agencies monitoring other MAF administrative policy areas 
– review this information, produce draft reports which are vetted by more 
senior officials in the relevant central agencies, send them for comment to the 
departments and agencies, and finalize them. As noted, the findings eventually 
inform the COSO review of deputy ministers and agency heads. Departments 
and agencies are encouraged to make summaries of the MAF reports available 
on their web sites, which are regularly mentioned and unevenly available on 
their corporate web sites along with other reports and disclosures of informa-
tion. There is no central repository or set of links to these reports.
The data and findings from these final reports are used by the MAF Director-
ate to develop government-wide roll-ups of the findings and performance of all 
department and agencies, putting their performance in comparative perspec-
tive. It provides detailed information on what indicators and lines of data were 
developed for each area of management for the 2015-16 and 2016-17 reporting 
cycles (Canada 2017b). However, unlike what we have come to expect from the 
UK government, these results are not promulgated on a central government 
web site as ‘league tables’. That said, TBS MAF Directorate does share infor-
mation the distribution of results across departments and agencies (in aggre-
gate) and does share some year-over-year comparisons (in aggregate).
Interestingly, MAF is depicted on the Government of Canada web pages as 
part of a larger suite of accountability and ‘government oversight’ devices 
along with access to information and privacy tools, department results reports, 
Audit and Evaluation, Commissions of Inquiry, and TB submissions.3 Else-
where I have depicted MAF as an organizational ‘systems check’ (Lindquist 
2009). Indeed, MAF increasingly has the look and feel of a quality assurance 
3 See the Government of Canada’s ‘Government Oversight’ page, accessed July 8, 2017. https://www.canada.ca/en/
government/system/oversight.html.
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and risk management assessment system, but without an audit or independent 
verification process on the quality or reliability of data or relationship to touted 
outcomes. The MAF results feed into the review of deputy ministers and 
agency heads undertaken by COSO. This emphasis on oversight and quality 
assurance seems a far cry from the internal learning orientation sought by 
many executive teams.
MAF: LATENT FUNCTIONS, BENEFITS, DISTINCTIVENESS
As noted in the introduction, there is no shortage of grumbling and criticisms 
of MAF, and it would not add value to repeat them here. The forthcoming 
TBS evaluation will likely focus on: whether the real and transaction costs for 
departments and agencies are reasonable;4 whether MAF focuses on outcomes 
in a manner consistent with the results orientation of the Trudeau govern-
ment; and, with the latter in mind, whether deputy ministers and agency 
heads see MAF reporting as helping them deal with strategic challenges and 
mandate letters emphasizing key priorities and deliverables, aligned with 
their strategic plans. Relatedly, there might be calls for more forward-looking 
‘capability reviews’ based on the UK and Australian models. What tends to be 
overlooked in casual and scholarly discussions are the key functions, benefits, 
and unique qualities of MAF, and, as will be discussed much later, innovative 
ways to draw public attention to these functions.
First, few outsiders appreciate that the MAF process, its succession of prod-
ucts, and portal serve as an important resource for the usually high-turnover 
Treasury Board analysts, whether they are responsible for particular depart-
ments or programs, or different parts of the administrative policy suite. As 
these analysts take on their positions or new portfolios, they have to be come 
‘instant-smart’.5  New analysts and managers must be trained up so that they 
are sufficiently knowledgeable about the process, various policies, and depart-
ments and agencies they liaise with. The MAF portal serves as a data-base 
for analysts on all facets of the management of departments and agencies, 
assembling department performance reports, evaluations, internal audits, as 
well as external audits and other reports on departments. Indeed, the very 
process of analyzing evidence and making judgements across the various 
4 Indeed, the presumption that there would be savings without MAF reporting is to miss the obvious point that, 
regardless of the fate of MAF, most of the data requested and relied on would be collected anyhow.
5 This phrase I learned from Ted Semmens, a well-known but retired management consultant in Victoria.
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domains and lines of evidence to arrive at the annual MAF assessments means 
that the Treasury Board Secretariat – and often other central agencies – have 
to develop a shared view of the strengths and weaknesses of departments and 
agencies. For departments and agencies, which often complain that various 
hands at ‘the centre’ know little about what the other are doing, this is no 
small byproduct.
Second, there has been an over-emphasis on the ‘costs’ of MAF and too little 
on possible benefits. Surely, some benefits arise with respect to fostering better 
risk management and practice improvement in different management areas. 
Supplying data and reporting on progress and gaps to the MAF Directorate 
should mean that departments and agencies – and not just the Treasury Board 
Secretariat – develop a better sense of the exposure of human resource, FOI/
privacy, information technology, financial management, security, and service 
delivery systems within and across departments and agencies. The costs of 
having such a monitoring system, unless it is divorced from the managerial 
reality of departments and agencies,6 would seem a reasonable investment 
since MAF reports – along with audits, evaluation, and other studies – feed 
into a broader risk management profile of departments and agencies. However, 
there is a legitimate concern on the part of deputies and agency heads about 
whether the MAF reporting and assessment process leads to genuine inter-
nal and external strategic conversations about dealing with administrative 
challenges, either as single issues or in combination (not to mention overload 
resulting from waves of change).
Third, MAF stands as a noted practice in many comparative studies (Lindquist 
2016), but it is unique: it is neither a forward-looking capability review of the 
kind found in the UK or Australia, nor is it an outcome-focused performance 
system, attempting to measure how improvements in the capacities and 
practices of departments and agencies improve the policies and services they 
deliver. Capability reviews might seem more strategic, and performance mea-
surement systems more relevant to governments, their critics, and key stake-
holders, but neither serve to provide administrative system checks in the way 
MAF does – they are different enterprises. It is not clear, however, whether it 
is prudent to substitute one for another. Capability reviews, as practiced in the 
6 An important question is whether the ‘systems check’ MAF reporting should be complemented by ‘in-person’ 
review teams to spot-check some departments and agencies, perhaps in certain areas (think of PSC audits), to 
ensure that the reporting is reliable, and not masking more fundamental issues at play.
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UK and Australia, provide a future-oriented stock-take of whether the staff 
capabilities of a department or agency are aligned with its strategic directions 
– the report provides a temporary compass for recruiting leaders and requisite 
expertise, but has proven vulnerable by changes in the machinery and prior-
ities of government (Panchamia and Thomas 2014; Australian Public Service 
Commission, 2015).
MAF reporting could be tweaked to include future capability dimensions 
in the reporting, and to more likely inform ‘strategic conversations’ going 
forward. Likewise, while performance measurement systems are potentially 
more externally outcome-oriented, to fulfil their potential they require min-
isterial and deputy champions along with credible forums for reviewing and 
testing findings – otherwise they quickly become largely political and symbolic 
exercises, which might compromise more important use of performance infor-
mation for learning and adjustment at the program level in departments and 
agencies (de Bruijn 2008; Lindquist 2016).
VIEWING MAF WITH OPEN GOVERNMENT LENS: 
OPPORTUNITIES AWAITING?
Much of the debate on MAF proceeds through the lens of monitoring results, 
cost reduction, and risk management. The previous section added a fourth: 
that of facilitating rapid learning of central analysts and other observers – e.g. 
MPs, agents of Parliament, scholars, think tanks, interest groups, and associa-
tions – seeking to understand the capacity of departments and agencies.  This 
section invokes a fifth lens on MAF – which involves seeking ways to ‘open up’ 
and make government more transparent – and points to some very different 
ways moving forward.
Together, the Open Government and Open Data movements seek to increase 
the availability of data for outsiders to use, to better lever and join up different 
kinds of data collected and held by government to better size up problems, 
design better policy and service delivery solutions, and to better engage citi-
zens. A less considered aspect of this concerns the need to increase the aware-
ness of the state and capacity of departments and agencies, as well as the many 
cross-pressures and reporting requirements they have to deal with. In this 
connection, then, a more transparent and readily accessible MAF portal would 
dramatically lower the costs of making such information available to internal 
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and external stakeholders in the governance system. Indeed, as noted earlier, 
most of the data MAF seeks from departments, agencies, and other central 
agencies has already been generated, and in the spirit of ‘open by default’ 
thinking, would involve making the data and resulting assessments  accessible 
as quickly as possible.
Even with the most modest expectations, though, MAF reporting is not very 
open from an open government perspective; potential users must go to depart-
ment and agency web sites to obtain the summary MAF assessments, and 
they have to work hard to obtain comparative or year-over-year information 
(bearing in mind, though, that some indicators and thresholds change over the 
years, so comparisons might not be easily made). The TBS MAF pages avail-
able to the public do not contain a series of links to the MAF assessments and 
departmental/agency responses to those assessments,7  nor, as noted earlier, 
does TBS provide league tables on the rankings of departments and agen-
cies in each MAF reporting domain.8 Moreover, although there is a limited 
public-service wide roll-up and analysis of MAF reports, it is not provided in 
a standard report format, nor are the implications of the government-wide 
figures drawn out (Canada 2017a).
Converting the MAF portal into an ‘open government’ platform would not 
simply be a matter of opening up a portal designed to facilitate transactions 
internal to the federal public service. To be sure, the MAF portal proper would 
have to remain closed in order to facilitate the upstream sharing of data 
between departments, agencies, and central agencies. However, the repository 
of prior completed MAF assessments and other documentation on depart-
ments and agencies could be made accessible by a ‘one-stop’ for department 
performance reports, evaluations, internal audits, external audits by different 
watchdogs, etc.  Indeed, some countries (e.g. Norway and Ireland) have started 
to experiment by sharing such information as part of a broader commitment 
to support portals that provide longitudinal information on machinery-of-gov-
ernment changes over many decades (MacCarthaigh and Roness 2012; Hardi-
man et al. 2014; Lindquist 2017).9
7 See http://open.canada.ca/en/suggested-datasets/management-accountabilty-framework-maf-results.
8 On the other hand, the use of indicators and rankings may reduce the extent to which the data is used for internal 
learning and adaptation at the program level (de Bruijn 2008; Mahler & Posner, 2014).
9 The Norwegian State Administration Database can be accessed at http://www.nsd.uib.no/nsd/english/index.
html, and the Irish State Administration Database at http://www.isad.ie/.
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The benefit of sharing more administrative-related information on depart-
ments and agencies would not simply be to ‘expose’ them.  Sharing MAF and 
other reports would showcase the huge array of accountability and man-
agement requirements for deputy ministers and agency heads, serving as a 
daunting warning shot to ministers seeking to meddle in the obligations and 
delegated authorities assigned to deputy ministers and agency heads (Brown 
2013). They should show the complexities of leading large organizations in 
over-determined environments, and provide useful context for critics or 
observers focused on any one strand or dimension of a department or agency. 
They would also identify capacity issues that should be taken into account 
when assessing why policies and services might not have been delivered well 
after a succession of reforms or expenditure restraint or cutbacks, or when 
considering the potential and risks of departments and agencies taking on new 
responsibilities.
Public servants are used to producing reports of different kinds, ostensibly 
because the public demands such information, when the actual take-up is 
usually (some would say, predictably) quite low. This breeds a certain amount 
of despair, even cynicism, among public servants because such background 
information can easily be seen as an adornment or symbolic, even if it could 
inform broader debates on issues which do attract attention. There could be 
similar disinterest for MAF reports and other information available or easily 
linked from a central ‘open’ repository. Perhaps governments ought to be more 
proactive in sharing not only the MAF reports, but also the Department Per-
formance Reports and consider resurrecting the issue-and-outcome focused 
Canada’s Performance reports (particularly given the Results and Delivery 
orientation of the Trudeau government), which were noted internationally in 
the comparative literature but drew hardly any attention in Canada.
The sharing of such reports should be accompanied by holding roundtables 
and panels with public administration and other scholars and observers 
with interests in administrative issues or the policy or service domains of 
departments and agencies. This could be led by the Treasury Board of Canada 
Secretariat and proceed in tandem with meetings of the Canadian Association 
of Programs in Public Administration (CAPPA) and the Institute of Public 
Administration of Canada (IPAC), as part of a larger strategy of reconnecting 
public service institutions to the increasingly interdisciplinary field of public 
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administration. This would not only further the knowledge of interested schol-
ars and observers, but also influence the training and development of the next 
generation of scholars and practitioners emerging from schools of public policy 
and public administration.
CONCLUSION
Despite the frustrations of and costs to departments and agencies in supply-
ing data, MAF reports provide a unique and organization-focused form of 
accountability, drawing together diverse data and information already pro-
duced for other purposes. MAF reports are not the only evidence considered 
by COSO and the Clerk in reviewing the performance of deputy ministers 
and agency heads, but they do feed into the mix. For Treasury Board analysts 
and for many department and agency counterparts, MAF reporting provides 
a good sense of where department or agency practices and systems stand in 
the system, and a sense of whether they are ready to take up new challenges 
and constraints. This can inform the briefing of incoming executives on 
department or agency challenges, to understand the organization ‘base’  from 
which various priority government policies or administrative issues are to be 
dealt with. As noted, it is also essential for getting new Treasury Board and 
other analysts up to speed on the departments and agencies for which they are 
responsible.
As the Treasury Board and the government more generally consider adjust-
ments to the MAF assessment process, decision-makers should consider its 
functions and possibilities through the lens of fast-paced learning and more 
open government, in addition to the usual lens of cost, oversight, and risk 
management. MAF reports can play important roles in facilitating quicker 
learning by TBS program and policy analysts (and those above them) and exec-
utives in departments and agencies, as well as educating and providing infor-
mation on tap for scholars and other observers in the media, think tanks, and 
other attentive organizations dealing with specific issues as they arise. While 
MAF remains unique and arguably important as an organizational ‘systems 
check’, there is scope to introduce more future-oriented lines of MAF report-
ing (e.g. recruitment, refreshing different systems), which would increase its 
relevance for executives seeking to engage in strategic conversations.
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An open government perspective also suggests that Treasury Board Secretar-
iat MAF reporting should be improved to provide links to the MAF reports 
promulgated by all departments and agencies. Related documents in the MAF 
repository should be made more readily available as part of an ‘open-by-de-
fault’ posture. This would lower the costs of accessing publicly available infor-
mation on departments and agencies, and better inform current and future 
generations of scholars and other observers interested in their management 
and performance.
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Chapter 12 
ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY IN 
GOVERNMENT SPENDING: 
THE CASE OF SKILLS AND 
INNOVATION*
By Helaina Gaspard
INTRODUCTION
What a government spends is different than how the money is spent. How a government spends has at least three components: 1) its overall ability to balance revenues and spending; 2) its alignment 
of spending and/or reallocations with its priorities; and 3) the efficiency with 
which public institutions deliver products and services (Schick 1998).  Assess-
ing how money is spent goes beyond the amount.  It becomes a question of 
performance, accountability, and credibility.  In all of the ways Ottawa spends, 
testing the consistency between government narratives and action by following 
the money, gives some insight into how government actions align to its stated 
priorities.  How a government spends or does not spend on programs, trans-
fers, and tax expenditures can say a lot at once about its economic and fiscal 
assumptions and its values.
Take for instance the current federal government’s focus on skills and innova-
tion spending.  A touted priority of the government, there have been advisory 
councils and task forces dedicated to fostering a more ‘innovative’ Canadian 
economy, and billions of dollars pledged to new initiatives and entities 
dedicated to this goal.  While the priority area is well-recognized in public 
discourse, do we know how much is actually spent on skills and innovation?  
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government is not the first federal govern-
ment to invest in ‘innovation.’  There have been layers of spending from previ-
ous governments that instead of being reallocated, serve as the base for new or 
additional funding.
* This Policy Brief is based on a study by the Institute of Fiscal Studies and Democracy (IFSD) at the University of 
Ottawa on skills and innovation spending in the federal government, Skills and Innovation: Where’s the money?  
Parts of the report are reproduced here.
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Most federal funding is bedrock funding—the stuff that does not change, 
upon which layers and layers of topsoil sit.  The bedrock funding are statutory 
appropriations of the federal government that it pays based on legislation, 
such as employment insurance, student loans and grants, and the Guaranteed 
Income Supplement.  These and other programs represent approximately 
60% of all government spending (Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, 
2016).  Since they were approved as statutory programs, Parliament does not 
have to provide an annual appropriation to keep them operating; the funding 
is automatically renewed, and the parameters can only be changed through 
legislative amendment.  Levels of statutory spending can vary based on the 
influencing factors such as demographic shifts, and economic growth that 
are defined in legislation.  New spending or topsoil may be more interesting 
politically, does not have the permanence of the bedrock, but can nonetheless 
become quite thick. These increases or decreases to revenues and/or spending 
take the form for instance, of programs (or program cuts) and tax expendi-
tures (or tax increases).
Spending or cutting at the top layers of spending soil is easy in the short-
term.  The revenue and spending decisions however, can settle over time and 
influence overall fiscal health.  Thus, to assess how much the government is 
actually spending, e.g. on skills and innovation, we have to move beyond the 
upper layers of soil to dig deeper into the sub-soil levels. This can be done by 
considering the allocative efficiency of spending, i.e. is the government spend-
ing in its stated priority areas?
Using current spending on skills and innovation as an example, this Policy 
Brief illustrates the utility of assessing public spending through the lens of 
allocative efficiency for a more accurate picture of not only what money is 
spent but how it is spent.  This chapter proceeds by first, discussing a public 
expenditure management framework.  Second, an overview of Canada’s fiscal 
context is presented, reminding that spending decisions have repercussions.  
Third, the case of skills and innovation spending is discussed, highlighting 
the breadth of existing spending and the weak performance indicators used 
to assess it.  This suggests that assessing new spending is only one part of the 
way Ottawa spends.  For a more complete picture, the alignment of new and 
existing spending to priorities should be considered.
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HOW GOVERNMENTS SPEND
According to Professor Allen Schick (1998), a government’s ability to manage 
public money has three components: 1) aggregate fiscal discipline (a govern-
ment’s overall ability to balance spending and revenues); 2) allocative efficiency 
(a government’s ability to align spending with priorities); and 3) operating 
efficiency (a government’s ability to deliver programs and services at a reason-
able cost and with suitable outcomes to taxpayers).  Moving beyond high-level 
questions of revenue and spending, this frame requires consideration of a full 
cycle of public spending: from economic and fiscal assumptions; to spending 
and priority alignment; to delivery.
Table 1
Reproduced in full from “A Contemporary Approach to Public Expenditure Management,” by Allen 
Schick for the World Bank Institute (1998), p. 2, Table 1.1, “Basic Elements of Public Expenditure 
Management.”
Aggregate Fiscal Discipline Budget totals should be the result of explicit, 
enforced decisions; they should not merely 
accommodate spending demands.  These 
totals should be set before individual spending 
decisions are made, and should be sustainable 
over the medium-term and beyond.
Allocative Efficiency Expenditures should be based on government 
priorities and on effectiveness of public 
programs.  The budget system should spur 
reallocation from lesser to higher priorities and 
from less to more effective programs.
Operational Efficiency Agencies should produce goods and services 
at a cost that achieves ongoing efficiency gains 
and (to the extent appropriate) is competitive 
with market prices.
Tracking spending decisions in this way may not have the same political appeal 
– unless there’s a scandal – as assessing new spending proposals.  It is typi-
cally a government’s budget proposal that gets the most media attention and 
theatrics in Parliament.  Thus, it is understandable that governments prefer to 
focus on new incremental spending that they can announce rather than doing 
the grunt work of assessing the existing bedrock of spending.  There are three 
key reasons for this approach. First, new spending can make a government 
appear to be active policy and change makers.  Who would not want the posi-
tive press of building a new bridge or establishing a child tax credit?  Second, 
new spending looks like a lot of money when not directly compared to overall 
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government spending. New announcements in the budget are a metaphorical 
drop in the bucket when compared to the $290 billion spent annually.  Third, 
reviewing and evaluating existing spending can be challenging and may not 
have clear political gains.  In looking at the spending base, a current govern-
ment would be examining the decisions of all governments that preceded it. 
The resulting accountability may or may not be wanted or politically useful. 
For instance, a review may create political losses when particular constituen-
cies or groups see their program or transfer cut or redesigned. Alternatively, it 
may help a government understand the realities of its fiscal base and potential 
problem files.  It is an open question as to whether a government really wants 
to know about the hidden risks behind the base of spending.  From the per-
spective of opposition parties and parliamentarians, these announcements and 
decisions can be endless sources of debate and commentary as they fulfill their 
role of holding the government to account.
The current government promised in its 2015 electoral platform to use data in 
their decision-making and that they would “stop funding initiatives that are 
no longer effective and invest program dollars in those that are of good value” 
(Liberal Party of Canada 2015). Knowing both what money is being spent and 
how is the first step in fulfilling a promise for better decision-making. Federal 
skills and innovation funding is a useful case through which to assess the 
challenges of spending alignment and the need to review existing spending 
before new money is allocated.
CANADA’S CURRENT FISCAL CONTEXT
This year, the Government of Canada is projected to spend roughly $290 
billion on its activities, people, and capital through its program expenses. Rel-
ative to its predecessor, the current government has an ambitious agenda with 
planned investments in infrastructure, skills and innovation, child welfare, 
etc.  It is little surprise then that Prime Minister Trudeau’s government is 
projected to outspend that of Prime Minister Harper (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1
Federal Program Expenses PM Harper v. PM Trudeau
This increased spending is the prerogative of a democratically elected govern-
ment—it laid out its proposals during the campaign, Canadians made a choice, 
and now it is up to parliamentarians and Canadians to hold them accountable.  
Much of the new spending is deficit financed (see Figure 2).  Between fiscal 
years 2015-16 and 2019-20, federal debt levels are projected to increase by 
14%.  Over the same period under the previous government’s spending plans, 
debt levels were projected to decrease by approximately 2%.  With low interest 
rates, it may be appealing to borrow to finance these investments and activi-
ties.  This type of spending, however, can be manageable until it is not.  If, for 
instance, interest rates increase or if economic growth weakens, future gen-
erations of taxpayers (today’s young people) risk being burdened with current 
spending choices.
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Figure 2
Projected Federal Debt PM Harper v. PM Trudeau
This is not to imply that deficit-financed spending is inherently problematic; it 
should be done carefully and responsibly.  When well planned and executed, 
investments in infrastructure for instance, are expected to yield returns and 
economic growth (see IMF 2014) that can help to offset increases in debt.
CASE STUDY: SKILLS AND INNOVATION SPENDING
In Budget 2017, the federal government promised $5.2 billion over five years 
to skills and innovation, fulfilling promises from their 2015 electoral platform.  
The proposals in the budget connect a skilled Canadian workforce with its 
capacity for innovation reflected in its proposed spending.  For instance, a 
new organization dedicated to promoting skills development and to mea-
suring the skills gap was proposed ($225 million); there were investments 
for underrepresented workers like women and Indigenous peoples; and an 
investment to promote youth in the labour force ($395.5 million).  There were 
also investments for research and development in places like business and 
post-secondary institutions.  A significant $950 million investment over five 
years to promote integrated innovation was committed to superclusters (see 
Budget 2017).  The current government is but one in a line of governments 
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that have committed to investing in skills and fostering innovation – there is 
a lot of spending deep in the topsoil to which the government is planning to 
add another layer.  While the nature and merit of the investments will not be 
discussed further here, citizens and taxpayers should ask themselves what is 
already being spent by the federal government on these issues, and how that 
spending base compares to these new proposals.
To understand what the government was already spending, the Institute of 
Fiscal Studies and Democracy (IFSD) at the University of Ottawa undertook 
a study of all of the 2014-15 Departmental Performance Reports (DPR) of 
federal departments and agencies released in 2016 (Treasury Board of Canada 
Secretariat 2016).  These publicly available documents are produced annually 
to report on the programs of federal departments and agencies, and their 
planned versus actual costs, and outputs.  The Department of Finance’s Report 
on Federal Tax Expenditures (2016) provided the latest available estimates 
of 2014 tax expenditure information credited to individuals and businesses 
(Department of Finance Canada 2016).  From the DPRs and tax expenditures, 
all activities related to either innovation and/or skills were captured and 
sorted based on the following definitions:
Innovation: At its most basic level, innovation can be defined as a means 
of creating economic and social value through the application of new 
technologies, products, services, or processes or through their re-applica-
tion in new and/or different ways (Conference Board of Canada 2011; The 
White House 2015).
Skills: Skills can be defined as the training and development of a labour 
force to improve human capital for the ends of economic value and pro-
ductivity. Any labour market or other program that invests in employees 
and employers and that promotes outcomes for their skills, training, or 
economic development was considered.
All activities in the two categories were assigned a secondary code to identify 
their target sector (e.g. science and technology, industry) or populations (e.g. 
Indigenous peoples, students). The IFSD has made this information available 
on its website for public access, enabling others to make their own assessments 
using the data.
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Program information was collected at the most granular level available to 
present activity details with the most precision possible.  In some cases, 
program descriptions are sufficiently broad that they encompass activities 
that may be deemed out of scope.  For example, a program activity to support 
both elementary and secondary education for Aboriginal children (what is now 
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada’s ‘Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion,’ program, $1.4 billion) was included, although the split between the target 
constituencies is unknown from the DPR.  The reverse may also be true; there 
may be some programs based on their definitions that were not included but 
should have been.  There was a measure of subjective judgement applied to the 
government data to make these assessments.
The data suggest that the government is spending approximately $22.6 billion 
on innovation and skills development and training across 147 activities (pro-
grams and tax expenditures) (see Figure 3). Over 60% of the money ($14.2 
billion) is spent on skills development and training activities (see Figure 4). 
These include well-known programs like: the Youth Employment Strategy 
($207.7 million) that is used to support the transition of youth into the work-
force; the Canada Student Loans Program ($1.7 billion) that provides loans 
(repayable) and grants (non-repayable) to students to finance post-secondary 
education; and funding through the labour market agreement that exclusively 
targets skills ($2.1 billion).1
1 Employment insurance (EI) and related ‘safety net’ programs were not included in this calculation. In 
2014-15, employment benefits were valued at approximately $16.2 billion.
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Figure 3
Total Spending on Innovation and Skills Development and Training by Percentage 
and Dollar Value
Figure 4
Number of Innovation vs. Skills Development and Training Activities
Budget 2017 identified six key focus areas for the government’s proposed 
innovation spending, including advanced manufacturing, agri-food, clean 
technology, digital industries, health/bio-sciences and clean resources, to 
foster growth and get more Canadians working.  There are numerous existing 
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government programs that align with these newly defined action areas. Con-
sider, for instance, the over $1.5 billion in grants and funding for the Natural 
Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC), the Canadian Institutes 
for Health Research (CIHR) and the National Research Council, to promote 
science and health research, as well as the development of related tools and 
technologies (health/bio-sciences); Agriculture and Agri-food Canada’s over 
$600 million in funding for agriculture research and sustainability (agri-food); 
and nearly $400 million at Natural Resources Canada alone for initiatives 
and technologies related to clean technology and clean resources.  Broader 
initiatives such as the Scientific Research and Experimental Development 
Investment Tax Credit support these focus areas, with $3.0 billion in credits to 
businesses for eligible expenses related to scientific research and experimental 
development.
The study demonstrates that the government’s proposed $5.2 billion in new 
spending for skills and innovation, while material,  pales relative to the exist-
ing $22.6 billion annual spending base.  With a significant amount of money 
already dedicated to programs and tax expenditures, it begs the question – 
how are these initiatives performing?  Is the money aligned to government’s 
priorities?  Could the government reallocate the existing spending base to 
meet its goals instead of deficit-financing new activities?
An important part of responsible financial management is understanding how 
money is currently being spent before spending more, i.e. assessing perfor-
mance.  If you owned a 10-year old car and were not sure if it would start in 
the winter, would you buy another car or would you try the one you own first 
and then decide what to do? The government will find several programs and 
tax expenditures that align with their goals and may find ways of realigning 
existing spending to meet their new objectives.
Activity evaluation provides a government with information on program per-
formance relative to stated objectives and outcomes, enabling it to determine 
whether to continue to fund, redesign or cancel the activity.  Value for money 
assessments consider whether the potential of every dollar spent is maximized. 
The public, as taxpayers and funders of government activities, are entitled to 
responsible financial management and should expect activities to derive from 
a government’s declared agenda.
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In an attempt to gauge how existing programs are performing, a simple binary 
code was designed to assess the performance of the 126 programs (perfor-
mance information is not consistently available for tax expenditures) related to 
innovation and skills development and training (see Table 2).  This framework 
was intended to roughly assess the robustness of the performance system, not 
to reapply the current output-focused evaluation framework that the Treasury 
Board of Canada, Secretariat applies.2 Performance metrics were considered 
strong if they contained both a value for money assessment and a requirement 
for evaluation (i.e. implying that there is assessment not only of program 
outputs but of outcomes).  Anything else was coded as weak.  Approaching 
performance in this way does not assess or comment on the program’s under-
lying policies or target communities; it is instead an attempt to assess the 
quality of the indicators used to capture information.
Table 2
Performance metric description and count
Metric quality Description Count
Strong performance Output and outcome indica-
tors that support value-for-
money assessment and a 
requirement for evaluation.
This is not an assessment of 
the quality of the outcome, but 
of the quality of the indicators. 
Both value-for-money and 
evaluation must be included 
for the performance indicators 
to be considered strong.
20
Weak performance Anything that is not strong. 106
Grand Total 126
Applying the binary frame to the data suggests that the government does 
not actively assess both value for money and the need for evaluation in its 
programs.  While performance criteria exist, the majority (over 80%) were 
considered weak as they did not meet the two-part test (see Table 2).  Meeting 
the twin objectives is possible, as demonstrated by the Canada Economic 
Development Agency for Quebec Regions’ Business Performance program’s 
2 The Treasury Board of Canada, Secretariat’s (TBS) guide to developing performance measurement is available 
here: https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/audit-evaluation/centre-excellence-
evaluation/guide-developing-performance-measurement-strategies.html. While the guide emphasizes the 
importance of output evaluation, there is no clear requirement to assess the value of money spent.
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strong metrics.  The program’s value for money was assessed by measuring 
the increase in income and sales volume for coached businesses.  This metric 
suggests that there was measurement of that utility and impact of the spending 
in relation to stronger business performance.  Evaluation was undertaken by 
assessing the number of businesses that were trained and that disseminated 
their changes in capacity.  Many of the Tri-Council funding agencies program 
performance metrics were also considered strong as they emphasized the out-
comes derived from their investments and not only their immediate products.  
While not a perfect science, this simple test suggests that the government has 
an opportunity to more regularly assess program performance and their cost 
with an improvement to its required reporting criteria.
CONCLUSION
As the case of skills and innovation demonstrates with $22.6 billion in existing 
allocations, there’s a great deal of bedrock spending deep beneath the topsoil 
of new announcements. One can only imagine existing spending levels across 
other policy areas.  The performance of these programs matters for services, 
operational efficiency, and is inextricably linked to sound public financial 
management.  Judgements on the salience of incremental spending should 
be considered in connection to existing programs.  A government’s ability to 
balance revenues and spending is but one element of its role.  How spending is 
aligned to its priorities and the results it delivers are as salient for its record, 
and its capacity to deliver on its promises to Canadians.
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Chapter 13 
POLITICS AND POLICY ON THE 
FEDERAL- PROVINCIAL JOURNEY 
TO A LOW-CARBON FUTURE: 
A NEW ERA OF CANADIAN 
ENERGY/ENVIRONMENT 
FEDERALISM?
By Aman Chahal, Zak Jacques, Marc Quintaneiro, and Glen Toner
INTRODUCTION
Ideas matter in the energy/environment policy domain… but politics drives policy. Sustainable development (SD) ideas began to drive Canadian poli-cies and institutional change in the early 1990s when adopted by the Brian 
Mulroney Progressive Conservative (PC), and Jean Chretien Liberal govern-
ments after being popularized by the publication of Our Common Future in 
1987, and the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Five election outcomes between 2013 
and 2015 shifted the fulcrum of Canadian energy/environment policy back 
toward sustainability. Liberal victories in British Columbia (BC), Québec, and 
Ontario, the New Democratic Party (NDP) victory in Alberta, and the Liberal 
victory federally opened a window of opportunity for SD ideas to once again 
shape policy after a decade on the sidelines under the Stephen Harper Con-
servative government. Without those electoral outcomes and in particular the 
defeat of Conservative governments federally and in Alberta, Canadians would 
not be having today’s discussion about sustainability and integrated energy/
environmental policy.  Put simply, a re-elected Harper government would not 
have launched the policies discussed below; indeed for a decade it aggressively 
undermined SD policy ideas in favour of a policy framework which blatantly 
privileged oil, gas and mining developments over environmental consider-
ations (Winfield 2016).
This is the third in a series of How Ottawa Spends chapters analysing the 
politics of the energy/environment policy domain under the Harper Conser-
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vative (2006-2015), and Justin Trudeau Liberal (2015- ) governments.1  The 
first chapter documented the Harper government’s wedge politics approach to 
governance and its attempt to systematically reverse the SD policy innovations 
introduced by the Mulroney and Chretien governments. The second chapter 
explored Trudeau’s decisive October 2015 defeat of Harper and the reestab-
lishment of a policy agenda imbued with SD values including an intergovern-
mental engagement approach to governance. This chapter covers developments 
in the first 18 months of the Trudeau government as it launched an intensive 
process of engagement with provincial and territorial governments to entrench 
sustainability values in a Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and 
Climate Change (PCF). As Table 1 shows, Canada’s four largest provinces 
include 86% of the population and produce over 80% of Canada’s greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. These provinces are the focus of this chapter as their 
governments were all strong advocates of the PCF.( VanNijnatten 2016 and 
Doern, Auld and Stoney 2016) argue that historically federal governments have 
struggled to provide serious leadership to provinces pursuing sustainability 
goals. Given this history, we ask if the Trudeau government’s policies can 
deliver adequate support to these provinces’ efforts to reduce emissions and 
strengthen low carbon economic growth and whether this approach represents 
a new era of energy/environmental federalism.
Table 1: Emissions Intensity Summary
1 See Toner and McKee 2014 and Toner et al, 2016a.
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CONTEXT
21st Century energy policy is intimately intertwined with environmental policy 
and is now substantially driven by climate change related issues. The Liber-
als assumed power just before the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP21) convened in Paris in 
December 2015, thrusting the climate change file into the limelight and testing 
Liberal campaign commitments immediately (McCarthy 2015). The 2014 Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC 
2014) consolidated the scientific certainty of anthropocentric climate change 
leading countries to embrace the goal of instituting mitigation policies to cap 
global temperature rise to 2 degrees above preindustrial levels (it has just 
passed 1 degree). “Almost 200 nations pledged to fight climate change when 
the Paris deal was signed…” (Strauss and Parkin 2017).
Trudeau’s governance approach to COP21 could not possibly have been more 
different than Harper’s. It started with a First Ministers Meeting on 23 
November 2015 that included a briefing by climate scientists who revealed that 
Canada’s rate of warming is about twice the global rate (Fekete 2015), whereas 
Harper had simply refused to meet with provincial/territorial leaders for the 
previous six years and muzzled climate scientists (Hoberg 2017). Trudeau actu-
ally invited premiers and Indigenous leaders to join the Canadian delegation to 
Paris.
In the absence of federal leadership over the Harper decade, provincial gov-
ernments stepped forward with policy innovations. The Liberal government of 
BC instituted North America’s first carbon tax in 2008.  The Québec Liberal 
government launched its cap-and-trade emission reduction system in 2013 
and joined California in targeting major emitters in 2014. In 2015 Albertans 
replaced a 44 year PC dynasty with a NDP government determined to shed 
Alberta’s status as an ‘international pariah’ by applying a carbon tax and 
phasing out coal-fired electricity production (Leach et al. 2015, 23). In 2014 
the Ontario Liberal government eliminated coal-fired electricity production 
and later announced a climate change program that included joining the 
California/Québec cap-and-trade system, enhancing building efficiency codes 
and retrofits, and expanding the uptake of zero emission and plug-in hybrid 
electric vehicles (EV).
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Post-Paris, Trudeau met First Ministers in March 2016 to develop an inter-
governmental climate change strategy. The Vancouver Declaration on Clean 
Growth and Climate Change that emerged was built on the 2015 provincial 
and territorial Canadian Energy Strategy and on the Paris COP21 Agreement 
(CICS 2016). This was the first time First Ministers had met in over a decade 
to craft a joint approach to climate change and they understood the need to 
show progress now that collaboration was possible. To address differences 
First Ministers created four working groups of federal and provincial officials 
on: clean technology, innovation and jobs; carbon pricing mechanisms; specific 
mitigation opportunities; and adaptation and climate resilience. On 9 Decem-
ber 2016 the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change 
(PCF) was signed by all First Ministers except the conservative Premiers of 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba (Canada 2016b).2
The first Liberal budget announced over $7 billion of initiatives to: address 
climate change and upgrade infrastructure; create a low-carbon economy 
fund; build charging stations for EV and hydrogen and natural gas refueling 
stations; retrofit buildings and improve standards for vehicles and products. 
There were also multi-billion dollar investments in science and innovation in 
both the university and government sectors to support clean energy and envi-
ronment initiatives (Canada 2016a). In their second Budget in March 2017, the 
Liberals outlined plans to advance Canada’s efforts to build a clean economy 
by investing $21.9 billion in green infrastructure, including initiatives that will 
support the implementation of the PCF (Canada 2017). To support those prov-
inces which had already introduced a price on carbon through a carbon tax 
or cap-and-trade program, the Liberals reiterated their pledge to introduce a 
backstop carbon levy that would apply in provinces and territories that do not 
meet the federal carbon pricing benchmark by 2018.
ANALYTICAL THEMES: PARTISAN POLITICS
Electoral politics matter:  the governments of the four big provinces were 
enthusiastic supporters of the spirit and mission of the Pan-Canadian Frame-
work.  BC has been a climate change innovator since 2008 when Liberal 
2 Premier Brad Wall of Saskatchewan refused to sign on the basis that he rejects the federal government’s right to 
require a minimum price on carbon in all provinces.  Newly elected Premier Brian Pallister of Manitoba refused to 
sign in the hope of using Manitoba’s agreement on pricing carbon to extract additional funds for health care from 
the federal government.
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Premier Gordon Campbell introduced a policy framework that created a pro-
vincial carbon tax, a low carbon fuel standard, and a clean electricity stan-
dard. His successor, Christy Clark, weakened some of these staple policies by 
freezing the province’s carbon tax and amending the clean electricity standard 
to allow for natural gas generation. So BC was at risk of slowing its progress 
towards a low-carbon economy.  But partisan politics once again shifted power 
in the energy/environment policy domain. After the May 2017 provincial 
election Christy Clark was defeated and the John Horgan led NDP formed 
government with the formal support of the Green Party, which signed an 
accord providing the NDP with a one vote majority. Andrew Weaver, the leader 
of the BC Green Party is a highly regarded climate change scientist; therefore 
the Green’s influence should actually strengthen BC’s commitment to the PCF.
Two major points of division between the Liberals and the NDP and Greens 
are the Site C hydroelectric dam project on the Peace River and the expansion 
of the Trans-Mountain Pipeline (TMX) carrying bitumen from Edmonton 
to Vancouver. Both the NDP and Greens are opposed to the TMX and have 
promised to employ every tool available to stop the expansion, and the corre-
sponding increase in bitumen tanker traffic on West coast waters. On the Site 
C project the NDP will refer the project to the BC Utilities Commission for 
review on the question of economic viability and consequences for ratepayers.
Motivated by a desire to prevent federal regulation of its oil and gas sector, 
Alberta introduced an emission charge on industrial emitters in 2002. The 
Alberta NDP victory in 2015 shifted the balance of power in the Canadian 
energy/environment policy domain fundamentally, as Alberta moved from 
an obstructionist approach on climate policy under various PC governments 
(Macdonald 2016) to implementing a policy framework that covers the main 
polluting sectors of its economy. Alberta was responsible for approximately 
82% of Canada’s GHG emissions growth from 1990-2015 (ECCC 2017b) as inef-
fective PC policies did little to slow emissions growth as oilsands production 
boomed. In November 2015, NDP Premier Rachel Notley unveiled Alberta’s 
climate change strategy as both a commitment to act on climate change, and 
as a strategy to get Alberta’s oil to global markets. Alberta oilsands bitumen 
has been labelled ‘the dirtiest oil in the world’ and the NDP hoped that action 
on climate change would make bitumen exports more acceptable. The strategy 
includes: a carbon price; a coal phase-out for electricity production by 2030; 
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a 100 megatonne (Mt) emission cap on the oilsands sector; reducing methane 
emissions from oil and gas operations; financial support for renewable power 
sources; and a province-wide energy efficiency program (Alberta 2017b).
In 2013 the Liberal government of Ontario executed the single most impactful 
emissions reduction regulation in North America by ending coal-fired electric-
ity production (OPA 2013). Ontario also expanded renewable energy produc-
tion through the 2009 Green Energy and Economy Act and reduced electricity 
consumption through efficiency and conservation policies. Ontario’s electricity 
system is now largely fossil fuel free with natural gas generators used only to 
meet peak demand. Liberal Premier Kathleen Wynne has been a strong pro-
ponent of the PCF, however, electricity prices have become an election issue in 
Ontario and the 2018 provincial election could significantly alter the politics 
of the PCF if the PCs were to win a majority government. Unlike most conser-
vative leaders in Canada, PC leader Patrick Brown says he believes the science 
of climate change and supports a carbon tax. Yet he says he will kill Ontario’s 
cap-and-trade carbon pricing system and it is unclear from the PC platform 
at the time of writing whether Brown would withdraw Ontario from the PCF 
(Hepburn 2017).
Québec has long had a strong societal and cross-partisan political consensus 
on the need to mitigate GHG emissions and grow a low-carbon economy. 
Liberal premier Philippe Couillard was a strong proponent of the PCF and 
the opposition Parti Québécois has committed to exceed the Liberal’s emis-
sion reduction commitments by 5 percentage points if elected in 2018. (Parti 
Québécois 2015). The Liberal’s 2013 Climate Change Action Plan and Climate 
Change Adaption Plan created a cap-and-trade carbon pricing system and 
committed the province to meet emissions reduction targets that matched that 
of the Kyoto Protocol, even though Harper had withdrawn Canada from the 
Protocol two years earlier (Curry and McCarthy 2011).
PRICING CARBON
Nowhere is the ideological schism between Canadian conservatives and their 
Liberal and NDP opponents in this policy domain more striking then on the 
issue of pricing carbon. Putting a price on carbon to account for negative 
externalities and to incent reduced consumption is a core SD principle. Of the 
fourteen contenders in the 2017 race to replace Harper as leader of the federal 
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Conservatives only one supported carbon pricing. The leadership race winner, 
Andrew Scheer, made only one substantive policy commitment in his victory 
speech and that was to kill Trudeau’s carbon price and to eliminate federal 
sales tax on heating fuel and natural gas for homeowners. The two provinces 
with conservative governments are the only ones refusing to price carbon and 
join the rest of Canada’s governments in the PCF.
In 2008, BC introduced the first climate policy to establish a carbon tax. The 
carbon tax started at $10 tonne CO2 in 2008 with a five-year scheduled rate 
increase of $5 per tonne CO2 until 2012. In 2013, the Clark government froze 
the price at $30 tonne CO2. All revenue collected has been refunded through 
corporate and personal income tax cuts and rural community tax credits. The 
new NDP government has committed to strengthening the BC carbon tax by 
$5 a year starting in 2018. This will ensure BC meets the federal price by 2022. 
To offset the price increase, the NDP will issue rebate cheques to low and 
middle income households.
A carbon tax is also the centerpiece of Alberta’s new framework, starting at 
$20/tonne of CO2 rising to $30/tonne in 2018. The Alberta carbon price model 
includes a direct tax on most transportation and heating fuels and emission 
intensity benchmarks for large industrial emitters, which taxes emissions from 
facilities that do not meet the province’s established benchmark. Over three 
years the tax is expected to raise $5.4 billion with Alberta rebating money 
directly to low and middle income Albertans and putting the rest into small 
business tax cuts, renewable energy production and other climate change miti-
gation projects. Alberta has phased in its carbon tax and is currently designing 
its pricing scheme for large industrial emitters.
In 2013, Québec became the first province to join the Western Climate Initia-
tive (WCI), establishing a cap-and-trade system that linked its carbon market 
with California. As of 2016, Québec firms in the electricity, industrial, trans-
portation, and building sectors with annual emissions greater than 25,000 
tonnes are mandated to participate in the cap-and-trade system (ICAP 2017). 
All revenues from the sale of emission permits are placed in Québec’s Green 
Fund, which is used to fund the province’s emissions reduction initiatives. 
From December 2013 to February 2017, the cap-and-trade system generated 
over $1.45 billion in revenues for the Green Fund (Québec 2017).
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Ontario plans to join Québec and California in the WCI in 2018 and held its 
first cap-and-trade auction in March 2017. The auction sold out all current 
emission allowances giving the new market a strong start while raising $472 
million. The second auction in June also sold out raising $504 million (Jones 
2017). The Liberal government hopes the quarterly auctions will bring in $1.8 
billion a year which will be invested in programs that reduce emissions and 
help businesses and consumers adapt to a low-carbon economy. At this early 
stage many large emitters receive allowances for free until 2020 to prevent 
them from moving to jurisdictions without carbon pricing.
In October 2016 the Trudeau government announced it would backstop pro-
vincial carbon pricing by introducing a national plan to ensure that all Cana-
dians would participate regardless of where they lived. Budget 2017 reiterated 
the federal pledge to provide a backup plan for those provinces leading with 
their own carbon levies. In a technical paper released in May 2017 the federal 
government proposed to give provinces three options for pricing carbon: 
legislate their own levy on emissions starting at $10 a tonne in 2018, legislate 
their own cap-and-trade system which can show it will produce equivalent cuts 
in emissions as a carbon tax, or use a hybrid model largely based on Alberta’s 
program (ECCC 2017a). The carbon levy will increase by $10 a year to $50 a 
tonne by the end of 2022. The federal levy will only apply to provinces which 
do not have a levy or have a levy that does not meet the federal baseline. If the 
federal government was required to impose its backstop levy, the province in 
which the levy is imposed would receive the revenues (McCarthy 2017).
DE-CARBONIZATION POLICIES
Tables 1and 2 present the key metrics on each province’s emissions, while 
Table 3 identifies the policy instruments being deployed in each province. This 
section outlines instruments currently deployed in each province and iden-
tifies federal programs and regulations designed to support these provincial 
initiatives.
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Table 2: Canada emissions profile summary by sector and province.
Table 3: Summary of federal and provincial clean energy program commitments
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From 1990-2005, BC’s emissions grew by 12 Mt but after 2005 fell slightly due 
to policies implemented under Campbell’s Climate Action Plan. Transportation 
and industry are responsible for 64% of BC’s total emissions, and will require 
substantial policy intervention if BC is to reduce emissions further. BC’s oil 
and gas sector accounts for 22% of emissions, and is expected to be the largest 
source of emissions growth due to expanding gas production (Morgan 2017d). 
BC is currently designing a methane emissions strategy for the oil and gas 
sector to reduce emissions by 45 percent below 2014 levels by 2025. The prov-
ince also has a carbon-neutral public sector commitment and has achieved 
carbon neutrality by emission reduction programs and investments of $51.4 
million in offset projects (British Columbia 2015). The May 2017 election 
outcome has kick-started a new NDP climate change strategy including a part-
nership with the Mayors’ Council on Regional Transportation and the federal 
government to improve transit and transportation infrastructure and increase 
energy efficiency in the buildings sector.
Alberta is responsible for 37 % of Canada’s total GHG emissions, despite 
having only 11.6 % of the population. The oilsands sector is responsible for 
50% of the province’s oil and gas sector emissions and 24% of the province’s 
total emissions. The oilsands sector was the fastest growing source of emis-
sions in Canada from 1990-2014, growing by 430% due to the rapid increase in 
bitumen extraction and upgrading. Alberta is redesigning its methane regu-
lations for the oil and gas sector to reduce methane emissions by 40-45% and 
placing a cap on oilsands emissions. Alberta has also implemented a carbon 
tax, a renewable energy procurement program, a province-wide energy effi-
ciency program, a coal phase-out plan, and is updating the design of its indus-
trial emissions reduction system. Approximately $500 million in funding from 
its carbon tax revenue was used to create Energy Efficiency Alberta which will 
introduce rebates for residential upgrades, appliance upgrades, business and 
institutional upgrades, and fund residential and commercial solar programs 
(Energy Efficiency Alberta 2017).
Alberta aims to generate 30% of its electricity by renewables by 2030. Due to 
its current reliance on coal for power generation, Alberta’s electricity sector 
is the province’s second highest source of emissions. The eighteen coal-fired 
power plants in the province account for roughly 62% of generation and 84% of 
total emissions from the sector.  In a very dramatic example of policy leading 
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to changes in corporate attitudes and practices, Alberta’s two largest electricity 
producers announced in May 2017 that they would convert their generating 
stations from coal to natural gas well before the NDP’s 2030 deadline. ATCO 
plans to convert from coal to gas by 2020 and TransAlta by 2022. ATCO also 
stated that it will increase renewable power generation in its portfolio to meet 
the NDP’s target of 30% renewable generation by 2030 (Morgan 2017a).
As Canada’s largest province by population and GDP, Ontario is critical to Can-
ada’s commitments to combat climate change. The electricity sector makes up 
just 3% of Ontario’s emissions after the coal phase out.  At 33%, transportation 
is Ontario’s largest emitting sector. Ontario’s Liberal Government, through 
its Climate Leadership Plan, has announced a comprehensive set of policies 
targeting the transportation and buildings sectors.  Ontario’s plan focuses on 
the electrification of transportation, investments in public transit, and the 
promotion of fuel switching. Ontario is investing in the diffusion of EV home 
charging stations while also investing in EV infrastructure to ensure there are 
connected highway corridors to support EV. In addition to the highway infra-
structure, new codes are being developed that will ensure that new houses are 
ready to support EV charging stations. EV rebates will encourage owners to 
replace older, higher emitting vehicles.
In addition to electrification, Ontario is developing a new fuel standard that 
will require a percentage of renewable fuel content in gasoline and a low 
carbon content standard for natural gas. The Green Commercial Vehicle 
Program and investments in low emission fueling stations are intended to 
increase the use of low carbon trucks and busses. Public transportation invest-
ments will expand regional rail service and develop infrastructure to promote 
cycling and walking. Ontario’s programs target government buildings, schools, 
hospitals and social housing for emission reduction retrofits through clean 
technology diffusion within buildings and strengthened appliance standards. 
Clean technology incentives to deploy low-carbon energy technologies in 
private homes, promote Near Net Zero Homes and expand the access to smart 
meter data to support clean energy programs will enhance energy efficiency. 
With these programs and the cap-and-trade system, Ontario is targeting a 
reduction in GHGs of 15% below 1990 levels by 2020 (Ontario 2016).
Transportation is Québec’s largest emitting sector, accounting for 39% of pro-
vincial emissions in 2015. As a result, Québec’s emissions reduction strategy 
170 How Ottawa Spends
deploys a single overriding policy direction: increased electrification. Québec’s 
2015 Transportation Electrification Action Plan (TEAP) targets for 2020 are 
to increase the number of EV in Québec to 100,000, reduce fuel consumption 
by 66 million litres, and create 5000 new jobs in the electrified transportation 
industry. TEAP is expected to reduce emissions by 150,000 tonnes annually 
through rebates for EV and charging units, investment in public charging 
infrastructure and research, development, and demonstration of technologies 
throughout the electrification industry’s supply chain, and EV sales require-
ments (Québec 2015).
Québec’s 2030 Energy Policy sets out energy efficiency and de-carbonization 
targets for industry. Funding is available to small and medium enterprises that 
face higher input and operating costs as a result of the cap-and-trade system. 
Québec’s industrial emissions reduction strategy will help firms convert their 
industrial processes and boiler technologies to more efficient options. By finan-
cially supporting these process conversion projects, the Québec government 
aims to reduce the sector’s use of petroleum products by 40% and eliminate 
the use of thermal coal in industrial processes by 2030 (Québec 2016). Qué-
bec’s electrification goals for transportation and industry are made possible by 
a decarbonized electricity sector which has the capacity to meet the increase 
in demand that will follow the deployment of these policies. A spokesperson 
for Hydro-Québec noted that the province could “easily... welcome a million 
electric vehicles without having to make any major investments in [the] infra-
structure or systems” (Dubinski 2016).
In their first two budgets the Trudeau Liberals allocated significant expendi-
tures to support provincial and territorial initiatives, including a $2 billion 
Low Carbon Economy Fund. Budget 2017 includes $9.2 billion in bilateral 
agreements to the provinces and territories over the next 11 years to support 
projects that reduce GHG, safely manage wastewater, help communities 
prepare for challenges that result from climate change, and help build cleaner, 
better-connected electricity systems. $11.4 billion over four years was allocated 
to accelerate the replacement of coal-fired electricity generation by 2030.  $3.4 
billion was allocated over three years to upgrade and improve public transit 
and $300 million over 11 years to launch a Smart Cities Challenge Fund.  An 
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additional $2.8 billion will be invested over the next 11 years through a series 
of national de-carbonization programs, including:
• $100 million to support next generation smart grid, storage and clean 
electricity technology demonstration projects.
• $200 million to support the deployment of emerging renewable energy 
technologies nearing commercialization.
• $220 million to reduce the reliance of rural and remote communities south 
of the 60th parallel on diesel fuel, and support the use of more sustainable, 
renewable power solutions.
• $120 million to deploy infrastructure for EV charging and natural gas and 
hydrogen refueling stations, as well as to support technology demonstra-
tion projects.
• $182 million to develop and implement new building codes to retrofit exist-
ing buildings and build new net-zero energy consumption buildings across 
Canada.
• $2 billion for a Disaster Mitigation and Adaptation Fund to support 
national, provincial and municipal infrastructure required to deal with the 
effects of a changing climate. (Canada 2017, 122)
The Budget reiterated Trudeau’s 2015 pledge to bring Canada into the inter-
national clean technology collaboration  “Mission Innovation” (Canada 2015)  
by doubling Canada’s 2014-15 baseline expenditures of $387 million for clean 
energy and clean technology research, development and demonstration by 
2020 and also by strengthening existing instruments deployed by Business 
Development Canada, Export Development Canada, and Sustainable Develop-
ment Technology Canada to support companies in the clean technology sector. 
A new Canada Infrastructure Bank is intended to invest $35 billion and lever-
age additional private sector and pension plan funds over 11 years to support 
“transformative projects such as public transit plans, transportation networks 
and electricity grid interconnections” (Canada 2017, 119). If even a significant 
portion of this spending is achieved it will be the largest allocation to clean 
growth and climate change in Canadian history.
172 How Ottawa Spends
Four departments are primarily responsible for implementing these plans. 
Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) leads energy efficiency and building 
standards programs and funds and conducts clean technology R&D programs 
through its Innovation and Energy Technology Sector – all priority areas of 
the Pan Canadian Framework. Budget 2017 provided NRCan $135.4 million 
for decarbonizing Canada’s transportation sector and developing a legislative 
framework for offshore renewable energy projects. The Budget also provided 
an additional $229 million to continue R&D activities in clean transportation 
areas; $200 million to support clean technology R&D in the natural resources 
sector; $67.5 million to renew energy efficiency programs (such as Energy Star 
for products, homes and buildings); and $13.5 million to reduce GHG emis-
sions from federal government operations.
These funding commitments build on energy innovation goals established in 
2016, which reoriented NRCan’s innovation priorities to include EV infrastruc-
ture and clean energy under its new Energy Innovation Program (EIP). Under 
Harper, NRCan’s support for energy innovation focused almost exclusively on 
hydrocarbons, with the department’s largest funding project being the large-
scale carbon capture and storage demonstration project at the Boundary Dam 
coal-fired power plant in Saskatchewan. Projects under the EIP now include: 
renewables, smart grid and storage systems; reducing diesel use by industrial 
operators in northern and remote communities; methane and volatile organic 
compounds emission reductions; reducing emissions in the building sector; 
and improved industrial efficiency. Specific projects that have received funding 
under these programs are still being rolled out; however, pivoting the depart-
ment’s innovation focus to include renewables, EV infrastructure, smart grid 
and storage systems, and the building sector represents an important policy 
shift for NRCan as Canada transitions to a low-carbon economy.
Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED) has developed 
the Automotive Supplier Innovation Program to develop and commercialize 
new products to improve fuel efficiency, develop better EV battery charging 
infrastructure, and design lighter weight engines to reduce vehicle weight 
and emissions. The Ministers of ISED and Transport Canada (TC) in May 
2017 announced an advisory panel “aimed at bringing more zero-emission 
vehicles to roads across the country” (Siekierska 2017).  Budget 2017 injected 
$400 million into Sustainable Development Technology Canada (SDTC), the 
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largest investment since its inception in 2001. Earlier in 2017 Canada and 
BC announced a partnership between SDTC and BC’s Clean Energy Fund to 
support the development of clean technologies in BC. With climate leadership 
plans in Alberta, Ontario and Québec all identifying opportunities to advance 
clean technology development, additional federal-provincial collaborations are 
likely. To strengthen demand for these emerging clean technologies, the federal 
government has committed a portion of federal departmental procurement for 
clean technology products. The departments will serve as first customers for 
new technologies and help companies gain credibility and a path to market. 
The program requires the National Research Council to evaluate the technolo-
gies and match them to host departments. In addition, the federal government 
has committed to improving access to existing programs and identifying 
“bottlenecks” that impede growth in key sectors like clean technology with 
the creation of Innovation Canada. Innovation Canada is intended to be a one 
stop shop for Canadian innovators that will simplify access to government 
programs.
Transport Canada’s ecoTechnology for Vehicles Program conducts laboratory 
and field testing on new and emerging advanced vehicle technologies for cars 
and trucks to help inform the development of regulations, codes and stan-
dards that will ensure these technologies are introduced in Canada in a timely 
manner. The Northern Transportation Adaption Initiative is a $4 million grant 
and contribution program to support territorial governments and not-for-
profit private sector R&D activities to develop resilient transportation infra-
structure and innovative technologies and practices. The Shore Power for Ports 
program provides shared cost funding for the deployment of marine shore 
power technology at Canadian ports. Shore power allows ships to plug into the 
local electrical grid to power the vessel instead of using their auxiliary diesel 
engines when docked.
The Trudeau government changed the name of its primary regulatory depart-
ment in the area to Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC). ECCC 
is rolling out new federal GHG regulations, in addition to the carbon levy, that 
will backstop provincial policies and drive emission reductions under the PCF. 
To date, ECCC has accelerated regulations to advance Canada’s coal phase-
out, strengthened emission standards for natural gas electricity plants, and is 
developing methane regulations for oil and gas production. It has proposed a 
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Clean Fuel Standard regulation to increase the use of lower carbon fuels and 
alternative energy technologies. The purpose of this suite of regulations is to 
prevent provincial backsliding on carbon mitigation and entrench long-term 
emission reductions in Canada.
On 15 June 2017 ECCC revealed the content of the $2 billion Low Carbon 
Economy Fund announced in the 2016 Budget. This fund is a critical part of 
the Pan-Canadian Framework as it provides finances to provincial and terri-
torial partners to help reduce emissions. $1.6 billion has been allocated to the 
Low Carbon Economy Leadership Fund which is available to the provinces 
and territories who have adopted the PCF, while a smaller $600 million Low 
Carbon Economy Challenge will be available to provincial and territorial agen-
cies, municipalities, Indigenous organizations, businesses and not-for-profit 
organizations in all provinces. Manitoba and Saskatchewan have been given 
until the end of 2017 to sign onto the PCF and access the funds available in 
the Leadership Fund. Each eligible province will receive a base of $30 million 
plus a per-capita share of up to $1 billion. If Saskatchewan and Manitoba do 
not sign on to the PCF their shares of the Leadership Fund (about $62 and 
$66 million respectively) will be transferred to the Challenge Fund where all 
provinces can apply for funding. ECCC Minister Catherine McKenna stated 
that “it is only fair” that the provinces that stepped up to help Canada meet its 
international commitments to reduce emissions get to share in the Leadership 
Fund (Rabson 2017).
EMERGING CHALLENGES TO THE NEW ERA OF ENERGY/
ENVIRONMENT FEDERALISM
In their first eighteen months in power the Trudeau Liberals revealed their 
vision of a Canada that is reducing domestic consumption of hydrocarbons 
and growing the low carbon economy while simultaneously developing oil and 
natural gas for export. While the PCF is steadfastly about reducing GHG emis-
sions and accelerating Canada’s transition to a low carbon economy,  Trudeau’s 
approval of the TMX expansion from Edmonton to Vancouver and the Pacific 
NorthWest LNG export terminal in Kitimat, support for the Keystone XL 
Pipeline project to carry bitumen to U.S. refineries, and continuing review 
of the Energy East bitumen export pipeline proposal from Alberta to New 
Brunswick, shows that the Liberals are also strong supporters of oil and gas 
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development. Speaking in Houston in March, 2017 Trudeau stated “No country 
would find 173 billion barrels of oil in the ground and just leave them there” 
(CBC 2017a). Some consider these dual goals to be a paradox that undermines 
his government’s efforts to help transition the world to a low carbon future.
However, critics who consider the Liberal’s approach problematic must 
remember that conservative governments in Canada have not accepted the 
science of climate change, instituted a serious price on carbon, or shown much 
interest in a low carbon growth trajectory (Selley 2017).  By any measure, the 
level of programmatic and financial support the Trudeau government has com-
mitted to the goals of the PCF is historic. The federal carbon levy backstop to 
support provinces’ carbon pricing regimes and the multitude of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation programs are without peer. Trudeau’s governance 
approach which engages provinces and territories as partners is refreshing 
after years of Harper playing provinces off against one another in the wedge 
politics game of friends and enemies.
Given the disappointing history of federal governments failing to deliver 
serious support to provinces attempting to reduce emissions and strengthen 
low carbon growth and other SD oriented goals, we asked in the introduction 
whether the Liberal’s approach and the provincial actions represents a new 
era of energy/environmental federalism.  It is relatively easy to answer the 
research question as yes.  The degree of intergovernmental coordination and 
cooperation represented by the PCF is an historic high for any period since 
climate change and carbon emission reduction ascended to the national policy 
agenda in the early1990s.
The question now is: can it be sustained? As argued in the introduction, parti-
san politics can intervene to change policy direction, especially now that there 
is no conservative equivalent to the Mulroney government that treated SD 
ideas seriously (Toner et al. 2016b).  Ontario and Alberta have elections in 2018 
and 2019 respectively. In Ontario, the Progressive Conservatives are leading 
in the polls in 2017 but have squandered pre-election leads before. While PC 
leader Patrick Brown is attempting to modernize his party by moving it closer 
to the middle of the political spectrum, it is still an open question whether 
Brown’s acceptance of the science of climate change and the importance of 
pricing carbon is genuine given his long service in the Harper government. A 
significant component of his voting base is clearly hostile to carbon pricing and 
176 How Ottawa Spends
other initiatives to reduce carbon consumption or drive low carbon economic 
growth, so if Brown is serious about pricing carbon this will likely result in 
significant tensions with his caucus and base. Alberta’s Wildrose and Progres-
sive Conservative parties are attempting to merge in order to consolidate the 
conservative vote and retake power from the NDP (Tait and Cryderman 2017). 
The defeat of the Ontario Liberals or the Alberta NDP by conservative parties 
could strip the PCF of two of its strongest proponents and be a major test 
to this new era of energy/environmental federalism. However, we cannot be 
certain that the current governments will be defeated or that even if they were 
that the new governments would automatically withdraw from the PCF. The 
national carbon price issue would be a major contention, but a critical consid-
eration is whether the federal spending programs launched from 2016-19 on 
green infrastructure, climate change resilient communities, clean technology 
development and the retrofitting of public and private buildings, for example, 
have developed a constituency of supporters in the provinces who rely on 
federal funds to strengthen the sustainability of the electricity, transportation, 
housing, and R&D sectors.  A constituency of supporters for such programs 
may make it difficult for a new provincial government to withdraw from the 
PCF. In other words, can carbon pricing and other regulatory initiatives and 
low carbon investment programs build staying power? (Bakx and Johnson 
2017).
The first six months of the Trump Administration has been a chaotic and a 
largely unprofessional operation. But Trump’s agenda to dramatically reduce 
corporate taxes and energy and environmental regulations does move in the 
opposite direction to the PCF. The loss of the Obama/Clinton continental 
ally on a low carbon growth trajectory was a setback for the PCF. It is hard to 
envision at the time of writing how much of Trump’s ultra-conservative agenda 
will be implemented before the mid-term congressional elections in 2018 when 
he could lose his legislative majority.  In June 2017, Trump formally withdrew 
the U.S. from the Paris Agreement. He did so in the face of major domestic and 
international pressure to keep America in. Indeed, his decision has prompted 
a response from a wide range of American stakeholders. “There’s been so 
much activity that it can be difficult to track all the new initiatives and groups. 
There’s the US Climate Alliance, representing 12 states and about a third of the 
US population. There’s We Are Still In, representing nine states, hundreds of 
cities, and thousands of businesses and institutions of higher learning. There’s 
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Climate Mayors, with 338 US mayors representing 65 million constituents” 
(Roberts 2017). This extraordinary collection of organizations represents over 
$6.2 trillion of the U.S. economy and is committed to meeting America’s Paris 
commitments. Anticipating Trump’s withdrawal, the Liberal government on 
23 May 2017 formed a climate leadership pact with China and the European 
Union to maintain momentum even after the U.S. pull out (Strauss and Parkin 
2017).  Still, the most conservative elements of the oil, gas and coal industries 
in Canada, and their sympathisers in the media and think tanks, have used the 
Trump agenda as an argument for stalling the PCF, arguing that it will make 
Canadian companies uncompetitive, despite evidence that major industry 
players are increasingly enthusiastic about transitioning toward a low carbon 
future (Morgan 2017b; Morgan 2017c; CBC 2017b).
CONCLUSION
We have underscored the close link between ideas, politics, and policy. Sus-
tainable development ideas were first integrated into Canadian policies and 
institutions in the early 1990s by the Mulroney and Chretien governments. It 
appeared that the Harper government had through a sweeping slate of leg-
islative changes in 2012- 2014 reversed the SD agenda and replaced it with a 
rapid resource development agenda. Politics, however, in the form of partisan 
electoral victories, re-opened the window of opportunity for a set of ideas that 
had been shuttled to the sidelines for a decade. The defeat of the Harper Con-
servatives by the Trudeau Liberals as well as election outcomes at the sub-na-
tional level significantly altered the “ideas in good currency” (Pal 2014) and SD 
ideas once again infused the federal and intergovernmental agenda.  If the new 
era of Canadian energy/environment federalism is to be sustained, the federal 
and provincial policies and programs inspired by the PCF’s sustainability ideas 
and process of intergovernmental collaboration will have to continue to show 
implementation results over 2017-2019.
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Chapter 14 
FINANCING THE PUBLIC 
PROVISION OF PRESCRIPTION 
DRUGS IN CANADA: 
COMPARISON AND ASSESSMENT 
OF FINANCING OPTIONS
By Marc-André Gagnon
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, pharmacare has emerged as an important part of policy discussions. Beyond issues of access, coverage and cost-containment, it is also important to think about financing options and mechanisms as part 
of that discussion. The public provision of pharmaceuticals is a key element of 
nearly all national healthcare systems. All OECD countries with a universal 
health care system include prescription drugs as a component of the publicly 
delivered essential health care services, except Canada. Although public cov-
erage for prescription drugs varies among OECD countries, they all deliver 
medicine in ways that are aimed to be accessible, equitable, efficient and 
sustainable.
To provide access to medicines for all, the public provision of pharmaceuti-
cals requires financial resources. Public drug coverage is normally financed 
through two different methods: general tax revenues or social insurance 
premiums (or payroll tax). Patient contributions (such as coinsurance, copay-
ments and deductibles) can also partly help support public drug coverage, but 
must be used with great caution in order not to create financial barriers to 
accessing essential medicines (Gagnon 2017).
In considering the possibility of implementing a national drug plan or any 
expansion in public drug coverage, it is important for Canada’s policymakers 
to analyze the different financing approaches that could be utilized, and the 
benefits and challenges associated with each type of financing. This chapter 
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aims to compare financing options for public prescription drug coverage while 
taking into account best practices among other OECD countries.
The analysis includes three sections. The first section provides a brief descrip-
tion of the different approaches that can be implemented to pay for drug 
therapies through public drug programs by analyzing how general revenues, 
social insurance premiums, and/or cost sharing (deductibles, copayments, and 
coinsurance) could act as viable financing methods. The second section pro-
vides a snapshot of the degree to which general revenues, premiums, and/or 
cost-sharing financing mechanisms are used in OECD countries, and describes 
in more detail the financing options used in selected OECD countries includ-
ing Australia, Finland, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, and Sweden. The third section includes an analysis and comparison 
of general revenues and social insurance premiums based on the criteria of 
accessibility, equity, efficiency and sustainability to examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of different financing methods.
From the start, it is clear there is no magic bullet when it comes to financing 
the public provision of pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, it must be taken into 
account that in OECD countries, the financing of prescription drugs is not 
independent from the financing of other public health care services. In each 
country, the design and financing of public health care services (including 
pharmaceuticals) follows specific institutional paths unique to the culture, 
institutions, and politics of each country (Boothe 2015). Analyzing best prac-
tices in other countries, however, can help Canadians find the most appropri-
ate way for them to finance their public drug coverage requirements.
SECTION 1: WAYS AND MEANS TO FINANCE THE PUBLIC 
PROVISION OF PHARMACEUTICALS
Public financing is first and foremost a system of accounting between payers 
and providers through different collection and redistribution mechanisms. 
In OECD countries, pharmaceuticals are normally publicly provided through 
different public insurance systems. Households obtain their drug therapies 
through four different ways of payment: public spending of the government, 
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social security funds1 , private insurance, or out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditures. 
These means of payment must also be funded one way or the other by house-
holds. Thus, it is possible to summarize the accounting principles behind the 
payment and delivery of pharmaceuticals in OECD countries mainly through 
four mechanisms.
1 - Households pay net taxes to governments that pay for prescription drugs 
through their general tax revenues.
2 - Households pay premiums (usually through payroll taxes) to social insur-
ance funds that pay for prescription drugs out of the premiums collected.
3 - Households pay premiums to private drug plans that pay for prescription 
drugs out of the premiums collected.
4 - Households pay OOP charges to access their prescriptions. While direct 
payment by individuals for the full cost of prescription drugs is not common, 
governments, social insurance funds, and private drug plans often implement 
cost-sharing mechanisms requiring co-payments, co-insurance or deductibles 
from individuals to access prescription drugs.
It is important to note, however, that access to prescribed medicines requires 
not only paying for the cost of pharmaceutical products, but also dispensing 
fees to pharmacists, mark-ups to pharmacies and wholesalers, taxes, and 
administration costs for public plans, social insurance funds, or private plans. 
Figure 1 synthesizes the financial flows between households and providers, 
and the ways and means involved in accessing prescription drugs.
1 According to OECD Statistics, social security funds are social insurance programs covering the community as 
a whole or large sections of the community that are imposed and controlled by a government unit. Social security 
funds are normally separately organized from the other activities of government units and hold their assets and 
liabilities separately from the latter; they are separate institutional units because they are autonomous funds (or 
at least they have some degree of autonomy), and engage in financial transactions on their own account. They 
generally involve compulsory contributions by employees, or employers, or both, and the terms on which benefits 
are paid to recipients are determined by a government unit.
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Figure 1
Drug financing approaches to access prescription drugs
Source: Adapted from Evans 2008
In OECD countries, we normally find three basic financing models for the 
public provision of health care services (including pharmaceuticals): public, 
social, and private. In order to better analyze and compare these models, it is 
important to define each basic financing model found in OECD countries.
1 Public health care systems funded through general tax revenues are one 
of the two main forms of public financing. Health care services are funded 
through taxation, and thus allow both income solidarity and risk solidarity, 
which means that the rich contribute to pay the services for the poor, and 
the healthy contribute to pay the services for the sick. The main OECD 
countries using general tax revenues to fund their health care systems are 
Australia, Canada (but our health care system excludes pharmaceuticals), 
Denmark, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
and the UK (Flood, Stabile and Tuohy 2008, 2). Finland also fits this cat-
egory for their health care system, but the financing of prescription drugs 
comes from a social security fund.
2 Social insurance systems can be diverse in their forms. They can be 
universal for all or fragmented based on types of employment.  Common 
features of social insurance systems could be described as follows: “social 
health insurance funding occurs when it is legally mandatory to obtain 
health insurance with a designated (statutory) third-party payer through 
contributions or premiums not related to risk that are kept separate from 
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other legally mandated taxes or contributions” (Normand and Busse 2002). 
Countries with social health insurance systems include Austria, Belgium, 
Czech and Slovak Republics, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland and Switzerland.
3 Private health insurance models are funded through voluntary contribu-
tions in a competitive market and administered by private for-profit or 
not-for-profit corporations. While private for-profit health insurance can 
be found in many countries to supplement public coverage, the coverage 
of the overall working population through the private for-profit insurance 
model exists only in the United States and in Canada (in the case of phar-
maceuticals). In the private health insurance model, governments can still 
play an important role. Governments can make private coverage manda-
tory (like in the case with the Affordable Care Act in the United States), 
and may regulate private commercial insurers to prevent risk-rating and 
cream-skimming (as they do in Australia and to some degree in the United 
States). Under systems of “managed competition”, like in the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Germany, Belgium or Israel, private not-for-profit insurers 
manage public drug coverage while potentially introducing the advantages 
of competition between providers. Under managed competition, heavily 
regulated insurers can collect premiums themselves, or a unique social 
insurance fund or general tax revenues can pay insurers based on a risk-ad-
justed capitation formula. As most systems of “managed competition” rely 
on social insurance funds, it is often associated with a form of social insur-
ance (Flood, Stabile and Tuohy 2008).
The design of public financing systems for health care services depends on 
well-established traditions and on the institutional path of different coun-
tries. Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguishes between three types of welfare 
states: liberal, social democratic and corporatist.2 Each type of welfare state 
has its own degree of de-commodification3 and unique outcomes in terms of 
social stratification. Liberal welfare states, mostly comprising Anglo-Saxon 
countries, often limit welfare programs to residual assistance, and are mostly 
2 This classification has stimulated a lot of literature in social policy in order to refine categories according to 
additional aspects of welfare states. Nevertheless, the original classification proposed by Esping-Andersen remains 
a useful tool in comparative social policy.
3 According to Esping-Andersen (1990: 21-22), “de-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter 
of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market”.
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designed to serve the needs of the labour market. Social democratic welfare 
states, mostly composed of the Scandinavian countries, offer a more generous 
social protection that “de-commodifies” social protection by reducing the 
dependency of citizens towards market income. Both liberal and social demo-
cratic welfare states normally finance their social protection through general 
tax revenues (Esping-Andersen 1990). Corporatist welfare states finance their 
social protection through social insurance schemes, which were developed 
to improve social protection while maintaining existing social stratification 
according to occupational status (Esping-Andersen 1990). The list of countries 
funding their health care systems through social health insurance has changed 
since the 1980s. Most Eastern European countries have turned to social health 
insurance, while Spain has shifted away from social insurance to general 
tax revenues. Germany, France and the Netherlands have also reduced their 
reliance on payroll contributions and social insurance premiums in favour of a 
broader financing base (Wagstaff 2010).
It is important to note that there is often overlap between social insurance 
and general tax revenues. The latter is often used to partially finance social 
security funds. Additionally, general tax revenues indirectly contribute to the 
financing of private insurance and OOP expenditures through tax subsidies 
and/or tax credits.
SECTION 2: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FINANCING OPTIONS 
USED IN OTHER OECD COUNTRIES
In all OECD countries, prescription drugs are financed by a mix of public 
and private spending. Sometimes complemented by private health insurance, 
tax-financed schemes or social security funds normally pay for the bulk of pre-
scription drug expenditures. In most countries, cost-sharing mechanisms also 
require patients to pay part of the cost of prescription drugs, although most 
countries provide specific exemptions or subsidies for vulnerable segments of 
the population, such as children, seniors, refugees, veterans, First Nations or 
patients with specific diseases. Public coverage of pharmaceuticals is not as 
developed as other inpatient and outpatient care. In 2013, across OECD coun-
tries, the public sector covered on average 79% of the costs of health services, 
while covering only 57% of the costs of pharmaceuticals, including drugs sold 
over-the-counter (OTC) (OECD 2015, 180).
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Comparing sources of financing for prescription drugs between countries 
requires tackling the complexities that comes with using the available data. In 
order to do so, this section disaggregates the international data to obtain the 
clearest portrait of the situation based on existing data, and analyzes seven 
different countries on the different approaches and technicalities that relate to 
drug financing.
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS: TRENDS AND CAVEATS
The OECD usually compares retail pharmaceuticals by the type of financing, 
distinguishing between private and public sources (see Figure 2). Note that 
medications used in hospitals are excluded from OECD data since most coun-
tries do not report expenditures for drugs financed through hospitals (OECD 
2008, 27). In 2013, medications delivered in hospitals represented an addi-
tional 9% over the value of retail pharmaceuticals in Canada and South Korea, 
10% in Germany and Australia, 27% in Spain and 44% in Portugal (Belloni et 
al. 2016, 14).
Figure 2
Expenditure on all retail pharmaceuticals by type of financing, 2013 or nearest 
year, %
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health-data-en.
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While Figure 2 offers a good general perspective for international compari-
sons, it is problematic due to discrepancies resulting from the exclusion of OTC 
drugs, the tax on pharmaceuticals in European countries, and the impact of 
confidential rebates offered by drug companies(OECD 2015).
Private OOP expenditures cannot simply be considered as the cost-sharing 
burden put on patients for prescription drugs because it includes OTC drugs. 
Although some plans partially cover OTC drugs, such coverage is rare and not 
substantial. On average, OTC drugs represent 19% of all drug expenditures. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that some countries might more easily accept 
the selling of OTC drugs as a cost-containment strategy for public drug cov-
erage. In such cases, a large proportion of OTC drugs can become a form of 
cost-sharing for patients. Poland has the highest proportion of expenditures on 
OTC drugs (52%) while Canada has the lowest proportion, at 9%.
The inclusion of taxes in pharmaceutical expenditures also affects the data and 
makes comparisons between countries problematic, as some countries include 
taxes and discounts for pharmaceutical products in their pharmaceutical 
expenditures. There are no taxes on pharmaceuticals in Canada, but among 
23 European countries, taxes represented on average 10% of prescription drug 
costs in 2013 (EFPIA 2015), making comparisons between Canada and Europe 
increasingly difficult, as the costs of prescription drugs are artificially inflated 
in countries where a tax applies. Finally, international comparisons of phar-
maceutical expenditures are sometimes blurred by confidential rebates offered 
by drug companies on brand-name products – such as product listing agree-
ments (PLAs) (see Morgan et al. 2013). The impact of PLAs on international 
comparisons is limited as most countries report their expenditures based on 
the overall budget spent, net of discounts and rebates; however, the accounting 
methods sometimes create a discrepancy between data of sales (which includes 
rebates), and data of expenditures (which exclude rebates). IMS Health esti-
mates that global off-invoice rebates and discounts represented approximately 
25% of global sales growth in recent years (IMS Institute for Healthcare Infor-
matics 2014). Because of its fragmented system and its reduced bargaining 
power, confidential rebates are likely lower in Canada (Gagnon 2014).
After noting these three significant caveats (proportion of OTC drugs, taxes 
and PLAs) and how they create noise in the data, it is now possible to turn to 
the international comparisons of financing sources for prescription drugs.
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Figure 3 presents the results in absolute terms (US$, PPP) for the OECD coun-
tries for which data are available. A more detailed synthesis and description of 
financing sources is offered in Table 1, based on information provided by the 
Commonwealth Fund, the OECD country profiles, and information provided 
by surveyed country members of the Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimburse-
ment Information network.
Figure 3
Per capita expenditures on Prescribed Drugs by Source of funding, 2013 or 
nearest year (US$, PPP)
* : Data from 2012
¶: Data from 2011
§: Include OTC and medical non-durables
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2015. OECD Health Statistics 2013; Paris 2014. 
doi.org/10.1787/health-data-en
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Table 1 Financing Approaches used in select OECD Countries
General Tax 
Revenue
Social  
Security 
Funds
Private 
Insurance
Cost-Sharing Other
Australia Y (72%) Ear-
marked income 
tax
N Marginal Cost per Rx depen-
dent on income. OOP 
capped for low-in-
come. Consumers 
pay full prices of 
non-listed medicines. 
(27%)
Marginal
Austria* N Y (86%) Marginal Fixed fee (12%) N
Belgium* N Y (76%) Marginal Co-insurance (24%) Marginal
Canada Y (39%) 
Provincial and 
Federal
Y (4%) 
RGAM in 
Quebec
Y (35%) Mix of deductibles, 
fixed fees and co-in-
surance depends on 
F/P/T public plan or 
private plan (22%)
N
Denmark Y  (61%) 
Earmarked 
income tax
N Y (9%) Fixed fee and co-in-
surance decreasing 
with higher OOP drug 
spending (30%)
N
Finland N Y (64%) Marginal Fixed fee and co-in-
surance (36%)
N
France Y (2%) Y (82%) Y (14%) Fixed fee and 
tiered co-insurance 
depending on thera-
peutic value (3%)
N
Germany Y (5%) Insur-
ance-extrane-
ous, mostly 
children
Y (80%) 
Employer/
Employee 
earmarked 
income and 
payroll tax)
Y (8%) Co-insurance with 
minimum and 
maximum co-pay, 
plus cost above 
reference price. Cap 
at 2% of household 
income. (7%)
Marginal
Hungary Y (3%) Y (38%) Y (5%) Fixed Fee, Co-insur-
ance (46%)
Y (8%) 
Occupational 
health
Netherlands Marginal Y (80%) 
Nominal 
Premiums 
by all 
+ risk/
income 
adjusted 
premiums 
by payroll 
taxes 
Y (1%) No cost-sharing for 
drugs below the 
reference price (19%, 
includes OTC)
N
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New Zealand Y (65%) Marginal Y (2%) Fixed fee per RX, No 
Cost-sharing after 20 
Rx Per year/family. 
Plus cost above 
reference price. 
(32%)
N
Poland Marginal Y (66%) N Fixed Fee, Co-insur-
ance (33%)
Marginal
Portugal Y (55%) N Y (2%) Co-insurance (43%) N
Spain Y (85%) Y (4%) N Co-insurance (11%) N
Sweden Y (68%) N N Deductible and co-in-
surance with annual 
cap. Patients pay full 
price of non-listed 
drugs (32%)
N
United States Y (40%) N Y (44%) Varies depending on 
coverage (17%)
N
Source: Commonwealth Fund 2016; Paris and Belloni 2013; Thomson and 
Mossialos 2010; Vogler, Habl and Voncia 2011.
Another limitation is that boundaries between categories are not always 
clearly defined. OECD countries rely on either general tax revenues or social 
security funds (SSF) to pay for prescription drugs. Some countries rely mainly 
on SSF, supplemented by general tax revenues to pay for specific non-working 
populations (e.g. children, veterans, prisoners or refugees). SSF are financed by 
contributions from employers and employees, but low-income enrollees often 
receive significant subsidies from the state through general tax revenues, blur-
ring the distinction between general tax revenues and SSF. Also, private health 
insurance often benefits from public tax subsidies or tax credits. In Canada, 
private drug coverage benefits from a 13% federal tax subsidy (Gagnon 2012), 
supplemented by unspecified provincial tax subsidies.
Finally, all countries providing universal health coverage include the public 
provision of prescription drugs, except Canada. In each country, public financ-
ing for prescription drugs is not independent from public financing for general 
health care services and products, with the exception of Finland, which 
created a SSF specifically for prescription drugs while the rest of the health 
care system is financed through general tax revenues. While Finland shows 
that it is possible to have an independent SSF to finance prescription drugs, 
the outcomes are far from ideal (see analysis below). Cost-sharing mechanisms 
implemented by public health plans are often implemented for all covered 
health care products and services, and are not specific to prescription drugs. 
192 How Ottawa Spends
However, many countries include additional cost-sharing mechanisms specifi-
cally for prescription drugs.
LEARNING FROM THE PUBLIC FINANCING OF PRESCRIPTION 
DRUGS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
To understand the public financing of prescription drugs, it is important to 
grasp each country’s overall logic regarding the public financing of health care 
coverage and the elements specific to prescription drugs. In order to do so, we 
detail here the public financing of prescription drugs in eight countries: Aus-
tralia, Finland, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom 
and Sweden.
AUSTRALIA
The public provision of pharmaceuticals in Australia is managed through 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), which subsidizes and reimburses 
pharmaceuticals approved for cost-effectiveness (Glover 2016).
Public financing of prescription drugs is done through general tax revenues by 
way of earmarked income tax. SSF and private insurance have no significant 
role.
Cost-sharing mechanisms are based on a system of deductibles depending on 
one’s level of earning with low-income earners paying lower deductibles with 
an annual cap. The general population has higher deductibles until they reach 
their cap, then they pay the low-income rate cap. When a drug is not listed on 
the PBS, consumers must pay the full price of the prescription drug.
Cost-sharing mechanisms in Australia are often considered to be very high 
as compared to other OECD countries, creating a significant financial burden 
on a large proportion of Australian households (Searles and al. 2013) and 
reducing the use of essential medicines by many Australians, which end up 
increasing the uptake of more intensive and expensive health services (Doran 
and Robert, 2009). The rate of cost-related non-adherence (rate of people not 
filling their prescription or skipping doses due to financial reasons) has signifi-
cantly decreased between 2010 and 2016 (from 12% to 6.3%) due to targeted 
assistance to low income patients, but it remains somewhat high as compared 
to comparable countries (See Appendix 1).
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FINLAND
Finland uses a hybrid system for financing health care services: a basic deliv-
ery system for hospital care and family physicians is financed through general 
tax revenues, while a special social insurance fund was set up to finance out-
patient pharmaceuticals. The social insurance plan is managed by the Social 
Insurance Institution (KELA), an independent agency created in 1937 and 
responsible for pensions (Mallory et al. 2011). Finland can be considered as a 
rare exception of a country that uses a hybrid system for financing health care 
services.
Finland is considered to have one of the least progressive financing systems for 
health care, due to weak risk-sharing of high-income individuals with individ-
uals of lower incomes (Mallory et al. 2011). Due to chronic deficits in the social 
insurance plan, the state has contributed since 1998 (Mallory et al. 2011), 
which forced the introduction of very high co-pay rates that have steadily 
increased over recent years.
In 2016, in order to be reimbursed for necessary prescription medicines, 
patients must pay a yearly deductible of US$ 57 (KELA 2016) and meet certain 
specifications regarding usage, amount purchased, and package size. Certain 
products have a reference-price system, meaning that if the patient wants a 
more expensive product than the cheapest available that meets specific ther-
apeutic categories the patient must pay the difference, plus the co-payment. 
The basic reimbursement rate is 40%, however some products may have a 
reimbursement rate of 65%, and others of 100%. If the yearly OOP expendi-
ture in prescriptions for an individual exceeds US$ 692, the exceeding part 
is reimbursed in full, except for a co-payment of US$ 2.83 for each additional 
purchase.
This dual approach of SSF and general tax revenues based on a sectoral 
approach for health care services has created what has been described as a 
logic of silo since there is evidence of cost-shifting where the two systems 
intersect (Jarvelin 2008). For example, since the funding of prescription drugs 
is different when taken in-hospital or in an out-patient setting, it creates an 
incentive for hospitals to release patients more quickly, requiring expensive 
medications in order for hospitals to save on the cost of drugs (Mossialos and 
Srivastava 2008, 84).
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FRANCE
The French health care system is a mix of public-private coverage with public 
expenditures administered by statutory health insurance. Less than two-
thirds of social insurance funds are financed through social insurance mech-
anisms, and more than a third of these social insurance funds are financed 
mostly through general tax revenues.
While the basic coverage is provided by social health insurance, French res-
idents normally face significant co-pays, leading to most French residents 
(95%) having complementary health insurance through employment-based, 
not-for-profit mutual associations, as well as by private for-profit insurers. 
Around 4% of the population has complementary public health insurance 
through means-tested vouchers for people with low-income (PPRI 2008).
Cost-sharing mechanisms for prescription drugs result in French residents 
paying a co-payment of US$ 0.60 for each prescription (up to an annual 
maximum of US$ 60), as well as a co-insurance rate that depends on the 
effectiveness of the drug, and the severity of the disease (Morgan et al. 2012). 
Rates of co-insurance are from 40% to 100%, based on therapeutic value, 
while highly effective drugs, like insulin, carry no co-insurance (Durand-Zale-
ski 2016).
Cost-sharing mechanisms are used to steer the use of prescription drugs 
towards treatments with high therapeutic value. However, because comple-
mentary private insurance often covers co-payments without discrimination, 
this steering effect is often defused, except in the rare case where private 
not-for-profit mutual associations provide complementary coverage respecting, 
and sometimes intensifying, the steering effect of tiered co-pays (Lechertier 
2013). In the end, OOP expenditures in France for prescription drugs are only 
3% of total costs (see Table 1).
NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands went through major health care reforms in 2006, moving 
from a system that relied on a mix of private insurance (for higher income 
households) and social insurance (for lower and middle income households), to 
a unitary system where everyone must purchase insurance from private “care 
insurers” (Jost 2008, 174). In order to promote universal coverage and avoid 
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adverse selection,4 the Netherlands has an individual mandate requiring each 
person to obtain health coverage from highly regulated care insurers. This 
new system is financed partly by an income-related contribution (a payroll 
tax), and partly by community rated-premiums (while premiums might vary 
from one insurer to the other, everyone with the same insurer pays the same 
premium, regardless of age and status). The Dutch government provides 
grants to help pay insurance for lower income households and residents under 
the age of 18. Care insurers are required to accept all applicants, and enrollees 
have the right to change their insurer each year. Contributions are collected 
centrally, and redistributed to insurers based on a risk-adjusted capitation 
formula to discourage competition between insurers based on risk selection5  
(Jost 2008, 175). However, despite the risk-equalization mechanisms in place, 
risk selection is always a reality, but the Dutch system does well on this issue 
as compared to other countries with mandatory social health insurance (van 
de Ven 2008).
With its mandatory coverage and risk equalization system, the Dutch system 
introduced a form of managed competition in which insurers are expected 
to engage in strategic purchasing with providers, while contracted providers 
are expected to compete on both quality and cost (Jost 2008, 175). . However, 
while private for profit insurers were allowed at first to bid as care insurers, 
the Netherlands imposed a ban on the distribution of profit (Commonwealth 
2016), which reduces the incentives for competition. The ban was renewed in 
February 2017 (Van Aarke 2017).  The Dutch “managed competition” resembles 
a tight oligopoly (a market with few sellers) since the four largest insurer con-
glomerates account for 90% of all enrollees (Wammes, Jeurissen and Westert 
2016).
In addition to statutory coverage through managed competition, 84% of the 
population purchases complementary insurance for extended health benefits, 
4 Adverse selection refers to the idea that individuals with higher risks will demand more insurance than 
individuals with low risks. By making insurance mandatory to all, adverse selection disappears.
5 Risk selection can be considered the opposite of adverse selection. Risk is selected when an insurer accepts to 
cover only individuals with low risks while excluding individuals with high risks. If risk selection is systematic, 
then low risks individuals usually end up covered by the same insurer and pay lower premiums, while high-risk 
individuals end up covered by other insurers and must pay higher premiums. Risk selection restrains risk pooling, 
and the result is that healthier and wealthier people end up contributing less to health care expenditures than 
poorer and sicker people.
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including the coverage of the full cost of co-payments for medicines (Wammes, 
Jeurissen and Westert 2016).
Patients normally have no co-payment or co-insurance for cost-effective drugs, 
except for rare types of medicines (like psychostimulants).  The national 
drug formulary is split into three sections, with reference pricing applying 
to 85% of drugs in section 1A (therapeutically interchangeable drugs subject 
to reference pricing) using tenders to reduce the price of interchangeable 
drugs. There are no co-payments for drugs under the reference price set for 
therapeutically interchangeable drugs in different therapeutic categories, but 
patients must pay the price difference if they choose a drug costing more than 
the reference price (Morgan et al. 2012). This mechanism allows the system 
to steer prescription drug use towards more cost-effective drugs without 
restraining access to medications or patient choice. The Netherlands has a 
low rate of cost-related non-adherence (CRNA) (see Appendix 1). One should 
note, however, that the additional voluntary health insurance covering the full 
cost of co-payments of medicines for 84% of the population could reduce the 
impact of this cost-sharing mechanism. Overall, considering that complemen-
tary private coverage for prescription drugs cover only 1% of total expenditures 
(see Figure 3), it seems that the Dutch drug coverage system is characterized 
by a cost-effective use of medicines.
NEW ZEALAND
The public health care system in New Zealand is financed through general 
tax revenues, which are not earmarked. Supplemental private coverage is also 
available, but represents only 2% of the financing for pharmaceuticals (see 
Table 1).
A flat co-payment of US$ 3.40 per item is required for prescription drugs, 
but after co-payments are made for 20 items per family per year, prescription 
drugs are free. There are also various means-tested subsidies for low-income 
people (Gauld 2016).  Just like in the Netherlands, all drugs covered by the 
national formulary, called the Pharmaceutical Schedule, do not have addi-
tional co-insurance for drugs under the reference price. If patients decide to 
buy drugs at higher prices than the reference price, they need to pay the differ-
ence OOP. Supplementary insurance schemes can cover co-payment charges 
(Morgan et al. 2012).
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Drug expenditure per capita in New Zealand remains the fourth lowest among 
OECD countries (see Figure 3) due to strategies to drive down pharmaceutical 
costs, such as the government’s set annual overall budget, which assists the 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency in charge of the public drug plan to 
use all available strategies to stay on budget and maximize value-for-money 
(Brougham, Metcalfe and McNee 2002).
UNITED KINGDOM (ENGLAND)
In England, prescription drugs are covered by the tax-financed National 
Health Service (NHS). The majority of the NHS financing comes from general 
tax revenues, with a small proportion coming from a payroll tax and some 
other minor sources. Public expenditure accounts for 83.3% of health care 
expenditure. Around 11% of the population benefits from supplemental private 
health insurance mostly provided by employers. Four private insurers account 
for 87.5% of the private insurance market (Thorlby and Arora 2016).
The NHS provides comprehensive drug coverage, but outpatient prescrip-
tion drugs are subject to a co-payment of US$ 11.60 per prescription. People 
exempt from co-payments on prescription drugs include children, people 60 
years or older, low-income people, pregnant women, young mothers who had 
a baby in the last 12 months, and people with cancer or with certain long-term 
conditions or disabilities. People requiring large amounts of prescription drugs 
can buy pre-payment certificates costing US$ 41.10 for 3 months or US$ 147 
for 12 months, and users do not incur further charges for the duration of the 
certificate, regardless of the amount of prescriptions they need. Because of all 
the exceptions and mechanisms, in 2013 90% of prescription drugs in England 
were dispensed free of charge (Thorlby and Arora 2016). The United Kingdom 
has the lowest rate of CRNA among surveyed OECD countries (see Appendix 
1) due to the fact that that Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland went further 
than England by simply abolishing co-payments for prescription drugs (Sinott 
et al. 2013).
SWEDEN
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The Swedish health care system provides universal coverage for most health 
care services, including pharmaceuticals, and is organized around three basic 
principles (Glenngard 2016):
1 Human dignity: All human beings have an equal entitlement to dignity and 
have the same rights regardless of their status in the community.
2 Need and solidarity: Those in greatest need take precedence in being 
treated.
3 Cost-effectiveness: When a choice has to be made, there should be a rea-
sonable balance between the costs and the benefits of health care, measur-
ing cost in relationship to improved health and quality of life.
The Swedish health care system is financed primarily through general tax rev-
enues. Financing is a shared responsibility between the central government, 
county councils and municipalities (Moïse and Docteur 2007). Private health 
insurance is available but accounts for less than 1% of health expenditures, 
and is insignificant for pharmaceutical expenditures (see Figure 3).
Because the Swedish health care system is designed to be socially responsible 
and equity-driven, everyone enjoys the same benefits. Ceilings on OOP apply 
to everyone and caps are not adjusted for income. Children, pregnant women, 
and seniors are generally exempted from user charges or granted subsidies for 
certain services like vaccination programs (Glenngard 2016). For prescription 
drugs, patients first pay an annual deductible of US$ 123, after which drug 
costs are subsidized at 50%, 75%, 90% and 100% based on the level of OOP 
expenditures. The maximum annual amount that a citizen will have to pay 
OOP is US$ 246 per year. Family with children must pay another maximum 
amount of US$ 246 per year to cover all children (Morgan et al. 2012). Patients 
must pay the full price when drugs are not listed on the National Drug Benefits 
Scheme (and are thus not reimbursed).
An interesting feature of the Swedish health care system when it comes to 
pharmaceuticals is that the state has a duty to provide the necessary drugs to 
its population based on the needs of the population. For this reason, Sweden 
established a public drug manufacturer, Apotek Produktion & Laboratorier 
AB, which is a branch of its public network of pharmacies, in order to protect 
the supply management of pharmaceuticals and to adapt prescriptions to spe-
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cific needs of the population through compounding pharmacies (Sjökvist Saers 
2014). This public manufacturer mostly produces generics and compounded 
medications, allowing for improved cost containment capacity, improved 
protections for Sweden against drug shortages and better adaptation of drugs 
to the specific needs of the population (Gagnon 2016). Apotek Produktion & 
Laboratorier AB has become a strategic asset in Sweden and has developed a 
great expertise for clinical trials for rare conditions. According to their annual 
reports, the company is now generating positive revenues for the Swedish 
government.
SECTION 3: ASSESSMENT OF FINANCING OPTIONS
This section compares the use of social insurance and tax revenues to finance 
public drug benefits and analyzes how cost-sharing mechanisms can also be 
used to contribute to the financing of a public drug program. Cost-sharing 
mechanisms are excluded since they cannot be considered as a form of financ-
ing in itself, but as complementary and limited financing mechanisms that 
need to be used with caution (Gagnon 2017).
COMPARISON BETWEEN SOCIAL INSURANCE AND GENERAL 
TAX REVENUES
The following comparison between social insurance (SI) and general tax rev-
enues (GTR) analyzes seven dimensions or criteria of the impact of financing 
sources on the health care system: equity, health care delivery and efficiency, 
macro-economic impact, sustainability, administration costs, public opinion 
and transition ease. The analysis is synthesized in Table 2.
EQUITY
Equity refers here to the equity of funding based on health and income risk 
sharing, which means that the rich contribute to pay the services for the poor, 
and the healthy contribute to pay the services for the sick. Progressivity in 
the financing of the program will lead to more equitable results. Progressivity 
depends on the design of SI or GTR. In the case of GTR, financing through 
consumption tax is certainly more regressive than income tax or corporate tax. 
However, some targeted consumption tax can be considered equitable, espe-
cially when targeted to harm-related products like tobacco and alcohol. France 
partially finances its health care system through such a tax, as well as taxes 
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on private voluntary health insurance and on the pharmaceutical industry 
(Durand-Zaleski 2016).
The design of SI can also make it a progressive financing system. Communi-
ty-rated premiums for SI (same amount for all enrollees with the same insur-
ers) can be regressive as compared to a payroll tax. For example, in the Neth-
erlands, the inequity of the community-rated premium is partly compensated 
with a risk equalization system using payroll tax (Jost 2008, 175). However, 
even an SI system totally funded by payroll tax will never be as progressive 
as GTR can be. Payroll tax can only tax wage earnings while GTR can tax all 
income, including interest, rent, and capital income (Gunderson and Hyatt 
2008). Finally, in systems with managed competition in which mechanisms 
are implemented to eliminate risk selection by insurers, it was observed that 
various forms of risk selection still existed; for example, by attracting healthy 
people through offering attractive supplementary health insurance over the 
basic insurance provided to all (van de Ven 2008).
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND EFFICIENCY
When it comes to health care financing, SI has been associated in the past 
with reduced waiting times (Jost 2008), while others have shown that this 
form of health care financing has no systematic relationship with efficiency 
(Glied 2008). Nowhere was it found in the literature that there is a correlation 
between the form of health care financing and the efficiency of the delivery of 
pharmaceuticals. The creation of an independent SI fund for pharmaceuticals 
can nevertheless bring a logic of silo into health care delivery, as in the case of 
Finland where cost-shifting has been observed when silos intersect (Mallory 
et al. 2011) when, for example, there is a different source of financing for drugs 
used in hospitals and in outpatient settings (Jarvelin 2008). This issue can be 
solved when the SI fund is not completely independent, and relies partly on 
infusion of GTR.
It was nevertheless observed that GTR normally has greater bargaining capac-
ities over powerful providers such as pharmaceutical companies, as compared 
to the fragmented SI fund (Jost 2008). In principle, the best bargaining capac-
ity against a monopolist supplier (brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturer) 
can be obtained only through a monopsonist purchaser (unique public drug 
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plan). A unique and mandatory SI system, however, is likely to achieve the 
same type of bargaining capacity as GTR.
MACRO-ECONOMIC IMPACT
The introduction of an SI system normally has a greater negative mac-
ro-economic impact than GTR. Financing a system only through payroll tax 
increases the cost of labour, which negatively impacts employment. SI is often 
considered a “tax on labour” and has a greater impact than GTR in terms of a 
disincentive for labour. However, if SI replaces existing private insurance, its 
effect would be limited or even be beneficial on employment (Flood, Stabile 
and Tuohy 2008, 253).
An important issue with SI is that a payroll tax is difficult to collect from the 
informal sector or for non-standard employment (Wagstaff 2010). If SI is 
mandatory only for full time workers and not to the entire working population, 
it creates incentives for employers to offer part-time jobs below the minimum 
threshold to reduce labour costs, or to outsource employment to self-employed 
contractors, or even to create jobs in the informal sector (Mintz and Tarasov 
2008, 72). The problem is not eliminated if we use community-rated premiums 
or if we put a ceiling on the payroll tax. In these cases, employers end up with 
an incentive to have their existing workforce work longer hours rather than 
hire new recruits (Gunderson and Hyatt 2008, 108). If the adverse effects of 
the introduction of an SI system are greatly reduced when it replaces existing 
private health benefits, GTR would still have a less adverse macro-economic 
impact.
SUSTAINABILITY
In theory, an earmarked payroll tax for an independent SI fund increases the 
willingness-to-pay for specific programs as compared to GTR (White 2008) 
and can also better protect the SI fund from political interference (Mintz 
and Tarasov 2008). However, in practice health care might be an important 
exception since there is a general consensus that it is acceptable to pay more 
for health care. This general consensus increases willingness-to-pay through 
GTR, especially if financing is organized through earmarked income tax or 
specific and earmarked consumption tax (Flood, Stabile, Tuohy 2008, 256).
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The financial sustainability of SI often requires a cash infusion from GTR, and 
SI funds are not completely immune to politics (Flood, Stabile, Tuohy 2008, 
264). The case of Germany shows that payroll tax is less financially stable than 
community-rated premiums, which implies a trade-off between equity and 
sustainability (Gress, Maas and Wasem 2008, 135). However, one can argue 
that it is more sustainable to rely on diversified sources of financing, including 
SI (Flood, Stabile, Tuohy 2008. 253).
GTR is normally associated with lesser overall health care expenditures than 
SI (Normand and Busse 2002). However, there is no clear evidence that this is 
also the case for pharmaceuticals.  GTR gives government greater control over 
costs, especially as compared to a SI system made of fragmented or semi-au-
tonomous funds (Jost 2008, 172). GTR can be said to be more sustainable as 
it avoids the logic of silos, and increases the degree of integration with other 
types of expenditures in times when considerations about health care expands 
to new frontiers, such as with the analysis of social determinants of health.
ADMINISTRATION COSTS
SI normally has higher administration costs than GTR, especially if SI is made 
up of multiple funds and uses exemptions for premiums or payroll tax (Henke 
and Schreyogg 2005). The difference is almost non-existent if SI is mandatory 
and universal for all workers. The economies of scale are the main drivers of 
reduced administration costs, not greater competition between insurers in a 
managed competition system (Wagstaff 2010).  In Canada, the four provinces6  
using payroll tax have low administration costs because the payroll tax is in 
fact collected through the income tax system (Gunderson and Hyatt 2008, 
101). However, the administration cost to collect payroll tax can remain high 
with non-standard employment or with the informal sector (or grey economy) 
(Wagstaff 2010). GTR remains the main benchmark for the lowest administra-
tion costs to finance health care services.
PUBLIC OPINION
As mentioned earlier, an earmarked payroll tax can create greater willing-
ness-to-pay, and thus could allow a smoother transition to a public phar-
macare plan in Canada. Considering that the Canadian population is already 
6 Quebec, Manitoba, Ontario, and Newfoundland/Labrador have payroll taxes that are labeled as health or 
education taxes, but are based on payroll.
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used to paying private premiums for their drug benefits, converting private 
premiums into social premiums could find little resistance, especially if 
employers can contribute to paying the SI contribution as they do for private 
premiums (Flood, Stabile and Tuohy 2008). Political expediency to please 
public opinion may be the only real reason to choose SI over GTR (Jost 2008). 
However, as mentioned earlier, earmarked income tax could create the same 
willingness-to-pay as a SI scheme.
A survey showed that a vast majority of Canadians supported financing a 
public drug plan using GTR through an increase of corporate tax, instead 
of an increase of consumption tax, income tax or the implementation of a 
health care premium (Angus Reid Institute 2015). When asked if universal 
pharmacare would be better for employers than the current system, 80% of 
private drug plan managers agreed, and 70% of those even supported the idea 
of implementing a specific fee to employers, like a payroll tax or an increase on 
the corporate income tax (Benefits Canada 2015).
An increase in corporate tax could be justified since financing pharmaceuticals 
through GTR would significantly reduce labour costs for enterprises currently 
providing drug benefits, and because Canada has among the lowest rates of 
corporate taxes in the world (KPMG 2016). Considering that many corpora-
tions offering health plans pay little or no corporate income tax, a payroll type 
tax or an increase in personal income tax could also be considered.
TRANSITION EASE
Overall, SI could be easier to implement in political terms if SI would replace 
the current system of private drug coverage. However, GTR would be easier 
to implement in terms of its macro-economic effect, its efficiency and lower 
administration costs. If a universal pharmacare system is considered, it might 
also require complementary institutions, for example to assess drugs, collect 
prescription data or influence prescribing habits (Morgan, Gagnon, Mintzes 
and Lexchin 2016). Financing such institutions would be ill-suited for SI funds 
and would be better done through GTR (Jost 2008, 177). Thus GTR could allow 
for the development of complementary institutions to obtain a well-performing 
public pharmaceutical system, instead of simply a system or group of systems 
to pay for drugs.
204 How Ottawa Spends
Table 2: Comparing Social Insurance and General Tax Revenues for the Financing 
of Pharmacare
Criteria Social Insurance (SI) General Tax Revenues (GTR)
Equity (Health 
and Income risk 
sharing)
Premiums can be regressive as com-
pared to payroll tax. Payroll tax is still 
less equitable than GTR because it does 
not tax revenues from capital income, 
interest or rent. Progressivity depends 
on design. Remnants of risk selection in 
systems based on managed competition.
Broader tax base. Progressivity depends 
on design. Financing through consump-
tion tax is regressive as compared to 
income tax or corporate tax.
Health care deliv-
ery and efficiency
SI for health care is associated with 
reduced waiting times but no significant 
differences observed for pharmaceuti-
cals. The creation of an independent SI 
fund can bring logic of silo in health care 
delivery.  Less of an issue if SI fund is 
not independent and can rely partly on 
infusion of GTR (which is normally the 
case).
Because of the monopsonist capacity of 
the State, GTR normally has greater bar-
gaining capacity over powerful providers 
such as pharmaceutical companies.
Macro-economic 
impact
SI can have a negative impact on employ-
ment by increasing labour cost. However, 
effect is limited (even beneficial) if SI 
replaces existing private insurance, but 
remains a problem for non-standard and 
precarious employment. If premiums 
are capped, it creates incentives for 
employers to make current employees 
work longer hours instead of hiring more 
people.  
Lower labour cost than SI.
Sustainability 
(political and 
actuarial)
Earmarked payroll tax for an inde-
pendent SI fund better protects from 
political interference. Normally greater 
willingness-to-pay with SI but unclear 
with health care for which there is good 
willingness-to-pay with GTR as well. 
SI normally requires infusion of GTR. 
Germany shows that premiums make the 
system more sustainable than a payroll 
tax. Might be more sustainable not to rely 
on only one financing source.
GTR normally is associated with lesser 
expenditures in health care (unclear for 
pharmaceuticals). GTR gives government 
greater control over costs, especially if 
SI is made of multiple semi-autonomous 
funds. Avoids silos and allows integration 
with other costs for health care or social 
determinants of health.
Administration 
Costs 
Normally higher administration costs as 
compared to GTR, especially if multiple 
funds and use of exemptions for pre-
miums. Difference less significant if SI 
is mandatory and universal, especially 
considering that, in Canada, existing 
SI programs collect payroll tax through 
income tax system. Administration costs 
can be higher because of non-standard 
employment.
Lower administration costs.
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Public Opinion Earmarking payroll creates greater 
willingness-to-pay. SI could be easier to 
accept for a population already used to 
paying private premiums, especially if 
employers can contribute to paying the 
public premium.
Earmarked income tax could create same 
willingness-to-pay as SI. Could be difficult 
to justify increase in consumption tax 
or income tax. Increase in corporate tax 
easier to justify since GTR would reduce 
labour cost for enterprises.
Transition Ease Overall, SI would be politically easier to 
implement.
Overall, GTR is easier to implement in 
terms of macro-economic effect and 
administration costs. Easier to finance 
complementary institutions as well, for 
example to collect Rx data or promote 
appropriate use.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of alternative financing systems for public drug coverage allows 
policymakers to make informed decisions.
Based on the available evidence, both SI and GTR can be highly effective in 
financing public drug coverage.  While SI could be politically easier to imple-
ment especially in countries with a SI tradition, GTR might provide more pos-
itive benefits as GTR performs somewhat better in terms of macro-economic 
impact, efficiency and administration costs.
In each country, the design and financing of public health care services 
(including pharmaceuticals) has followed specific institutional paths unique to 
the culture, institutions, and politics of each country. The SI path and the GTR 
path are both viable options, each with their benefits and their difficulties. 
While the SI path could be politically easier to implement by simply replac-
ing current private drug coverage offered by employers, it would create silos 
between a SSF for prescription drugs and the rest of the health care system 
funded through GTR. However, these silos could be defused if the SSF for pre-
scription drugs is partly (or wholly) funded through GTR. Another possibility 
could be to reorganize the financing of the whole Canadian health care system 
based on SI, which seems like an unlikely possibility. Financing public drug 
coverage through a corporate tax, however, seems to be the institutional route 
that would get the most popular support.
Finally, one should not overestimate the cost for financing public universal 
drug coverage in Canada, which more or less means shifting the cost of private 
drug coverage to the public budget. Taking into consideration that private drug 
coverage represents $10 billion in Canada, 13% of which is publicly financed 
through tax subsidies (Gagnon 2014); that 30% of private drug coverage is in 
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fact the private coverage of public employees (Morgan et al. 2015); and that the 
current fragmented drug coverage considerably restrains bargaining power 
to reduce the price of drugs in Canada, and makes Canadians pay the highest 
cost per capita on prescription drugs after the United States (Gagnon 2014), 
one can easily conclude that establishing universal pharmacare in Canada will 
be a win-win-win situation for households, employers, and governments.
Given the wealth of international experience in financing public drug coverage, 
Canada is well positioned to draw important lessons, specifically that either SI 
or GTR would be significantly more efficient and less costly than the current 
patchwork of public and private coverage.
Disclosure:
The author has received funding from Health Canada for this research.
Acknowledgements:
The author would like to thank Lisa Rylaarsdam for her editorial assistance.
REFERENCES
Angus Reid Institute. 2015. Prescription drug access and affordability; An issue for nearly a 
quarter of all Canadian households. Accessed May 2016. Http://angusreid.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/07/2015.07.09-Pharma.pdf
Belloni, A., D. Morgan, and V. Paris. 2016. “Pharmaceutical Expenditure And Policies: 
Past Trends And Future Challenges”. OECD Health Working Papers No. 87. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. Accessed May 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jm0q1f4cdq7-en
Benefits Canada. 2015. “Face to Face in Drug Plan Management - Research results 2015.”
Boothe, K. 2015. Ideas and the Pace of Change: National Pharmaceutical Insurance in 
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Brougham, M., S. Metcalfe and W. McNee. 2002. “Our Advice? Get a Budget!” Healthcare 
Papers 3 (1): 83-94.
Canadian Institute for Health Information. 2017. Commonwealth Fund Survey 2016. Ottawa: 
CIHI. Data tables available online. Accessed May 2017.  https://www.cihi.ca/sites/default/
files/document/cmwf2016-datatable-en-web.xlsx
Cohn, J. 2011. “Lessons from Abroad: The Dutch Health Care System.” The Commonwealth 
Fund Blog, October 11, 2011. http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2011/
oct/lessons-from-abroad
Commonwealth Fund. 2010. 2010 Commonwealth Fund International Health 
Policy Survey in Eleven Countries. Results available online on the Commonwealth 
207 How Ottawa Spends
Fund Database. Accessed May 2017. http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
interactives-and-data/international-survey-data/results?ind=416&ch=391#/barch
art/391/53,54,55,56,58,59,60,62,63,61,1/0/Ascending
Commonwealth Fund. 2016. 2015 International Profiles of Health Care Systems. Results 
available online on the Commonwealth Fund Database. Accessed May 2017. http://www.
commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2016/jan/international-profiles-2015
Doran, E. and J. Robertson. 2009. “Australia’s Pharmaceutical Cost Sharing Policy: Reducing 
Waste or Affordability?” Australian Health Review. Vol. 33(2): 231 – 240.
Durand-Zaleski, I. 2016. “The French Health Care System, 2015”. In Commonwealth Fund 
(2016). 2015 International Profiles of Health Care Systems. New York: The Commonwealth 
Fund: 59-68.
EFPIA. 2015. The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures; Key Data 2015. Brussels: European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry Associations.
Esping-Andersen, G.A. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Evans, R. 2008. “Reform, Re-Form, and Reaction in the Canadian Health Care System”. 
Health Law Journal (16 - Visions Special Edition): 265–286.
Flood, C. M., M. Stabile and C. Hugues Tuohy (eds). 2008. Exploring Social Insurance; Can 
a Dose of Europe Cure Canadian Health Care Finance. Kingston: School of Policy Studies 
McGill Queens’ University Press.
Gagnon, M-A. 2012. “Pharmacare and Federal Drug Expenditures: A Prescription for 
Change”. How Ottawa Spends 2012-2013 Vol. 33: 161-172.
Gagnon, M-A. 2014. Roadmap to a Rational Pharmacare Policy in Canada. Ottawa: Report of 
the Canadian Federation of Nurses’ Union.
Gagnon, M-A. 2016. Informations complémentaires quant au projet de loi 81; Loi visant 
à réduire le coût de certains médicaments couverts par le régime général d’assurance 
médicaments en permettant le recours à une procédure d’appel d’offres. Mémoire présenté à 
la Commission de la Santé et des Services Sociaux, Québec.
Gagnon, M-A. 2017. “The role and impact of cost-sharing mechanisms for prescription drug 
coverage”. CMAJ 189: E680-E681. doi:10.1503/cmaj.170169
Gauld, R. 2016. “The New Zealand Health Care System, 2015”.  In 2015 International Profiles 
of Health Care Systems. New York: The Commonwealth Fund: 123 - 131.
Glenngard, A. H. 2016. “The Swedish Health Care System, 2015”. In 2015 International 
Profiles of Health Care Systems. New York: The Commonwealth Fund: 153-160.
Glied, S. 2008. “Health Care Financing; Efficiency and Equity”. Working paper from National 
Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge: NBER, March 2008.
Glover, L. 2016. “The Australian Health Care System, 2015”. In 2015 International Profiles of 
Health Care Systems. New York: The Commonwealth Fund: 11-19.
208 How Ottawa Spends
Greb S., S. Maas and J. Wasem. 2008. “Social Insurance versus Tax Financing in Health 
Care: Reflections from Germany”. In Exploring Social Insurance: Can a Dose of Europe 
Cure Canadian Health Care Finance? edited by Colleen M. Flood, Mark Stabile, and Carolyn 
Hughes Tuohy, 116 - 138. Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series – School of Policy Studies.
Gunderson, M. and D. Hyatt. 2008. “Payroll-Tax Financed Health Insurance: A Way for the 
Future?” In Exploring Social Insurance: Can a Dose of Europe Cure Canadian Health Care 
Finance? edited by Colleen M. Flood, Mark Stabile, and Carolyn Hughes Tuoh, 91 - 114. 
Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series – School of Policy Studies.
Henke, K., and J. Schreyogg. 2005. Towards Sustainable Health Care Systems. Geneva: 
International Social Security Association.
IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics. 2014. 2014 Global Outlook for Medicines through 
2018. IMS Health.
Jarvelin, J. 2008. Health Care in Transition: Finland. European Observatory for Health 
Systems and Policies.
Jost, T.S. 2008. “Funding Health Care Services; The Optimal Balance”. In Exploring Social 
Insurance: Can a Dose of Europe Cure Canadian Health Care Finance? edited by Colleen M. 
Flood, Mark Stabile, and Carolyn Hughes Tuoh, 163-184. Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies 
Series – School of Policy Studies.
KELA. 2016. Reimbursement for Medicines Expenses. Accessed on June 20, 2016. http://
www.kela.fi/web/en/reimbursements-for-medicine-expences
KPMG. 2016.  Competitive Alternatives: KPMG’s Guide to International Business Location 
Costs. Accessed on June 20, 2016. https://www.competitivealternatives.com/reports/
compalt2016_report_vol1_en.pdf.
Lechertier, L. 2013. International Experience with Pharmacare : The French Drug 
Policy. Presentation for the Rethinking Drug Coverage in Canada; Is it time for Universal 
Pharmacare?  organized in Ottawa by Carleton University’s School of Public Policy and 
Administration and the Canadian Health Coalition, Ottawa, Ontario, May 25, 2013.
Mallory, C., A. Constant, A. Piercy, and J. Major. 2011. Research Synthesis on Health 
Financing Models: The Potential for Social Insurance in Canada. Ottawa: Canadian Health 
Services Research Foundation.
Mintz, J. and A. Tarasov. 2008. “Efficient and Fair Financing of the Canadian Health Care 
Insurance with Greater Reliance on the User-Pay Approach”. In Exploring Social Insurance: 
Can a Dose of Europe Cure Canadian Health Care Finance? edited by Colleen M. Flood, Mark 
Stabile, and Carolyn Hughes Tuoh, 59 - 89. Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series – School 
of Policy Studies.
Moïse, P. and É. Docteur. 2007. “Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Policies in 
Sweden”. OECD Working Papers No. 28. Accessed May 2016. doi.org/10.1787/135870415741
Morgan, S., P. A. Thomson, J. R. Daw, M. K. Friesen and A. Dijkstra. 2012. The 
Public Provision of Pharmaceuticals: A Synthesis of Policies in Ten Developed 
209 How Ottawa Spends
Countries. Pharmaceutical Policy Research Collaboration Report. University of 
British Columbia. Accessed May 2016. https://open.library.ubc.ca/cIRcle/collections/
ubccommunityandpartnerspublicati/47136/items/1.0048534
Morgan, S., J. R. Daw, and P. Thomson. 2013. “International Best Practices For Negotiating 
‘Reimbursement Contracts’ With Price Rebates From Pharmaceutical Companies”. Health 
Affairs 32 (4): 771-777.
Morgan, S. G., M. Law, J. R. Daw, L. Abraham, and D. Martin. 2015. “Estimated cost of 
universal public coverage of prescription drugs in Canada”. Canadian Medical Association 
Journal: 491 - 497. doi:10.1503/cmaj.141564.
Morgan, S., M-A. Gagnon, B. Mintzes, and J. Lexchin. 2016. “A Better Prescription: Advice 
for a National Strategy on Pharmaceutical Policy in Canada”. Healthcare Policy 12 (1): 18 - 36. 
doi:10.12927/hcpol.2016.24637.
Mossialos, E., A. Dixon, J. Figueras, and J. Kutzin. 2002. Funding Health Care: Options for 
Europe. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Mossialos, E., and D. Srivastava. 2008. Pharmaceuticals Policies in Finland; Challenges and 
Opportunities. Copenhagen: World Health Organization.
Normand, C. and R. Busse. 2002. “Social health insurance financing”, in E. Mossialos et al. 
(ed.): 59-79. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
OECD. 2008. “Pharmaceutical Pricing Policies in a Global Market”. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Accessed May 2016. http://www.oecd.org/els/pharmaceutical-pricing-policies-in-a-global-
market.htm
OECD. 2015. Health at a Glance 2015: OECD Indicators. Paris: OECD Publishing. Accessed 
May 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health_glance-2015-en.
Paris, V. 2014. “Health Benefit Plans in OECD Countries”. LAC webinar. Accessed on May 
2016.
Paris, V., and A. Belloni. 2013. “Value in Pharmaceutical Pricing”. OECD Health 
Working Papers No. 63. Paris: OECD Publishing. Accessed May 2016. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/5k43jc9v6knx-en
PPRI. 2008. France. Vienna: Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement 
Information. Accessed July 2017. http://whocc.goeg.at/Literaturliste/Dokumente/
CountryInformationReports/France_PPRI_2008.pdf
Saltman, R., R. Busse, and J. Figueras (eds). 2004. Social Health Insurance in Western 
Europe. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
Saltman, R. 2004. “Social Health Insurance in Perspective: The Challenge of Sustaining 
Stability”. In Social health insurance systems in western Europe, edited by R. Saltman, R. 
Busse,  and J. Figueras, 3-20. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press.
210 How Ottawa Spends
Searles, A., E. Doran, T. A. Faunce, and D. Henry. 2013. “The Affordability of Prescription 
Medicines in Australia: Are Copayments and Safety Net Thresholds Too High?” Australian 
Health Review Vol. 37: 32-40.
Sjökvist Saers, E. 2014. “Re-engineering the drug preparation; The Swedish Model.” 
Presentation to the 19th Congress of the European Association of Hospital Pharmacists. 
Barcelona, March 13, 2014. http://www.farmaactueel.nl/webcasts/extern/EAHP2014/
Inleiding.htm
Thomson, S. and E. Mossialos. 2010. “Primary Care and Prescription Drugs: Coverage, Cost-
Sharing, and Financial Protection in Six European Countries”. Issues in International Health 
Policy Vol. 82 (The Commonwealth Fund pub. 1384): 1 – 13.
Thorlby, R. and S. Arora. 2016. “The English Health Care System, 2015”. In Commonwealth 
Fund (2016). In 2015 International Profiles of Health Care Systems. New York: The 
Commonwealth Fund: 49-58.
211 How Ottawa Spends
CONTRIBUTORS
NATALIA BOLIARI is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics 
and Finance of Manhattan College, New York.
STEPHEN BROWN is Professor, School of Political Studies, University of 
Ottawa.
AMAN CHAHAL has an MA in Sustainable Energy Policy from Carleton 
University. She works at Sustainable Development Technology Canada where 
she manages clean technology projects.
DR. SENADA DELIC currently teaches Public Policy and Administration 
and Social Policy at the Arthur Kroeger College of Public Affairs at Carleton 
University.
MARC-ANDRÉ GAGNON is Associate Professor with Carleton University’s 
School of Public Policy and Administration. His current research focuses 
mainly on the political economy of the pharmaceutical sector and comparative 
regimes of health and drug coverage.
HELAINA GASPARD, Ph.D. is Director, Democratic Institutions, at the Insti-
tute of Fiscal Studies and Democracy (IFSD) at the University of Ottawa.
KATHERINE A. H. GRAHAM is Professor Emerita in the School of Public 
Policy and Administration at Carleton University.
ADITY DAS GUPTA is a Graduate student at the Johnson Shoyama Graduate 
School of Public Policy at the University of Saskatchewan.
ROBERT HARMSEN is Professor of Political Science at the University of 
Luxembourg.
ERICH HARTMANN is the Practice Lead for Intergovernmental Affairs at 
the Mowat Centre, located at the School of Public Policy & Governance at the 
University of Toronto.
MICHAEL HORVATH is a Graduate student at the Johnson Shoyama Gradu-
ate School of Public Policy at the University of Saskatchewan.
212 How Ottawa Spends
ZAK JACQUES has an MA in Sustainable Energy Policy from Carleton Univer-
sity. He works at Natural Resources Canada as a policy analyst.
GRAEME JOBE is a Graduate student at the Johnson Shoyama Graduate 
School of Public Policy at the University of Saskatchewan.
SARAH JUMA is a Graduate student at the Johnson Shoyama Graduate 
School of Public Policy at the University of Saskatchewan.
SAMUEL KANYORO KARBA is a Graduate student at the Johnson Shoyama 
Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Saskatchewan.
EVERT LINDQUIST is Professor of Public Administration and Acting Direc-
tor, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, and Editor, Cana-
dian Public Administration.
RICHARD LOCHEAD is a retired federal servant with an interest in pension 
issues.
ALLAN M. MASLOVE is Distinguished Research Professor (Emeritus) in the 
School of Public Policy and Administration at Carleton University.
JAMES A. MCALLISTER teaches in the School of Public Policy and Adminis-
tration at York University. His previous career was with the Ontario Ministry 
of Finance.
ALLAN MOSCOVITCH is Professor Emeritus at Carleton University from 
which he retired in 2015.
PETER WB PHILLIPS is the Director of the Centre for the Study of Science 
and Innovation Policy (CSIP), and a Distinguished Professor at the Johnson 
Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Saskatchewan.
MARC QUINTANEIRO has an MA in Sustainable Energy Policy from Carleton 
University. He works at Parks Canada as a policy analyst.
ACHINT RASTOGI is a Graduate student at the Johnson Shoyama Graduate 
School of Public Policy at the University of Saskatchewan.
ANDREW SETO is a Master of Arts Student in the Carleton School of Public 
Policy and Administration.
213 How Ottawa Spends
CHRISTOPHER STONEY is Associate Professor in the School of Public Policy 
and Administration, Carleton University and Director of the Centre for Urban 
Research and Education (CURE).
LIAM SWISS is Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Memorial 
University.
GLEN TONER is Professor in the School of Public Policy and Administration 
at Carleton University.
PAUL TRUJILLO JACOME is a Graduate student at the Johnson Shoyama 
Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Saskatchewan.
ALLAN TUPPER is a Professor of Political Science at the University of British 
Columbia.
